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NEWSPAPER REACTION

TO ISSUES OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY IN CANADA

by



ELIZABETH MCLEAN

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ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to find out if issues of domestic and foreign policy in Canada are treated differently by the press.

The domestic/foreign dichotomy has been well established in politics and in political science, and it has usually been assumed that the domestic and the foreign are qualitatively and quantitatively different and must be treated and studied separately. Little empirical research has been done to validate this assumption.

In recent times doubts have been voiced by political scientists regarding the analytical viability of the domestic/foreign dichotomy. James N. Rosenau is an American political scientist who was one of the first to point out that the domestic and the foreign often overlap. At the same time he insisted that the two areas be empirically investigated. Specifically, Rosenau suggested that domestic and foreign issues may precipitate different motives, roles and interaction sequences, among different political actors.

The political actor chosen for this study is the press as represented by three well established Canadian daily newspapers: the Toronto Globe and Mail, the Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press. Editorial reaction of these newspapers to one domestic issue: federal-provincial fiscal relations, and one foreign issue: Canada in NATO/NORAD, is investigated. The time period covered is 1957-67, which embraces the Conservative administration of John Diefenbaker and the Liberal administration of Lester B. Pearson.

According to Rosenau domestic issues cast members of the system in opposition to each other, They thus bring to the issues a multiplicity of affiliations and loyalties, which confound their goals and aspirations, and the resulting complexity curbs the intensity of their feelings. Not so with foreign issues, which are viewed in a simple "we" versus "they" dichotomy, with motives not confused by cross-cutting interests and therefore undiluted in intensity. The first two hypotheses therefore propose that 1) the domestic area is likely to stimulate a lower intensity of newspaper reaction towards issues and as a result newspapers will be less likely to take editorials stands on domestic than foreign issues, and 2) the domestic area is likely to stimulate a lower intensity of newspaper reaction towards the government's policy towards issues and as a result newspapers will be less likely to take editorial stands on the government's policy regarding domestic than foreign issues.

With respect to the competence of political involvement Rosenau claims that in the domestic area issues are immediate, familiar and amenable to influence, and thus make actors feel more capable and willing to get involved in their resolution. In the foreign area issues are distant and beyond the control and jurisdiction of national actors, who may feel less competent to deal with them. The third hypothesis thus proposes that newspapers are more likely to exhibit a competence of political involvement in the domestic area, and as a result their editorials will be more likely to offer suggestions or advice regarding the resolution of domestic than foreign issues.

Finally, with respect to the patterns of interaction through which issues are sustained or resolved Rosenau suggests that the resolution

of domestic issues depends on bargaining and coalition and therefore is likely to involve horizontal interaction (directed towards other national actors). Foreign issues, on the other hand, are likely to involve more vertical interaction (directed towards the government), because foreign policy is generally the responsibility of a few top officials in the government. The fourth hypothesis therefore proposes that the domestic area will produce a higher degree of horizontal interaction than the foreign area, which will produce a higher degree of vertical interaction. As a result domestic editorials will have more references to national actors taking part in the resolution of domestic issues, while foreign editorials will have more references to the Opposition Party or its Leader.

The results of this study fail to provide convincing support for any of the four hypotheses and indicate that there is no clear cut distinction in the manner in which domestic and foreign issues are treated editorially by Canadian newspapers. Political partisanship and parochialism emerge as the two most noticeable sources of newspaper motivation. The very unstable and competitive nature of Canadian federalism acts as an important intervening factor, as it forces the newspapers to rally around to the defence of their own province, to the detriment of other considerations. Further doubts are raised as to whether Rosenau's hypotheses, constructed out of his experience in the American political system, can be easily transplanted to Canada. Generally speaking, the study lends support to the current trend in political science which attempts to minimize the potency of the domestic/foreign dichotomy as an analytical tool for research.

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I spent two years in the Microfilm Department of the University of Alberta's Cameron Library reading and photocopying newspaper editorials. I am grateful to the staff of the Department for the courteous and efficient service they provide to students.

During the eight years I spent studying and teaching at the Department of Political Science of the University of Alberta I benefited from many acts of friendship and assistance of the Department and its staff.

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CHAPTER 1: THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the differentiation between domestic and foreign issues, as it is reflected in the editorial performance of Canadian daily newspapers.

Ever since the beginning of political science the domestic and the foreign have always been separated and studied individually. The unspoken assumption, which decreed this division, was that they were substantially different and could not be adequately investigated when lumped together. The concept which served as the criterion of the division was that of a national boundary. And thus, a course in Canadian Foreign Policy would concentrate on Canada's relation with political entities lying outside of her borders, while a course in Canadian Domestic Policy would focus on what went on inside Canada's borders. The fact that what went on inside Canada was related to and greatly dependent on what went on in the world at large, and conversely, that what Canada did internationally was often closely linked to what she was doing domestically, was not grasped at first.

In the last two decades or so, however, various analytical innovations in the field of political science, as well as systemic changes in the world, have resulted in a partial blurring of the domestic/foreign dichotomy. Indeed, some political scientists maintain that the dichotomy is no longer valid, for analytically it is too doubtful to serve as a tool for research purposes. Other view it with scepticism and demand empirical proof of its existence and potency. James N. Rosenau is an American political theoretician who claims that the domestic/foreign dichotomy does exist and that its parameters should be

empirically validated. As a contribution to the study of the two fields Rosenau postulates that the domestic and the foreign precipitate different and unique motives, roles and interaction sequences among different political actors.

The actor chosen as a subject of this thesis is the press, as exemplified by three major Canadian daily newspapers. The press has been chosen as a subject because it happens to be of special interest to the author, and because empirical studies of the press in Canada have been few and far between. John Porter, in his monumental study of the Canadian society, devoted one chapter to the mass media, especially from the point of view of the concentration of ownership. Sociological data about the people of the media are also scattered throughout the book.¹ John Meisel, in his studies of elections, devoted some space to the reactions of newspapers to the issues and parties which affected the elections.² The 1970 Senate Committee Report into the mass media contained a detailed questionnaire, administered to a random sample of Canadians, which evaluated popular perceptions of the role and function of the press in Canada.³ Finally, a group of researchers headed by R.B. Byers of Carleton University did a comprehensive study of editorial attitudes to NATO among nineteen Canadian daily newspapers in the period of 1960-67.⁴ Several shorter studies, published in article form, have also been done. This is not a substantial literature considering the fact that in a liberal democracy like Canada the press performs an important function. The media in general and the print media in particular occupy a unique position in our political system in that they act as a guardian of public good and a watchdog

over government policy. In its performance of these duties the press to some extent reflects public opinion but also influences and directs public opinion. It has at its disposal several powerful resources which enable it to have a considerable impact on policy making. For example, it can focus public and official attention on some issues but not others, provide information, serve as a two way communication link between the government and the public, and evaluate governmental performance with a claim to authoritativeness usually beyond the capacity of an individual citizen. The way in which the press treats domestic and foreign issues of public policy is, therefore, of some interest and may have far reaching implications.

This study should be seen then as an attempt to look at the theoretical problems of the domestic/foreign dichotomy, using the press as a testing ground. Of particular interest is whether the press sees and treats domestic issues differently from foreign issues. In brief, the thesis is an attempt to establish whether the domestic/foreign dichotomy can be empirically proven to exist on the editorial page of Canada's daily newspapers.

THE DOMESTIC AND THE FOREIGN

The differentiation between things domestic and things foreign was well established in politics for centuries--ever since the rise of the modern nation-state in the mid 1600's. Domestic policy came to be defined as having to do with political processes taking place within the boundaries of a nation state, while foreign policy was understood to deal with political processes, or interaction, between a nation state and the environment external to its boundaries. Thus, there was, from the very beginning, a conceptual difference between the two. In addition, history has supplied additional reasons for differentiating between the domestic and the foreign. In all liberal democracies, for example, foreign policy came under public supervision much later and more reluctantly than domestic policy. Long after various domestic policy issues came to be debated openly, in the press and in the legislative chambers, foreign policy issues were still clouded in secrecy and seldom openly dealt with. Since self-preservation has always been the primary objective of the state's foreign policy its imperatives mitigated against open public participation. These imperatives came to be understood mainly in the negative sense, as implying war, conquest, and various international intrigues. These, of necessity, had to be kept secret for they contained military plans, questions of war strategy and tactics, and the like. With the development, mostly in this century, of positive foreign affairs, which cover such areas as trade relations, cultural cooperation and tourism, there is less need for secrecy and more rationale for a full and public debate of these issues. In addition, U.S. President Wilson's insistence in 1917 to

have "open covenants openly arrived at" added further impetus to the process of democratization of the political/military part of foreign affairs.

Canada provides a good example for the disparity between the status of the domestic and the foreign affairs. Although the country had de facto shed its colonial status and assumed general responsibility for the conduct of her domestic affairs over 100 years ago, her foreign affairs continued to parallel and be conducted under the tutelage of the mother country. The British government had relinquished all important controls over local affairs in British North America before Confederation. Some measure of control was exercised through the office of the Governor General, who for decades thereafter retained powers to disallow provincial legislation, refuse prorogation or dissolution, make statements on public questions, dismiss a lieutenant governor or reject appointments suggested by the cabinet. In all these areas, however, the Governor General came gradually to accept the advice of his cabinet, so that by 1914 "the general effect...was to make the Canadian practice coincide with that of Great Britain and thus to emphasize the reality of Canadian autonomy in all aspects of its internal affairs."⁵

The Canadian assertion of sovereign control over foreign affairs came much later. At the time of Confederation Canada possessed the right to control her own tariffs and to send representatives abroad to discuss commercial relations. Gradually she also asserted her power over commercial agreements and treaties with foreign countries. However in the political, as distinguished from the commercial field, the

diplomatic unity of the empire was jealously guarded, so that at the beginning of this century "in formulating foreign policy the Dominions had virtually no share; and in the more vital matters of declaring war, making peace, appointing diplomatic agents and participating in major international gatherings, the Dominions had no share whatever."⁶ In August 1914 Canada was automatically at war when the British government declared war. It was only in the post war years that the Dominions began actively to struggle for more independence in the conduct of their foreign affairs to which the British government responded in a friendly fashion. And thus, the Imperial Conference of 1926 proclaimed that the Dominions "are autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs...."⁷ In 1931, the Statute of Westminster, in addition to removing certain remaining legal connections between the mother country and the Dominions in the domestic field, also proclaimed that "the Parliament of a Dominion has full powers to make laws having extra-territorial operations."⁸ As a result, Canada began to operate in international forums as a fully sovereign country, and in September 1939 declared war on Germany independently of, and a full week later than Great Britain. Thus, while Canadian domestic policy may be said to be only one hundred years old, independent Canadian foreign policy has been in operation for only about 40 years.

Such differences in domestic and foreign policy resulting from historical happenstances gave rise to premises that there were certain factors inherent in the nature of foreign policy that were not present in domestic policy, and that foreign policy had different roots and

different requirements of interest and support in the political system. Consequently, ever since the scientific study of public policy began over half a century ago, foreign policy has been treated as a field of specialization separate from domestic policy. Courses in foreign policy were offered separately from courses in domestic policy, using separate textbooks, for common sense dictated that the two areas of study were properly separate and different enough to warrant separate treatment. Many different assumptions were at the root of this intellectual differentiation. The most prominent of these was that foreign policy concerned and affected the national interest of a country as a whole and therefore touched on the most fundamental values of national integrity and survival, while domestic policy concerned and affected special interest and therefore secondary values. In this way foreign policy was seen as somehow more formidable than domestic policy, and as possibly evoking different political responses. It was further assumed that the process of foreign policy was somehow different from that of domestic policy making, and that institutions charged with foreign policy making may have functioned differently from those charged with domestic policy making.⁹ Very few of these assumptions have been empirically investigated.

Parallel to the assumptions about the uniqueness of foreign policy, arose similar assumptions about the differences in popular responses to, and interest in, foreign and domestic policy issues, as well as the differences concerning the role of the press in the two fields. For example, scholars have emphasized the supposed volatility of mass opinion with respect to foreign policy issues,¹⁰ and the lack of interest

in these issues on the part of an average citizen.¹¹ With respect to the press, one of the most common assumptions is that the chief market for foreign policy coverage in the United States is only a small opinion elite, and that therefore "newspapers do not emphasize foreign affairs because the people are not interested, and the people are not interested because they do not find much foreign news in their papers."¹² The Canadian experience may or may not be different, but it has not been investigated adequately.

Further in relation to the press, it has often been believed that the two basic assumptions of the democratic theory that "the people have a right to know" and that "the people know best" (which provide the rationale for the role of the press in the domestic field) do not apply with equal force in the foreign field. In foreign affairs people may not know best, and their right to know may be justifiably denied on the grounds of national security or public interest. James Reston summarized the dilemma this way:

The theory is that the people know best...that the intelligence, judgement and character of a majority of the people, if well informed, will probably produce more satisfactory solutions than any leader or small band of geniuses is likely to produce. This is undoubtedly sound doctrine for sinking a sewer or building a bridge or a school in a local community, but is this a practical way to conduct foreign policy? Are the people getting adequate information to enable them to reach sound judgements on what to do about South Asia, or the Atlantic, or the balance of payments, or China or outer space?¹³ Is there any such information and any such people?

The dictum that "the people have a right to know" is of similarly questionable validity when applied to foreign affairs, and has been violated many times, especially in times of war or international crisis,

when censorship was imposed or requested on voluntary basis in the name of greater national good. The war in Vietnam provided many examples of the American government withholding information, and in Canada even such a seemingly straightforward deal as the sale of nuclear reactors to foreign countries in the mid 1970's was surrounded by secrecy and intrigue. It is very easy for the government to use the excuse of greater national good for self-serving purposes of secrecy.

Finally, an active press involvement in a foreign issue has often been feared and discouraged, especially in a crisis situation, because the press has frequently adopted a partisan stand and insidiously moulded public opinion in a certain direction, thus constraining governmental options and policy choices. For example, in the 1890's, the American press conducted a vicious campaign against brutal Spanish authorities in Cuba. Although much of the press' criticism was undoubtedly justified, the overall assault did much to push the government into the war with Spain in 1898. Such examples illustrate the fact

...that press exaggerations or misrepresentations are especially mischievous in questions arising with foreign countries. Where the controversy is domestic, the citizens know more about it, and the activity of the opposing parties may be relied on to bring out the facts and provide answer to mendacious statements and fallacious arguments. This may not happen where a foreign country is concerned, whose case no political party nor any newspaper need feel bound to state and argue....Newspapers have in all countries done much to create ill feelings and bring war nearer.¹⁴

Of course the role of the American press in the war of Vietnam illustrates how the press can do just the opposite and bring war closer to an end - contrary to the designs of the government.

In recent years there has been less emphasis put on the domestic/

foreign dichotomy as doubts have arisen as to whether domestic and foreign policy are indeed genuinely distinctive and mutually exclusive areas of concern and study, each with a delineable boundary, distinguished by a genuine political dynamic peculiarly its own. The partial abandonment of the dichotomy did not come about as a result of empirical studies which proved this dichotomy to be untenable. It came about as a result of changes in the international political system, and as a result of analytical innovations in the field of political science.

For one thing, world conditions have changed rapidly in the past few decades, as the combined imperatives of nuclear defence, advanced technology and resource shortage greatly increased mutual interdependence of states. States now have to increasingly swap oil for military hardware and food products for manufactured goods, as no state is entirely self-sufficient and able to shrug off its foreign friends. As a result, states find it difficult to divorce their domestic affairs from the foreign ones, and vice versa. A good example in Canada is the production and export of grain. The method and size of production seems to be a purely domestic matter, but the amount and direction of its export becomes a matter of foreign policy. It is practically impossible to determine how much grain should be produced each year unless it is decided how much of it needs to be exported, to whom and at what price. Prime Minister Trudeau recently (February 1978) illustrated both the mutual interdependence of states and the close link between domestic and foreign policy when, following his expulsion of several Soviet diplomats accused of spying, he nevertheless insisted that normal and friendly Canadian-Soviet relations would be maintained because they need us as much as we need

them. Not even a spying scandal should be allowed to upset what has been a mutually beneficial relationship. The Soviet Union has been one of the more solid and consistent purchasers of Canadian grain and other products.

For another thing, analytical innovations in the field of political science, which came about partially as a result of the systemic changes and partially as a result of conceptual thinking, resulted in new theoretical developments which caused doubts to be voiced about the desirability of distinguishing between the domestic and the foreign. Scholars began to note that the dichotomy was analytically doubtful and often unnecessary. One suddenly heard such concepts as "penetrated political systems", "linkage politics", "domestic sources of foreign policy", "convergence of national and international systems", and the like, all of which called the attention of the student to the fact that the line between something domestic and something foreign was very fragile indeed.¹⁵

To further confuse the dichotomy, some political science theories use the concepts of "boundaries" and "external" and "internal", but in a different way from the traditional one, which made them co-existent with boundaries of national states. For example, in his communication theory Karl W. Deutsch defines boundaries "as marked discontinuities in the frequency of transactions and marked discontinuities in the frequency of responses...."¹⁶ which may not coincide with national boundaries and quite often transgress them.

The domestic/foreign dichotomy also loses its saliency when scholars abandon the state-centered, micropolitical approaches to the

study of international politics, which focus on foreign policies of individual states, and switch instead to the world society-centered macropolitical level of analysis, which attempts to address itself to such global problems as international trade and development, global resource supply and demand or the laws of the sea. This approach requires them to look at individual states as exhibiting common salient values and sharing common problems. The switch in perspective calls for the understanding of the political environment from the perspective of the global whole rather than from the vantage point of the smaller part, and in the process has far reaching implications for the foreign/domestic dichotomy:

To the extent that such a shift in the angle of vision takes place, the ancient distinctions of principle between foreign and domestic will fade and disappear, together with the rationale for the old tribal verities expressed in the terms "we" and "they". This shift away from traditional sight lines of international relations is the indispensable condition for a transition from the paramountcy of micropolitics to the paramountcy of macropolitics, to an international politics which in theory and practice recognizes that the parts can function satisfactorily only within a satisfactorily functioning whole.¹⁷

The switch from micropolitics to macropolitics came about as a result of the very realization that a state's fate is to a significant degree dependent on the international system in which it finds itself, and that many so called domestic problems have their parallels on the international arena:

The fundamental lesson of our age is that there is no qualitative difference between international and domestic politics. Indeed, and despite numerous arguments to the contrary, no such difference has ever existed. The root problems of the state - civil peace or civil war, civil liberty or civil oppression, civil wealth or civil property - find and always have found their precise counterparts in relations among states.¹⁸

These are then some of the modern academic developments which affect the traditional conceptual distinction between the domestic and the foreign policy. They undermine the long cherished assumptions about the qualitative differences between the domestic and the foreign, even though the differences remain empirically untested:

There is growing uncertainty among political scientists, in the United States at least, as to the validity of these assumptions. There is also considerable skepticism concerning the theoretical value of treating foreign policy process as analytically distinctive - a skepticism that will undoubtedly draw all the different public policy research fields closer together in the future. Nevertheless, the present state of our knowledge reflects, for better or worse, a set of beliefs about the uniqueness of foreign policy processes within the political order.¹⁹

The major shortcoming in the field, therefore, is the scarcity of systematic comparative studies on the differences between the domestic and the foreign area. As James Rosenau points out:

More importantly, regardless of whether the distinctions between the two areas are concrete or analytic, they are seldom identified, and even more rarely are their sources specified. One is hard pressed to even find a mere listing of the differences between the motives, roles and interaction sequences that foreign and domestic issues are, respectively, likely to activate. There is no consideration of the possibility that certain kinds of foreign and domestic issues may precipitate political processes more akin to each other than to the other foreign and domestic questions with which they are usually clustered. In short, foreign policy issues may not constitute an area with clear cut boundaries and distinguishable characteristics, but the reasons thereof have yet to be expounded.²⁰

The only way to replace speculation with evidence is to conduct empirical studies designed specifically to compare and contrast domestic and foreign issues. This thesis attempts to make a small contribution by discovering if one issue area of domestic policy involves different press reaction from one issue area of foreign policy.

Specifically, it will be investigated if the two issue areas generate different motivational intensity, motivational competence and different interaction sequences. The "old fashioned" method of distinguishing between the domestic and the foreign will, therefore, be preserved here, and it will be maintained that the two issues are qualitatively different.

THE DOMESTIC AND THE FOREIGN ACCORDING TO JAMES N. ROSENAU

The initial inspiration for this study comes from an article by James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area" in which he attempted to postulate some basic hypotheses with reference to the domestic/foreign dichotomy, and more specifically with reference to the differences in motives, roles and interaction sequences that domestic and foreign issue might generate.²¹ With respect to motivational intensity, for example, Rosenau claims that domestic and foreign issues are dissimilar because they are likely to stimulate different intensity of reactions:

For the citizenry, the former area /foreign policy/ is likely to generate motivation that is less complex and ambivalent, and therefore more clear-cut and intense, than in the domestic area. Foreign policy deals with events and circumstances outside the system...fellow system members thus come to be viewed as a "we" who are constantly endangered by a "them". Hence, proposals designs to ward off and manage "them" tap motives that are relatively unfettered by cross cutting interests and therefore remain undiluted in intensity. Domestic issues, on the other hand, cast members of the system in opposition to each other and their common system membership is...usually irrelevant as a motivational source. Instead, individuals bring a multiplicity of affiliations and loyalties to domestic issues. Goals thus become confounded by cross-cutting interests....Things are never as clear-cut as they are with respect to non-citizens. Motives offset each other; perhaps they even cancel each other out; and presumably the resulting complexity curbs the intensity of the feeling that is invested in domestic controversies.²²

The object of Rosenau's hypotheses are two identifiable groups of political actors, namely private citizens and groups, and government officials and organizations, who, he claims, might respond differently to domestic and foreign issues: private actors in the manner outlined above, while officialdom with equally low intensity to both types of issues, because officials are conditioned to approach every type of

issue in a similarly casual way. The object of this study is the press, an identifiable group of private actors acting in a professional capacity. Its reactions to one domestic and one foreign issue area will be investigated in order to find out whether the press, in terms of motivational intensity, reacts to domestic and foreign issues differently, as Rosenau alleges private citizens and groups do, or more like government officials and organizations, coolly and casually regardless of the type of issue at hand.

Another hypothesis posed by Rosenau, and falling within the general area of motivation, has to do with the degree and competence for political involvement in foreign and domestic issues, on grounds of the dissimilar levels of competence that the involvement requires:

The very fact that citizens are subject to the laws of their system also entitles them - at least theoretically - to help shape or change its legal arrangements and political balances. On the other hand, events or situations...in somebody else's system clearly lie beyond their control and jurisdiction. Consequently it seems reasonable to presume that most citizens bring to domestic issues a much greater sense of what Almond and Verba call 'subjective competence' than they bring to foreign issues. That is they feel more capable of influencing the outcome of disputes in the former area than in the latter. In turn this difference in subjective competence is likely to lead most citizens to participate more extensively in domestic political processes than in these through which foreign policy is developed.²³

Consequently, Rosenau claims that there is more public debate on domestic than foreign issues, and the people are likely to delegate to the executive more discretion to make foreign policy which they will then readily support, than to make domestic policy on which they expect to be extensively consulted and may not readily support. This claim will be tested with respect to the press, i.e. whether the press

displays a different level of competence in dealing with a domestic and a foreign issue area.

In addition to motivational differences, Rosenau asks whether there are any differences between domestic and foreign areas in terms of patterns of interactions through which issues in them are sustained or resolved. The question can be posed with respect to the degree of interaction among the parties to an issue as well as to the direction of interaction, i.e. the intensity of interaction generated by domestic and foreign issues, and the extent to which interaction unfolds vertically through hierarchical channels or horizontally among relatively equal actors. Rosenau claims that foreign policy calls for decisive and unified action and therefore all political systems concentrate the responsibility in the hands of a relatively few top officials. As a result, both for private citizens and groups as well as government officials and agencies, foreign issues involve a low degree of vertically directed interaction.

...foreign policy issues focus primarily on resources or relationships that are to be distributed or rearranged in the /foreign/ environment, whereas domestic issues involve mainly distribution and rearrangement among members of the system. Members of the system do not run the risk of forfeiting or relinquishing any possessions when they participate in a foreign policy controversy. ...Foreign policy controversies, in short, do not require the participants to threat each other as rivals for scarce resources....Each participant seeks to persuade the decision making authority to adopt a particular solution, but none posits a solution which necessitates depriving other system members of some of their possessions or privileges. Thus, since there is nothing material to bargain over, the parties to the issue need never come together or respond to each other. Each can contest the issue independently and without regard to the other.

This is not so with domestic issues, whose solution depends on bargaining

and coalition and is more likely to involve high degrees of horizontal interaction:

Domestic issues...unfold under conditions of scarce resources....What one actor or group gains, another gives up or fails to gain. There are only so many tax dollars that can be raised and only so many ways to spend them.... Similarly, statuses have historical roots within the system and to change is to deprive some of privilege and to provide it to others. Necessarily, parties to a domestic issue must view each other as rivals, as obstacles that must be confronted, refuted, thwarted, or accommodated in such a way as to permit satisfactory resolution of the issue. They must interact, if not on a face-to-face basis, then through actions that are explicitly in response to each other.²⁵

Again these claims will be applied to the performance of the press to see to what extent it being a private group addresses itself vertically, i.e. to the federal government, and to what extent it addresses itself horizontally, i.e. to the other private individuals or groups also taking part in the debate of the issue.

James Rosenau is an American, brought up and educated in the American political culture, and much of his reasoning concerning the dichotomy between the domestic and the foreign policy reflects American notions of political reality. Whether or not the same situation obtains in Canada is difficult to assess. There exist important differences between the two countries: Canada being a parliamentary and not a presidential democracy, a middle and not a great power, a young rather than a well established political culture, it may be that these differences make up for differences in which the domestic/foreign dichotomy in the United States is unlike the domestic/foreign dichotomy in Canada. Factors influencing the conduct of domestic and foreign policy also change constantly, including pressures of the external environment,

of the domestic environment, as well as of the organizational environment in which decision makers function. A Canadian political scientist Denis Stairs claims, for example, that since the early 1960's we have witnessed in Canada a considerable increase in the scale and intensity of demands placed upon our foreign policy-makers as well as a proliferation of the channels through which these demands are expressed.²⁶

Stairs provides examples such as: (a) the creation in 1963 of the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence, which in 1966 was to become a standing committee, (b) the establishment in Ottawa in 1968 of the Parliamentary Center for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and (c) the expansion, in the late 1960's, of the activities of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, as well as the expansion of university facilities for the study of foreign affairs and the corresponding growth of the relevant literature written by Canadians about Canada. Canadian foreign policy makers now face a variety of pressures and demands, and the Canadian public has acquired a number of avenues through which to express its foreign policy concerns and aspirations. Whether these developments have appreciably altered the environment in which Canadian foreign policy-makers function, and whether similar development may be said to have occurred in the United States is difficult to assess. Stairs himself, in spite of his argument, seems to be aware that foreign policy making remains somewhat different from domestic policy making, when he stresses that in terms of public debate the making of foreign policy is "confined for the most part to the attentive few...",²⁷ that "questions of foreign policy do not have a high priority among the preoccupations of electors"²⁸ and that as a result

foreign policy-makers "need in most cases have no serious fear of electoral punishment."²⁹ It seems therefore, that Stairs would have little quarrel with Rosenau's assumptions, and there is no reason why hypotheses constructed by an American and based on the experiences of the American political culture could not be applied to and tested in the Canadian political culture. Thus Rosenau's reasoning has been adapted in this thesis and has been used for the construction of hypotheses, which can now be restated as follows:

THE HYPOTHESES

1. The domestic area is likely to stimulate a lower intensity of newspaper reaction toward issues than the foreign area.
2. The domestic area is likely to stimulate a lower intensity of newspaper reaction to the government's policy toward issues than the foreign area.
3. Newspapers are more likely to exhibit a competence of political involvement in the domestic than the foreign area.
4. The domestic area will involve a higher degree of horizontal interaction than the foreign area, which is likely to involve a higher degree of vertical interaction.

FOOTNOTES

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5. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, Fifth edition revised by Norman Ward, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 44
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7. Ibid., 49.
8. For text of the Statute, see Ibid., 540.
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10. See for example, Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed. (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 1961).
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13. James Reston, "The Press, The President and Foreign Policy," in Charles S. Steinberg, ed., Mass Media and Communication (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1971), 405-406.
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16. Karl Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 3.
17. Richard W. Sterling, Macropolitics, International Relations in a Global Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), 331.
18. Ibid., 330.
19. Bernard C. Cohen, "Foreign Policy," 530.
20. James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue-Area," in The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1971), 411.
21. Ibid., 411.
22. Ibid., 414.
23. Ibid., 418.
24. Ibid., 434.
25. Ibid., 430.
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27. Ibid., 233.
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

THE CONTENT ANALYSIS

The research design chosen to test the hypotheses has been inspired by, and will resemble, the method of content analysis. Content analysis has become an accepted method of analyzing the nature, meaning and process of spoken or written communications.¹ It calls, in its empirical dimension, for an organized assembling of communications and the construction of categories which will permit a classification of data on the basis of selected concepts with respect to both the intensity and frequency of occurrence of variables represented by each category. The techniques of content analysis are diverse, but basically the method consists of devising a system of code designations made up either of numerals, or symbols or names of categories, which are used to evaluate the data under study. For instance, the World Event Interaction Survey at the University of Southern California, which systematically collects body of evidence about the international interactions of states, employs such coding categories as: Yield (yield position, admit wrong doing), Consult (meet with, receive visit), Promise (promise policy/material support), Agree, Protest, Threaten, etc.² The code designations are taken as manifestations or indicants or certain types of orientations, actions or characteristics on the part of the object of the study. In this way, recorded communications are combed for the presence or absence of the code designations and are classified in terms of a given property. Each communication unit is coded separately, and then all the coded units are recombined to provide the composite picture, which gives the total profile of the entire communication as

a whole. The simplest form of combining is the frequency count, whereby the researcher simply counts the number of units in each coding category or the frequency with which certain categories are present, to determine how pervasive these categories are in the communications under study. Alternatively, depending on the type and purpose of the study and the size of the sample used, more sophisticated statistical procedures can be used, such as factor analysis, Guttman Scaling, etc., to uncover patterning among the different codes, and other not easily visible dimensions of the data. The results are then interpreted i.e. inferences are drawn from the frequency and distribution of the codes in the data. Although the main objective of content analysis is exploratory and thus the study is more likely to be deductive than inductive, certain basic hypotheses are formed by the researcher prior to the study, if only in the process of constructing valid and relevant coding categories. Thus, the interpretation consists mostly of assessing to what extent prior hypotheses have been confirmed, and also of uncovering latent relationships which had not been anticipated and were not immediately apparent.

Any recorded communications, be they letters, memoirs, documents and anything published in the press, lend themselves easily to the technique of content analysis. The technique has been used to investigate social and cultural changes in Western Europe over a long period of time,³ to study psychiatric data obtained from interviewing patients,⁴ and to examine motives, attitudes and psychological states of historical persons such as president Woodrow Wilson.⁵ In the field of political science, H.D. Lasswell and A. George did separate content studies

of war time propaganda,⁶ R. L. Merritt searched the colonial press for symbols of 'America' and discovered a relationship between the frequency of the use of the symbols and the outbreak of the war of independence against the British,⁷ and O.R. Holsti analyzed statements of decision-makers in the crisis of 1914 to discover their perceptual pre-occupations.⁸ In addition, several quantitative studies of the press have also been undertaken.⁹ This thesis employs a simple form of content analysis, namely the coding of several hundred newspaper editorials according to several coding categories, chosen to denote observable presence or absence of certain themes and attitudes postulated by Rosenau.

CODING, DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS

All editorials gathered from three Canadian daily newspapers, domestic as well as foreign, have been coded for the presence or the absence of the following coding categories:

1. Presence of an editorial judgment or stand on the issue.
 1. In favor/Approbative
 2. Split/Ambivalent
 3. Against/Critical of
 4. No stand
2. Presence of an editorial judgment or stand on the federal government/Prime Minister's policy towards the issue.
 1. In favor/Approbative
 2. Split/Ambivalent
 3. Against/Critical of
 4. No stand
3. Nature of the editorial discussion.
 1. Presence of an independent editorial suggestion/advice.
 2. Absence of an independent editorial suggestion/advice.
4. Reference to the opinions/actions of the federal Opposition Party/Leader.
 1. In favour/Approbative
 2. Split/Ambivalent
 3. Against/Critical of
 4. No reference
5. Reference to the opinions/actions of other national actors.
 1. In favour/Approbative
 2. Split/Ambivalent
 3. Against/Critical of
 4. No reference

The first two coding categories have been chosen to denote the motivational intensity of newspaper editorials, on the assumption that if a newspaper makes a judgement of or takes a stand on an issue, or the government's policy towards that issue, i.e. it expresses a value

judgment on the issue or the policy by forming an opinion about its merits or shortcomings, then it indicates its willingness to become committed to the solution of the issue one way or another. The overall number of editorials printed will be considered an additional indicator of motivational intensity because a decision to print an editorial also indicates a commitment. The third coding category has been chosen to denote the motivational competence of newspaper editorials, on the assumption that if a newspaper feels bold enough to offer its own suggestion on how the issue should be resolved, then it must feel competent about its familiarity with the issue and its ability to offer helpful advice. The last two coding categories have been chosen to denote the actor orientation of newspaper editorials, and show whose views and opinions, apart from those of the government, are likely to be used in editorials, and thus to suggest whether issues are being resolved horizontally or vertically.

In addition to coding the editorials for the presence or the absence of the categories, the type of stand or reference has also been noted, that is if it was basically approbative, ambivalent or critical. It is hoped that this extra information will help to explain why newspapers take certain stands but not others, or make references to some actors but ignore other actors. This procedure constitutes a departure from the conventional form of content analysis, which usually pays no attention to the socio-political environment of the communications under study, but concentrates exclusively on the search for the presence of the code designations used. Such abstract procedures are possible when undertaking large scale content analysis studies, using

several thousand editorials or multiple sets of documents. The volume of the study and the size of sample then allow the researchers to make use of their data to measure their concepts, i.e. to classify them in terms of a given property. This study has a more modest ambition, first because it is a one-person and not a group effort, and second because the volume of data is of necessity smaller - 404 editorials. Consequently, the coding categories are not so abstract but relate directly to the events taking place - to the socio-political context of the time period investigated. Using this particular form of analysis it is possible neither to attempt detailed measurements of the concepts employed nor to engage in complicated statistical experiments. It is possible, instead, to describe newspapers' reactions in discursive language, using the coding categories as guides to the finding of editorial attitudinal trends and orientations.

When the coding stage was completed the data were key punched and a computer program was run in order to determine the basic distribution of frequencies between the domestic and foreign issues, which was of primary interest. Of secondary interest were the differences among the three newspapers under study, as well as the differences between the two administrations. The results obtained formed the backbone of the assessment of the comparative editorial treatment of domestic and foreign issues.

In addition a test of statistical significance was performed in order to determine whether differences between domestic and foreign frequencies could be called statistically significant. The results of the test were used to add validity to the research project.

The main part of the analysis will consist of a frequency count of the coding categories used, in order to find out how predominant and pervasive they were within the entire body of the editorials. Furthermore, a large part of the analysis will consist of description, or elaboration, of the context in which the editorial orientations and characteristics represented by the coding categories occurred. Thus the analysis will be partly descriptive in form, but also analytical to the extent that it will have been obtained after a systematic and orderly search of the data for the presence or absence of certain selected reactions and dispositions.

It is hoped that the analysis will throw light on the predominance in newspaper editorials of certain dispositions and orientations toward the issues of domestic and foreign policy, as outlined in the hypotheses, and that additional insight will be obtained concerning the role that the political orientation of the newspaper and of the federal government in power play in determining these dispositions.

THE NEWSPAPERS

The three newspapers studied in this thesis are the Toronto Globe and Mail, the Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press, all English newspapers, representing the views of English Canada. The selection of suitable newspapers for an empirical study of the press in Canada presents very considerable difficulties for several reasons. For one thing, Canada has no national newspaper comparable to the London Times or the New York Times. We have no newspaper which would be brilliant, trustworthy, nationally rather than locally oriented, and read from coast to coast, although the Toronto Globe and Mail has boldly struggled to become one. Thus, there is no one newspaper which would be an obvious and self evident choice for an empirical inquiry.

Moreover, in terms of circulation figures, the city of Toronto has monopolized the market for many years. In 1957, when John Diefenbaker came to power, three of the four largest Canadian daily newspapers, in terms of daily circulation, weekend circulation, out of province circulation and advertising revenue, were the Toronto Star, the Toronto Telegram and the Toronto Globe and Mail.¹⁰ The Telegram closed down in 1971 and its place has been filled alternately by the Vancouver Sun or the Montreal La Presse. Thus, anyone wishing to study the largest newspapers of the Diefenbaker/Pearson era would inevitably produce a Toronto oriented study.

Furthermore, a random selection of Canadian dailies is hardly appropriate not only because they vary in size and scope of coverage, but also because very few of them are independent newspapers. Almost all Canadian newspapers are owned or controlled by huge media conglomer-

ates, which combine the ownership of newspapers with radio and TV stations. Certainly, all major Canadian papers are chain owned, so that the actual choice of newspapers for study purposes also becomes the choice of newspaper chains, which produces the inevitable inferences about political orientation and economic backing. The three newspapers chosen belonged, in 1957, to three different chains but this was soon to change, for the Toronto Globe and Mail, which at the time of Mr. Diefenbaker's election was owned by a Montreal financier Howard Webster, was to be sold in 1965 to the F.P. Publications. It is difficult to say to what extent the change of the owner affected the newspaper's editorial policy and political orientation, for no appropriate research has been done in this case, nor in any other case of change of newspaper ownership.

Finally, it is very difficult to choose newspapers according to their political orientation, for its direction is not something stable and permanent which can be attached to a newspaper with any degree of certainty. In fact, newspapers tend to avoid excessive attachment to one political leader or party. Until the turn of the 20th century the practice had been for individual newspapers to act as spokesmen for different political groups in the country, which reciprocated the favor by providing the newspapers with the financial support needed. Modern newspapers, which are by and large self-supporting, avoid partisan journalism and reserve their right to support any political party on any grounds they see fit. No Canadian newspaper supported one political party during its entire history. This trend had something to do with the growth of journalistic autonomy sustained by the precepts of the

libertarian theory of the press, as well as the practical requirements of the business of producing newspapers:

...newspapers have not always been consistent in their partisanship, nor directly under the aegis of a political party.... Running a newspaper means engaging in a profitmaking enterprise, and the search for both circulation and a sphere of influence tends to mitigate any slavish partisanship....The advent of newspaper chains has probably shifted the balance even further to local emphasis, with the consequence that partisanship itself has become subject to the judgment of what is appropriate for the local market.¹¹

It is equally difficult to judge the political orientation of a newspaper by the political orientation of its owners/publishers, because in highly developed industrial societies, of which Canada is one, the owners, be they a few individuals or many shareholders, are often considerably detached from the process of production. This process is usually supervised by the managers, and carried out by the staff, whose normative aspirations, motives, attitudes and values are often very different from those of the owners. Although it is never very clear to what extent ownership and control have become separated in any given industry, the fact remains that the growth of salaried managers and the fragmentation of ownership have mitigated against any excessive control of the production process by a closely knit self-centered clique of owners.¹² This is particularly true of the media business, which by its very nature tends to attract eccentric, self-guided, independent individuals, who are often difficult to goad and almost impossible to bribe. Moreover, the journalistic profession has, over the years, developed a variety of rules of ethical conduct and procedure which further inhibit consistent subservience to the owning class. As a result the political orientation of a newspaper is often at odds with the political orientation of its owners:

Typically, the partisanship of the press has come about through the personal loyalties of owners and publishers....There have been instances in Canada as well as direct financial support for parties....Publishers have entered politics, but normally they take their place with other candidates in the amount of space given their personal campaigns. More usually, the partisan inclinations of newspaper owners, managers, and leading columnists and correspondents...exist independently of party sponsorship of electoral ambitions. While support from the communication elite is sought after, and often forthcoming, it is also unstable....¹³

On the other hand, it must be pointed out that these tendencies towards objectivity tend to be mitigated in some measure through: (a) the control by the senior management of the hiring process, by which people with undesirable opinions can be kept away, (b) a network of internalized controls such as the seniority principle according to which a senior man overrules the junior man, and (c) a set of mutually supportive expectations which operates within all newspapers and creates a consensus about what should and should not be printed. It is, therefore, possible for newspapers to develop certain political orientations which last for a period of time. If a newspaper acquires a political label it is because it has acquired a habit or an inclination to be more favourably inclined toward one party rather than another. The Winnipeg Free Press is known as a Liberal paper even though on occasions it has damned the Liberals more viciously than anyone else and once even compared a federal Liberal cabinet minister to Mussolini. The Toronto Globe and Mail is often called a Tory newspaper because in recent decades it has tended to support editorially the Conservative party. Yet during the 1963 federal election it supported the Pearson Liberals. The Montreal Star is very difficult to characterize because it is a newspaper of the English minority in Montreal, which also constitutes that province's ec-

onomic and financial elite. It would, therefore, be very easy to expect it to propagate conservative ideas. Yet its support of the federal Liberals has been frequent, as will be shown later in this thesis.

The three newspapers selected for the purposes of this study have been chosen because they are all major, reputable, established papers, with long tradition and history. They represent three different provinces, as well as somewhat different political orientations. In many ways the Toronto Globe and Mail, the Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press are representatives of Canadian newspapers: all family papers, Canadian owned and belonging to three different media empires.

At the time of Mr. Diefenbaker's Prime Ministership, the Globe and Mail Ltd. was listed as Canada's fifth major mass media complex and the newspaper bearing the Company's name, with its daily metropolitan circulation of 226,000, was Canada's fourth major paper, after the Toronto Star, the Toronto Telegram and the Vancouver Sun.¹⁴ The newspaper has a long and proud history. Its predecessor, the Globe, was founded by George Brown in the second part of the 19th century and from the very beginning of its existence was well known and well read in Toronto. In the 1880's the controlling influence in the paper was acquired by Senator Jaffray, whose son subsequently became the president of the paper. In 1936 the Globe was purchased by a wealthy stockbroker George McCullagh, who subsequently also purchased another Toronto paper, the Mail and Empire, and joined the two into the Globe and Mail. The Mail and Empire had been the property of Sir Isaac Walton Killam a prominent Montreal financier and philanthropist whose ambition was to make his newspaper a worthy competitor of the venerable Globe in the morning-

paper Toronto field. In 1955 the Globe and Mail was purchased by Newsco Investments of Montreal, whose owner and president was R. Howard Webster, a descendent of a wealthy Quebec family with considerable investments in the coal mining industry. Finally, in 1965 the Globe and Mail Ltd. entered into a merger with the F.P. Publications, another powerful media chain.¹⁵

In the 19th century the Globe had been an enthusiastic supporter of the Liberal party and in a state of permanent opposition to Sir John A. Macdonald and his Conservatives. In the 1920's and 30's, when Senator Jaffray's intolerant son ran the paper, it was best known for its condemnation of sexy movies, cigarettes, whisky and the writings of Sinclair Lewis, because of the author's atheism. Since the merger with the Mail and Empire, the newspaper has supported the Conservative party and was very critical of the Liberal administrations of Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent. Its political stance has been traditionally in opposition to the party in power in Ottawa.¹⁶ Throughout the many years of its existence the newspaper has maintained high standards of performance and is now considered Canada's best newspaper as well as, possibly, the only national newspaper. Even though its political leanings are conservative it has excelled itself in ignoring partisanship when necessary and presenting a wide variety of issues and opinions in a reasonable and objective fashion. In 1957 the paper supported John Diefenbaker but in 1963 it switched its backing to the Liberals.¹⁷ In 1965 it returned to a lukewarm support of the Conservatives.

The second newspaper chosen for this study will be the Montreal Star. It began its existence in the middle of the 19th century as a

four-page daily. In 1869 it was purchased by Hugh Graham, later Lord Atholstan, who built it up and controlled it to the very day of his death in 1938. The paper was then taken over by the McConnell family, which had extensive holdings in many trust and commercial companies in Quebec as well as in other French and English daily newspapers. In 1961 the Montreal Star Company Ltd. was considered to be the seventh largest media complex in Canada, as well as the biggest English-language daily in Montreal, with its daily circulation of 191,000.¹⁸

Lord Atholstan was an ardent Conservative. His ambition was to make the Montreal Star into a powerful voice of conservatism in the province of Quebec. But the candidates for public office supported by the Star consistently failed to get elected. The political orientation of the paper changed somewhat in 1938. The McConnells were close to Prime Minister Mackenzie King. In 1938 J.W. McConnell, then owner and publisher of the Star, offered King his personal help and that of his newspaper in bringing about the defeat of the Duplessis government in the 1939 provincial election in Quebec. In later years the Prime Minister often consulted McConnell on major appointments and policies.¹⁹ But the Star never became a servant of the Liberal party. With the help of talented editors such as George V. Ferguson and Claude Ryan, the newspaper has maintained a high quality of news coverage and editorial opinion. It is now considered to be an organ of the affluent English minority in Quebec but it has also often been praised for promoting French-English understanding. During the 1957 federal election the Montreal Star gave a lukewarm support to the Conservatives. It found both parties competent and eager to govern and advised its readers to vote for the better man,

but in case of doubt to vote Conservative. In 1963 the newspaper supported Mr. Pearson and the Liberals.²⁰

The Winnipeg Free Press has been in the Sifton family for almost 85 years. It was acquired in 1889 by Sir Clifford Sifton, a prominent and wealthy Westerner who later became a member of Laurier's cabinet. It was known then as the Manitoba Free Press. The name was changed to the Winnipeg Free Press in 1931. Sir Clifford left the newspaper in the hands of his two sons who enlarged their newspaper empire by purchasing several other Western Canadian papers. When John Diefenbaker came to power the Winnipeg Free Press, with a circulation of 120,000, was owned by the Sifton-Bell enterprise, a company formed by one of Sir Clifford's sons and G. Max Bell, whose family owned among other things the Calgary Albertan. In 1959, by a complicated transaction of purchase and exchange of shares, the two entrepreneurs formed Free Press Publications Ltd. which expanded rapidly by acquiring four years later a controlling interest in the Sun Publishing Company. In 1965 they entered into a merger with the Globe and Mail Limited. The Senate Committee Report on Mass Media listed the F.P. Publications as the largest of all Canadian newspaper groups in terms of circulation.²¹ Today both the Winnipeg Free Press and the Toronto Globe and Mail are 100% owned by the F.P. Publications Ltd. However, in 1957 they were owned by two different media complexes.

Ideologically, the Winnipeg Free Press has been primarily a Liberal newspaper. The Sifton family had formal connections with the Liberal party, Sir Clifford having been a member of Laurier's cabinet. He later revolted against Laurier and during the 1917 election the news-

paper editorially opposed Laurier on the conscription issue. By and large, however, it has supported the Liberal party. If it disagreed with the federal Liberals it was almost always on some issue of particular significance for the West, like agricultural policies, tariffs on farm machinery, freight rates, etc. In fact the newspaper has been an avid defender of Western farm interests. From 1901 to 1944, when the paper was edited by the brilliant John W. Dafoe, the Winnipeg Free Press was probably one of the most respected papers on the continent:

In the halcyon days of Dafoe the Free Press derived its prestige from the breadth of its international outlook, and from the brilliance of its editorial page. The geographic, ethnic and economic character of Winnipeg largely accounted for the newspaper's catholicity of interest and for the attention it gave to international events. Read by farmers dependent on international rather than local markets and published in a city containing one of the continent's large grain exchanges and serving as the prairies' principal distributing center, it was understandably less parochial than many newspapers published in larger communities.²²

Since Dafoe's death the newspaper has lost some of its lustre but it is still considered one of Canada's most responsible and respected newspapers. During the 1957 election the paper was very hostile to Mr. Diefenbaker and supported the Liberal party.²³ In 1963 its anti-Diefenbakerism became almost fanatical and it enthusiastically supported Mr. Pearson.²⁴

Thus, the three newspapers are comparable in terms of their history, type of ownership, prominence and scope. In addition, each comes from a province which is ethnically, economically and socially different from the other two: Quebec which is Canada's largest French-speaking province and which in the late 1950's was beginning to wake up from a long era of economic backwardness and political paternalism, Ontario

which is the bastion of Anglo-Saxon majority and Canada's richest and industrially most developed province, and Manitoba with its varied ethnic population and an economy based on the production of such primary products as grain and lumber. The varied provincial background of the newspapers should add an interesting dimension to the objectives of the study.

THE EDITORIAL

The subjects of the analysis are several hundred editorials found in the three Canadian newspapers. The editorial has been chosen as the specific subject of this study because according to current journalistic ethics it is the only item in the newspaper where opinions, as opposed to facts, are to be freely expressed. In the early decades of this century, when newspapers were supposed to represent and be attached to various political factions, all news was tinted with the particular ideological bias of the paper's patron and sponsor. As the concept of objective and unbiased news emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, many newspapers decided to limit their opinions to the editorial page, so that the reader would be able to distinguish between the fact, as objectively reported, and opinion, as straightforwardly expressed on the editorial page. In practice, it is acknowledged that much of a newspaper's reporting can also be biased by its partisan inclinations, but the formula of dividing fact from opinion has been universally accepted and newspapers attempt to confine their viewpoints to the editorial page.

Some students of the press have suggested that the editorial, whether merely explanatory or sharply controversial, "is the most significant part of the relationship between the press and the public."²⁵ This may be an exaggeration for it is also generally believed that editorials appeal only to the so-called attentive public: a rather small segment of the population, who are interested in public issues and make an effort to understand them and keep abreast of them. Some studies have verified that those "who do read a paper's opinion are

also the most influential thinkers in their communities."²⁶

In addition to not being widely read, not even by those who generally read newspapers, editorials have been found to have little potency to influence or change attitudes. In a local study of voter susceptibility to influence, for example, it was discovered that while 83% of respondents claimed to have read the Edmonton Journal every day, only 27% read locally oriented editorials that often, while with respect to influence and motivational potency of editorials the author concluded that:

Editorial reading led voters to become more informed about the election...and being informed in this sense led voters to cast higher proportions of their votes for the candidates of the UCAP (United Civic Action Party). But the sequence, from exposure to editorials to ultimately voting for the UCAP, was by no means as straightforward as this might suggest. More assiduous reading of editorials did bring about greater awareness, especially in the case of the cognitively less competent yet more interested person, but any influence the paper had on voting through its editorials - virtually none in the aggregate - was on the least informed voters.²⁷

Similar studies done in the United States confirm this finding. In a study of editorial endorsements in California elections, for example, the researcher concluded that "such factors as incumbency, partisanship and the amount of attention given candidates and issues by radio, television and the news columns of newspapers all tend to diminish the influence of newspaper editorial endorsements."²⁸ Another study, of the impact of the editorial page on a municipal referendum, also supported this conclusion.²⁹ Editorials were also found to have little impact on national issues and elections where editorial endorsements, for example, proved to have the greatest opportunity to influence only the last-minute deciders.³⁰

While failing to change attitudes, editorials nevertheless may provoke, stimulate and inspire. One American study found that editorials frequently stimulated letters to the editor, prompting the researchers to claim that:

One of the functions of the newspaper editorial in a democratic society is to stimulate public debate and discussion of important issues. It may well be that the newspaper editorial functions more effectively in this way than it does in the realm of opinion change, i.e. it "stimulates" more than it directly "influences."³¹

In fact editors see the editorial as an institutional expression of opinion whose purpose is to call attention to and may be exert influence on public issues, and to provide a public forum for the exchange of ideas about such issues.

Editorials are usually written by editorial writers and edited by the editor-in-chief and/or the publisher. The extent to which the publisher determines day-to-day editorial policy varies from newspaper to newspaper. Many a publisher has reached his position from a background of news and editorial work and may be very understanding of his writer's desire for independence. Others may do just the opposite and assert their authority over junior staff. Generally speaking, editorials are planned at a conference directed by an editor-in-chief, at which the publisher may also be present. The point of view to be taken or an attitude to be adopted in a given editorial is determined by the combined opinions of the publisher, the editor and the editorial writers present. A consensus will likely emerge and editorials will be assigned to different writers. They will then be edited by the editor and/or the publisher, who may make changes. Many newspapers have an unwritten rule that no editorial writer will be forced to write

something he does not believe in.

Furthermore, Canadian newspaper chains have no fixed editorial policy but leave all editorial decisions to the local publisher. The situation at Southam Press is probably typical for newspaper chains in Canada:

The Southam company picks its local publisher and tells him to run the show. As far as editorial and news treatment go, its action as a company stops there. The publisher picks his staff and takes responsibility for how the show is run; for what his paper says. Under this practice the company's one recourse in the event of some persistently flagrant editorial campaign would be to fire the publisher. It has never had occasion to do so.³²

As a result a Southam spokesman could confidently claim that "There is no such thing as a Southam policy as far as editorial viewpoints are concerned."³³ This emphasis on local editorial autonomy, in addition to freedom from party ties acquired by the press in this century, ensures that a variety of viewpoints will be expressed.

The content of editorials has undergone very dramatic changes during the 20th century:

In the beginning they were far more inclined than they are today to exhort, to take positions, to advise a confident course of action that would ensure health, happiness, success, and social and political virtue. The modern editorialist spends far more of his time in explaining, in furnishing the background of important social, economic, political, scientific and religious issues.³⁴

The Great Depression that began in the late 1920's is often credited with bringing a new seriousness to the editorial page for it forced readers and editors to give attention, for the first time, to complex political, economic and social questions.³⁵ These questions have grown even more complex since, and as a result editors are less likely

to claim infallibility and pontificate with the self-assurance of zealots, less likely to sermonize and exhort, and more likely to explain and interpret, elucidate and define. It is not that they are less confident or less courageous than their counterparts half a century ago, but that they are more aware of the complexities of issues and the limited supply of categorical and indisputably correct answers. The rise in popular literacy and general awareness also means that today readers would be very unlikely to accept pretentious and bombasting editorials.

It is difficult if not impossible to pinpoint the source of motivation of editorial writers. No research at all on this subject has been done in Canada and memoirs of publishers and editors provide only an occasional insight. In the United States no studies of motivation have been done either, but some research on subjects related to motivation has been carried out. A few recent articles in The Masthead, a quarterly publication of the National Conference of Editorial Writers, have sought to emphasize the need of editorial writers to understand their own prejudices.³⁶ A study done by two researchers from the University of Georgia, using a mailout questionnaire, disclosed that a good subject and the quality of argument were chosen as the most important factors in developing the editorial, while the primary functions of editorials were considered to be: to express a viewpoint (38% of respondents), to motivate (20% of respondents), and to provide information (12% of respondents). To tell both sides of an argument and tell the reader which side appears to be right was claimed to be the usual method of handling issues by 73% of respondents.³⁷ With respect to

political partisanship one American study disclosed that most editors try to balance liberal and conservative views in their editorials,³⁸ and another one, testing 400 executive editors and news editors, revealed that most of them considered themselves politically independent, although some differences were found between Republicans and Democrats regarding selected issues.³⁹

It is thus evident, from the limited research available, that in the United States editorial writers have a positive self-conception of being servants of the public whom they would like to inform and enlighten using the best means available at their disposal. It is also evident that a majority of editorial writers feel that blatant partisanship does not constitute the source of their motivation, and that they consciously attempt to recognize their biases and be at least fair in their assessment of issues and situations. It is reasonable to assume that Canadian editorial writers do not differ dramatically from their American counterparts. What exactly their sources of motivation are is open to speculation. For some no doubt it is a question of efficacy. Having some perception of what the general public as well as the government want to hear, and believing themselves able to exert influence on the public and the government, many editorial writers will simply echo the views of their readers. Others will take stands on existential grounds and will say something which simply has to be said for the sake of peace, morality or good government. They would thus be behaving out of their need to perform their jobs with responsibility and commitment. Finally, it is reasonable to presume that editorial writers, as individuals and citizens, have certain interests,

as well as certain geographic and/or political loyalties, which may motivate them to act in a certain way. Their position in society will to some extent determine their view of the world, and their need to justify their situation in the world. While passing judgements on the behavior of others they may be passing judgement on themselves as well, on their own actions and beliefs. These various possibilities suggest that in the absence of evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to imagine that the motivations of editorial writers spring from a variety of sources other than those mentioned by Rosenau.

Wherever the motivation comes from, it produces day in and day out thousands of editorials on a variety of subjects. With respect to the length and depth of editorials, the three newspapers investigated in this thesis pursue three vastly different editorial policies. The Globe and Mail publishes three or four fair-sized editorials every day. In the period covered in this thesis, from June 1957 to December 1967, it would have printed approximately 13,000 editorials, of which 146 were used in this thesis. The Montreal Star publishes six or seven shorter comments every day. In the time span, therefore, it would have published over 20,000 editorials, of which 140 were used. Finally, the Winnipeg Free Press generally prints only one long editorial of seriousness and substance, which means that it printed around 3,300 of them, of which 118 were investigated in thesis.

Long or short the editorial usually makes a point about a public issue. It often takes a stand, pronounces judgment or expresses a point of view. In this study it is the testing ground for Rosenau's theories.

THE TIME PERIOD

The time period covered in this thesis, from the coming to power of John Diefenbaker in June of 1957 to the announcement by Lester B. Pearson of his intended resignation as Leader of the Liberal Party in December 1967, has been selected because during that time the two issues under investigation, namely federal-provincial fiscal relations and NATO, came into prominence and underwent a drastic reappraisal. In the domestic area it was found that a wholesale restructuring of federal-provincial fiscal agreements would have to replace the existing maze of ad hoc allocations, if the provinces and the federal government were to meet their increasingly weighty financial responsibilities. In the foreign area, the growing dissatisfaction with the strategy of NATO, and especially the proposed introduction of nuclear weapons into the alliance's arsenal, were to throw the country into a serious debate about the value and purpose of its international commitments. The series of political developments which made the reappraisals necessary will be dealt with in greater detail later in the thesis.

The coming to power of the Diefenbaker Conservatives was a political milestone because it brought to a sudden end twenty two years of uninterrupted Liberal supremacy in Ottawa. Mr. Diefenbaker was to win two more federal elections, one in March of 1958 by the largest majority ever accorded to any political party in Canadian history, and another in June of 1962, which saw his majority reduced to another minority government. Finally, in April 1963 he was to relinquish power to a Liberal minority government under Mr. Pearson, who himself was to manage only another minority government elected in November 1965. In

December 1967 Mr. Pearson chose to announce his intention to leave politics, and eventually, in April 1968, handed power over to his successor Pierre Elliot Trudeau.

Thus, the time period chosen has the advantage of paralleling important developments in the field of federal-provincail finances and Canada's relationship with NATO. In addition, it covers two regimes, one Conservative and the other Liberal, each ruling the country for approximately five years, and each trying in its own way to come to terms with the tasks at hand. The succession of two different political regimes in Ottawa during the time period investigated, will show how important issues were treated by the press under a Conservative and then a Liberal government.

FOOTNOTES

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14. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, 477-478.

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17. Editorial, "For Province and Nation," Globe and Mail, June 3, 1957, and Editorial, "Facing the Facts," Globe and Mail, April 2, 1963.
18. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, 479.
19. Kesterton, A History of Journalism in Canada, 90.
20. Editorial, "The Election," Montreal Star, June 1, 1957; Editorial "Why Mr. Pearson Deserves Support," Montreal Star, April 4, 1963.
21. Information Canada, Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, Vol. II, 85.
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23. Editorial, "Innuendo for Policy," Winnipeg Free Press, June 4, 1957.
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CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ISSUES AND ISSUE-AREAS

THE ISSUES AND ISSUE-AREAS

This study deals with issues. An issue will be understood as a polemical discord over values or interests among identifiable political actors. It is not an event, like a federal-provincial conference or a meeting of the NATO Council, but rather a controversy that such events often generate or inflame. An issue touches on and involves matters of importance to a society, persists for some time, and involves major segments of that society's governmental organization as well as the general population.

For the purposes of empirical analysis issues can be grouped into issue-areas, which involves classification of numerous issues into a manageable number of mutually exclusive areas, according to a valid criterion of classification. This criterion could be the nature of values or interests encompassed by the issues or the identity of actors likely to get involved in them, etc. The classification adopted in this study is between a domestic and a foreign issue-area.

A domestic issue-area will embrace issues which have to do with a discord over values or interests regarding the political process which transpires, generally, within the boundaries of a nation state: here the federal-provincial fiscal relations.

A foreign issue-area will embrace issues which have to do with a discord over values or interests regarding the political process which involves, generally, a nation state in a relationship with the environment external to its boundaries: here NATO.

In order to understand the distinction better, a historical review of the two major issue-areas and the numerous issues which came up in the period 1957-1967 will now be provided.

THE ISSUE-AREA OF FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FISCAL RELATIONS

Federal-provincial fiscal relations have been a complicated subject in Canadian history due both to the nature of the British North America Act of 1867, and the specific character of Canadian federalism to which the Act gave rise. The BNA Act of 1867 assigned the more costly responsibilities of economic development and maintenance of peace, order, and good government of Canada to the Dominion (Section 91). These included trade and commerce, raising and borrowing of money, postal service, militia, defence and shipping, banking, currency and coinage, etc. The provinces were allotted property and civil rights, as well as other minor tasks, such as local works, maintenance of provincial prisons, appointment of provincial officers, etc. (Section 92-93).

Having been burdened with these major tasks, the federal government was also given the principal revenue sources, namely an unlimited power of taxation (Section 102-126). Provincial powers were restricted to direct taxation, which at the time of Confederation provided the provinces with less than one fifth of their revenues. The remaining four fifths came from fees, licenses, royalties, etc., and annual grants paid by the federal government.

Under the terms of Confederation the federal government assumed all the outstanding debts and liabilities of the four provinces (Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick) but undertook, in exchange, to pay them three types of annual statutory subsidies: (1) an interest on debt allowance (Section 116), which was set at 5% per annum on the amount by which the actual debts of the province, on its entry into Confederation, fell short of a basic debt allowance, which was calculated at approximately \$25.00 per capita, (2) a fixed sum for the maintenance and support

of provincial governmental structures and legislatures (Section 118), and (3) an allowance per capita of population, fixed at 80 cents per capita up to the population of 2,500,000, and 60 cents per capita thereafter, up to the population of 400,000 (Section 118). These three regular payments from the federal government constituted the back-bone of provincial finances.

Nevertheless, when balanced with provincial expenditures, these payments were evidently found to be inadequate for "the print on the 1867 Act was not dry before the provinces started to agitate for better financial terms."¹ The spectacle of the provinces bickering for more money from the federal government thus began very early and has continued unabated during the last 110 years.

Many of these demands have been justified because history has played an expensive trick on the provinces. For one thing, the scope of provincial powers and responsibilities has been broadened well beyond the one envisaged by the founding fathers. This was achieved partly by the courts, which decided that many emerging social problems requiring expenditure of money, relief and social welfare for example, related to the property and civil rights clause of the BNA Act (Section 92) and not to the peace, order, and good government clause (Section 91), and were therefore a provincial and not a federal responsibility. Secondly, much of the twentieth century has been a period of economic prosperity and expansion, and the provinces and municipalities have played an active role in the boom, which resulted in the great upsurge of provincial expenditures, such as highways, bridges, etc., to keep up with the growing economy and the expanding motor-car related industries. Thirdly, the rapid industrialization and urbanization brought with them the now

familiar, but not anticipated in 1867, problems of community services, increased expenditures on education and welfare, which the Great Depression which began in 1929 greatly aggravated. It is not surprising, therefore, that even before the turn of the century the provinces began to impose taxes on land, and then on income, corporations and successions.

The federal government also recognized the provincial difficulties and instituted, at first modest but always expanding, network of patchwork payments to help the provinces cope with their responsibilities. In the years immediately following Confederation it initiated a series of special grants to various provinces which requested them on grounds of economic hardship. In 1907 an amendment to the original subsidy provisions of the 1867 BNA Act resulted in an increase of about one third in the federal statutory payments to the provinces. During the first World War the federal government assumed the responsibility for running the railway system in Canada and after the War considerably expanded a system of conditional grants first tried on an experimental basis in 1913. These grants were given for a specific purpose on condition that the province matched the federal grant with an equal grant from its own purse for the same purpose. Some of the joint projects financed in this way were vocational education, establishment of employment offices, and venereal disease prevention. The most famous was the old age pension program which was inaugurated as a joint federal-provincial venture in 1921 and lasted until 1952. With the onslaught of the Depression the federal government began to subsidize certain industries, instituted grants-in-aid for the relief of farmers and urban unemployed, undertook federal works programs, and made relief payments to unemployed and transients, bearing an estimated 40% of the overall cost of relief.² In 1927

it also doubled statutory payments to three Maritime Provinces: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, as they had been particularly cruelly affected by the Depression, and in 1931 replied favourably to the Prairies provinces' request for the transfer of the jurisdiction over their natural resources, thus returning to Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta an important source of revenue, as well as agreeing to reimburse them for the past federal use of the resources.

In order to pay for these undertakings the federal government had to devise ways and means of raising money. Under the pressure of World War I it had been forced to impose both personal and corporation income taxes, thus invading the field of direct taxation previously monopolized by the provinces. It subsequently raised the taxes several times and the provinces did the same with the taxes they were imposing. The outbreak of the Second World War saw the government drastically increase all taxes and invade more provincial tax fields by introducing a federal inheritance tax.

The pressure of the War also forced the creation of a unique federal-provincial fiscal system in the form of the War Time Agreements. The Agreements specified that the provinces would get out of the income tax and corporation tax fields altogether so that the federal government could centralize and coordinate the country's finances during the War period. In exchange, the government undertook to compensate the provinces for the loss of revenue from the two taxes "rented" to the federal government, and pay them, in addition to the statutory subsidies, fixed annual compensations.

Although the tax rental system outlined above was conceived as a temporary war-time measure, it continued with minor variations, until

March 1962, having been renewed every five years. Two years before each agreement was to expire a federal-provincial conference was called to discuss the terms of the subsequent agreement, which was then negotiated individually with each province. The province of Quebec abstained from the agreements altogether while Ontario abstained from the 1947 Agreement but joined the scheme in 1952. The inheritance tax became the third tax rented to the federal government and the fixed payments to the provinces were increased several times.

Although continued for a long time, the tax rental system was not entirely satisfactory to the provinces because it excessively centralized the taxing powers in the hands of the federal government, and to the detriment of provincial occupancy of tax fields, because it did not satisfy provincial fiscal needs and because it did not eradicate provincial economic inequalities. Therefore, a few months before Mr. Diefenbaker came to power some profound modifications to the system were introduced by the Federal-Provincial Tax Sharing Act of 1957. Its first most prominent feature was that equalization payments would be made independent of the rental of tax fields. These payments were unconditional grants, calculated on the basis of the per capita yield of the three standard taxes for the two wealthiest provinces, and given to the poorer provinces in order to make them, in terms of per capita revenue from their share of tax rental payments, equal to the richest provinces. The aim of these payments was to counterbalance the disparities of Canadian geography and economy. In the previous tax sharing agreements this federal assistance was built into the tax rental formula and came as a package deal together with the rental fee. Now a distinction would be made between equalization payments and rental payments. Equalization

was to be paid automatically to deserving provinces, while tax rental payments followed only if an agreement to that effect had been signed between the federal government and the province.

The second most prominent feature of the new agreement was that the provincial right to a share of the major direct tax fields was recognized by expressing the provincial share of the three standard taxes in terms of actual tax rates. Specifically, the agreement provided that each province was free to rent or not to rent its tax fields to Ottawa. If it chose not to rent, the federal government would allow abatements equal to provincial tax shares offered. These were: 10% of federal personal income tax, 9% of corporate profits, and 50% of federal succession duties. These rates came to be known as the "10-9-50 formula" and denoted the shares of federal taxation going to the provinces or an abatement of federal tax if the province had no tax agreement with Ottawa. Eight provinces accepted the agreement as outlined above. Ontario rented only its individual income tax but reserved the right to levy its own corporation and succession duties, while Quebec continued to levy all three taxes.

In spite of this Agreement the matter of federal-provincial finances became a major issue in the 1957 election campaign. Mr. St. Laurent and the Liberals pointed out, with justification, that each time a new tax sharing agreement had been negotiated the provinces had obtained a larger share of revenue and that this was achieved without excessive taxation. Their Conservative opponent Mr. Diefenbaker, on the other hand, accused the Liberal administration of "a deliberate federal policy of invasion of the major taxation fields in order to shut out the provinces and municipalities from their main source of income and to

force them to beg for hand-out from Ottawa."³

The issue-area of federal-provincial fiscal relations, if seen in its historical perspective, thus embraces a variety of issues related to the division of fiscal duties and responsibilities between the two levels of government, as well as specific programs and payments, schemes and trends relevant to the subject. All the issues which fit this description will not be considered for the years 1957-1967.

FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FISCAL ISSUES DURING THE DIEFENBAKER ADMINISTRATION

During his election campaign Mr. Diefenbaker argued that the federal government had become excessively centralist and promised that, if elected, he would immediately call a dominion-provincial conference to bring about a settlement of dominion-provincial differences.⁴ Five months after taking office the newly elected Conservative government met the provincial premiers in Ottawa, in an exploratory conference, which produced a friendly exchange of views but postponed the revision of the existing tax-sharing agreements until the new year. Two months later, in January 1958, Prime Minister Diefenbaker, unexpectedly and unilaterally, announced a major revision by increasing the part of personal income tax remitted to the provinces from 10 to 13% (thus giving them an additional \$60 million annually), initiating special grants to the impoverished Maritimes in the amount of \$25 million annually for a period of five years, as well as promising an increase in federal grants to all provinces for hospital construction.

It was not until 18 months later that federal and provincial finance ministers met in Ottawa in July 1959 in order to discuss the overall structure of tax revenues and their allocation to each level of government, but no decisions were made. A year later, in July 1960, the second federal-provincial conference of Mr. Diefenbaker's administration met in Ottawa and saw the provincial premiers, starved for money, present a long list of fiscal demands. All premiers demanded substantial increases in the share of provincial tax divisions, as well as increased provincial powers of taxation and economic initiative. The latter cause was championed primarily by Premier Lesage of Quebec who declared a long term objective of bringing to an end the policy of federal grants for

purposes which lie constitutionally within provincial jurisdiction. In reply, the federal government left all options open but insisted that the principle of equalization be maintained at all cost.

The conference adjourned until October when Prime Minister Diefenbaker finally stated his proposals and suggested that at the termination of present agreements in March 1962, the federal government should vacate the three tax fields to the extent now returned to the provinces, and permit the provinces to levy their own taxes at their own rates. Furthermore, the equalization payments would be continued, but frozen at the current level of \$220 million annually. The proposals were closest to the views of Premier Frost of Ontario. Both Premier Roblin of Manitoba and Lesage of Quebec opposed the freeze on equalization payments, while the vacating of the three tax fields only to the extent then being returned to the provinces was criticized by all premiers without exception.

In February 1961, the final federal-provincial conference of Mr. Diefenbaker's administration took place in Ottawa and was presented with the Prime Minister's revised proposal. Effective April 1962, the tax rental system would be discontinued, thus leaving the provinces free to impose their own taxes in the jointly occupied fields. In lieu of the tax rental payments the federal government would collect the provincial taxes free of charge, if the provinces so wished, provided the taxes were assessed by the same method as the federal tax. Moreover, the federal government would pay 50% of the yield of the federal estate tax from a province to that province if it did not impose succession duties, and abate 50% of the estate tax with respect to provinces levying succession duties. The provincial share of personal income tax would be increased from 14% to 16% for the fiscal year 1962/63 and an additional 1%

every year until it stood at 20% in 1966/67, while the provincial share of corporation taxes would be maintained at 9%. The calculation of equalization payments would be modified to correct the present system which ignored all sources of revenue other than the three direct tax fields. The new calculation would be based on the national average per capita return of the standard taxes plus 50% of the three year average of national resource revenue. The Atlantic Provinces Adjustment Grants would be increased from \$25 million to \$35 million annually, and a stabilization formula would ensure that no province would see its revenue under the new arrangement fall below 95% of the average of the two preceeding years.

The net effect of Mr. Diefenbaker's proposal was to abandon the post-war system of fiscal centralization, and its most prominent feature, the tax rental system. The system had allowed the federal government to rent certain tax fields from the provinces and collect the taxes, but in return guaranteed that the poorer provinces, whose tax fields were barren, got the help they needed to provide services for their citizens at the level approximately equal for the country as a whole. The new system signaled a return to provincial taxation, and left it open to the provinces to impose whatever taxes, in the three jointly occupied fields, they deemed necessary, to meet their financial responsibilities. Mr. Diefenbaker called it a victory for provincial autonomy and a return to the true meaning of the Constitution.⁵ But all provincial premiers, with the exception of the Maritime representatives, were critical of the deal, and Premier Douglas of Saskatchewan called it the betrayal of the principle of national equality and a return to the dog eat dog situation.⁶ In spite of their opposition the new deal was duly passed by Parliament

in September 1961.

Thus, the more important federal-provincial fiscal issues of Mr. Diefenbaker's administration were: the provincial need for more income, the provincial demands as presented to the federal government, the January 1958 modification of the tax-sharing formula, the validity of equalization payments, and the subsequent two new fiscal deals offer to the provinces by the federal government in October 1960 and February 1961.

FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FISCAL ISSUES DURING THE PEARSON ADMINISTRATION

The Liberal Party under the leadership of Mr. Pearson, following its electoral victory in the spring of 1963, inherited a dilemma which has been succinctly summarized in the following manner:

All parties were committed to a more decentralized federal system - usually labelled cooperative federalism - and each had made some gesture towards finding a solution to the tax sharing arrangement which would provide the provinces with larger sources of revenue. Yet they were also committed to the leadership of the central government in securing a rapid rate of economic growth, combating unemployment, offsetting regional inequalities, and raising the standards of social welfare and security on a national level. Few envied the victorious Liberals in their attempt to find the unmarked channel of cooperative federalism between the Scylla of national needs and the Charybdis of provincial rights.⁷

Mr. Pearson wasted no time in getting down to business, and in the remainder of 1963 called no less than three federal-provincial conferences, in July, September and November. The first Liberal election promise to be implemented was the \$400 million Municipal Loan Fund, designed to enable municipalities to expand their capital works projects as an anti-unemployment measure. The fund was to be administered by the federal government but projects would have to be approved by the provinces. Following the July conference, the federal government concurred with provincial demands to broaden the scheme to include schools and hospitals, and also agreed that the provinces could contract out to the extent of administering the fund themselves.

With reference to the tax sharing formula, the November conference heard the now familiar list of provincial complaints. Premier Lesage of Quebec demanded cooperation and consultation between Ottawa and the provinces in virtually all phases of economic policy through

the means of a permanent federal-provincial body to be created. Premier Robarts of Ontario also favoured some permanent machinery for federal-provincial consultation, but approved of the current tax sharing and equalization structures as well as the joint programs. Premier Roblin of Manitoba strongly endorsed the principle of equalization, and with some reservations, the joint programs. He preferred regular plenary conferences to the setting up of a permanent federal-provincial consultative body. At the conclusion of the conference, Mr. Pearson announced a new deal for the provinces which specified that: (a) equalization would be based on the per capita revenue of the two highest provinces, rather than the average or the highest, with revenue from natural resources partially taken into account, and (b) that the abatement of succession duties would be increased by 25% to 75%, and the increased revenue would not be considered in calculating equalization. The two provisions would cost Ottawa an additional \$87 million, with Quebec getting about \$43 million, Ontario \$14 million and Manitoba \$7 million.

Two more federal-provincial conferences took place in 1964. The March meeting tackled the issue of shared cost or joint programs. Mr. Pearson was strongly in favour of continuing them, but allowed that the government would transfer to the provinces, if they so wished, full responsibility for well established programs, and alter the fiscal arrangements in such a way that the size of the expenditures transferred would be matched by the extra room made available for provincial taxes. Both the Premiers of Ontario and Manitoba were in favour of making the programs more flexible, in order to reduce federal interference in matters of provincial responsibility. But Premier Lesage wished Quebec

to withdraw from all joint programs of a continuing nature, and remain only in temporary ones, such as the Centennial and the Trans-Canada highway. In the future Quebec would prefer fiscal equivalent to entry into more joint programs. Following the March conference, and some post-conference negotiations with Quebec, the federal government proposed a formula for contracting out of shared cost programs, to the satisfaction of Quebec and other provinces.

With respect to the overall allocation of revenues, the federal government agreed to the raising of the annual increase in tax abatement from one percent per year (Diefenbaker's last formula) to three percent per year and a corresponding increase in equalization payments. In addition, Ottawa and the provinces agreed to the establishment of a tax structure committee to study the whole range of fiscal problems related to the federal-provincial relations.

Another Liberal election promise to be discussed was a national contributory pension plan. In September of 1963, the federal government unexpectedly announced a \$10.00 a month increase in pensions, to give itself time to prepare the pension bill. Two weeks prior to the March 1964 conference the appropriate legislation was introduced in the House of Commons and it called for a national plan with standardized contributions, coverage, benefits and timing. All provinces but Quebec were more or less agreeable to the federal formula, especially when it was agreed that they would ultimately control the Canada Pension Plan investment reserves.

The year 1964 was marked by an increasing militancy of the government of Quebec, which was becoming an issue in its own right. In

addition to insisting on its own pension plan, and the negative attitude towards shared cost programs, Quebec called for a 25-25-100 division of direct tax returns, equalization payments based on the richest province, and demanded an estimated \$150 million as a compensation for the shared programs in which Quebec had not participated in the past. Premier Lesage also threatened to fight in the Supreme Court the federal government's plans for a system of student loans and the extension of family allowances, which, according to him, invaded provincial jurisdiction. When none of his demands were met, he refused to sign his name on the March conference's final communique. After weeks of behind the scene negotiations, Mr. Lesage was partially mollified when the contracting out formula for shared cost programs was announced, and when Ottawa agreed to give Quebec a fiscal equivalent for non-participation in both the student loans plan and the extension of family allowances.

The year 1965 saw the launching of national Medicare. The federal proposal called for a universal, comprehensive and portable national program, publicly administered and financed jointly by the government and the provinces, to replace the existing maze of private programs. Following the July 1965 conference, Mr. Pearson announced that as a supplement to the federal Medicare layout, Ottawa would establish a \$500 million fund to support medical training and research. Even Quebec was pleased. In addition, the government agreed to surrender to the provinces most of its corporation taxes on private power utilities and promised to increase federal grants to meet the cost of higher education in the provinces.

In June of 1966, the Lesage Liberals lost the provincial

election to Daniel Johnson's Union Nationale and the new government was to further test Ottawa's resistance to provincial demands. At the September 1966 meeting of the Tax Structure Committee, Premier Daniel Johnson demanded rights for Quebec approximating those of a truly sovereign state. These included the assuming of all responsibility for virtually all economic, fiscal, social and educational services within the borders of Quebec, the access to 100% of personal and corporate income tax and succession duties, and the recognition of the special status of the province of Quebec, which was allegedly a province unlike any others, a national home of French speaking people, etc. The Premier stubbornly opposed all shared cost programs, all federal proposals to the Tax Structure Committee, and threatened to hold a referendum on Quebec's place in Canada.

In spite of Quebec's intransigence, in 1966 the Pearson government attempted a basic reconstruction of federal-provincial fiscal relations. Early in September in the House of Commons, Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp announced that as an anti-inflationary measure the government planned to defer the university scholarship program, not renew the federal forestry program and postpone national Medicare until 1968. A week later, at the meeting of the Tax Structure Committee, Mr. Sharp presented a clear and comprehensive federal position of federal provincial relations when he delivered "one of the most important statements on federal-provincial relations since the war."⁸

While admitting the provincial expenditures were rising faster than federal expenditures, the Finance Minister maintained that the federal government must remain a regulator of the national economic

policy and a guarantor of national equity, and therefore must have a predominant share of both the corporation tax and the personal income tax. Beyond this, on the subject of the joint use of tax fields, henceforth the principle would be that each level of government would bear responsibility for its own level of taxation.

With reference to the shared cost programs the federal government would continue the programs of an economic nature (such as economic development, employment, etc.) but in the social field the provinces should follow the lead of Quebec and opt out of these programs over a period of time, with a 17% abatement of the personal income tax. Since this field of jurisdiction (social welfare programs) was primarily provincial, Mr. Sharp argued, the provinces should assume fiscal responsibility for their establishment and implementation.

With respect to equalization, the new formula would not be based on the yield of the jointly occupied fields and natural resources revenue, and equalized to the national average, but rather would be based on the whole revenue and fiscal capacity of the province, which would result in an increase of \$140 million in federal payments to all provinces except Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia which did not qualify because they were considered rich. The largest lump sum, almost \$86 million, would go to Quebec, and the remainder would be divided among the Maritime provinces and Manitoba and Saskatchewan.

The reception of Mr. Sharp's proposal was not good. Premier Robarts of Ontario was indignant that the federal government kept for itself the growth taxes (personal income and corporation) while the provinces were made responsible for growth fields (social welfare pro-

grams). Daniel Johnson of Quebec demanded 100% of all tax fields for himself, while Premier Roblin of Manitoba called the federal proposal "a retreat from equality and equity."⁹

At the October 1966 federal-provincial conference, Prime Minister Pearson introduced two minor modifications to the deal outlined by Mr. Sharp when Ottawa agreed to meet 50% of the operating costs of post-secondary education, as well as increase the payment allocation to vocational and technical training. In a mood described as "equalized unhappiness,"¹⁰ the provinces had no choice but to accept the federal package for a period of two years.

The 1966 fiscal deal left the federal government in charge of the economy and with sufficient cash to take new national initiatives if such were called for. It thus assuaged the fears of those, especially members of the media, who had voiced concern about the gradual disintegration of federal power in the face of the rising tide of provincialism.

No new developments occurred in the area until the end of Mr. Pearson's tenure in office. In the fall of 1967, Premier Robarts of Ontario organized the Confederation of Tomorrow Conference, which discussed a variety of long term federal provincial fiscal problems and solutions. Its aim was to provide a forum for an exchange of views and an outlet for pent up resentments rather than to modify the existing arrangements, which remained intact until Mr. Pearson decided to leave office shortly afterwards, in December 1967.

Some of the major issues in the area of federal-provincial fiscal relations during Mr. Pearson's time in office thus were: the

institution of the Municipal Loan Fund in the summer of 1963, the increase of \$10.00 in the old age pensions in September 1963, the new federal-provincial deal of November 1963, the viability of shared cost programs, the Canada Pension Plan, Medicare, the militant, independent stance of the Province of Quebec, the constant financial demands of the provinces, the surrender by the federal government of the tax on power utilities in September 1965, the new federal deal of September 1966, and the final, revised one of October 1966.

THE ISSUE-AREA OF NATO

The issue-area of NATO dates back only to April 1949 when twelve European and North American states, concerned with the power and foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union, decided to form a military alliance designed to prevent or repel aggression and promote cooperation among its signatories. The fourteen articles of the Treaty provided for the maintenance and increase of the individual and collective capacity of members to resist armed attack, mutual consultation in military and other fields, and most importantly, contained a firm pledge that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America would be considered an attack against all of them.¹¹

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 gave the necessary impetus to the creation of a NATO strategy. In the fall of that year, the NATO Council, the highest decision making authority in the alliance, decided to "plan for the creation of an integrated force under centralized command, adequate to deter aggression".¹² Three months later the creation of an integrated European defence force and the establishment of a Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was approved, and shortly afterwards General Dwight D. Eisenhower became NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). All member states would be asked to assign to SACEUR a specified number of men, who would remain under national control in peace-time, but would be commanded by SACEUR in the event of a war.¹³

In February 1952, the NATO Council, meeting in Lisbon, called for the creation, by the end of the year, of fifty divisions, one half of them combat ready and the other half at reduced strength but quickly mobilizeable, as well as four thousand first-line aircraft. The hope was to increase the force to ninety six divisions by 1954.¹⁴ Thus, NATO's first military strategy was entirely conventional, i.e. it called for the defence of Europe on the ground, with conventional armed forces, using conventional equipment.

Within a very short time it became evident that many NATO members would find it impossible to fulfill the quotas set at Lisbon. France, who was at the time fighting the Indochina war, could contribute only five of the fourteen divisions allotted to her. In anticipation of the Federal Republic of Germany's admission into the alliance, that country was allotted twelve divisions, but it had none at the time and her armament program did not begin until three years later when she became a NATO member in May of 1955. Many other allies, including Canada, still recovering from the disruptions of the War regretfully concluded that the military goals set at Lisbon were far too ambitious for their capabilities.¹⁵

In the meantime, the nuclear and conventional power of the Soviet Union was growing. By the mid 1950's, that country possessed the strongest conventional armed forces in the world. But more importantly, she was also becoming a significant nuclear power. She had exploded her first atomic weapon in September 1949, and developed a hydrogen (thermo-nuclear) bomb by the summer of 1953, slightly more than a year after the United States.

The nuclear gap initially existing between the two superpowers was thus almost closed. By the summer of 1957, the Soviet Union was to fire an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM), and in the fall of the same year, to the astonishment of the world, successfully launch an earth satellite into space.

In view of these developments, the NATO Council meeting of December 1955 officially decided that the armed forces of the alliance would be equipped with the most advanced weapons. The word 'nuclear' was used for the first time only two years later, at the NATO heads of government meeting, held in Paris in December 1957, which Prime Minister Diefenbaker was to attend, and where it was explicitly stated that intermediate range ballistic missiles would become an integral part of SACEUR's arsenal, and that nuclear weapons would be stockpiled for use by the NATO forces.¹⁶

Canada was to be intimately affected by these developments. The country had been an enthusiastic promoter and supporter of NATO from the very beginning of the alliance. Her major initial contribution consisted of widening the possible field of cooperation among the NATO allies to cover also the political and economic fields. Article 2 of the NATO Treaty, which has often been called 'the Canadian article' because Canadian negotiators fought most fervently for its incorporation into the Treaty, called on the parties to cooperate "by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded", as well as to "encourage economic collaboration between any of all of them".

But although Canada exhibited the greatest interest in the non-military aspects of the Treaty, she has fulfilled conscientiously all the military requirements of the alliance. By the winter of 1951/52 one infantry brigade, over 5,000 men, had been recruited and posted in Europe, where they were to be joined, by the spring of 1953, by eleven squadrons of Canadian interceptor aircraft, later increased to twelve squadrons. Canada also undertook to create and maintain a credible standing army and earmarked for services under the NATO command virtually all the units (about 30 ships) of the Royal Canadian Navy's Atlantic command, as well as the patrol aircraft of the RCAF's Atlantic command. The country also initiated the construction, on Canadian soil, of such facilities as were required to build the common NATO infrastructure, at the cost of approximately \$2 billion.¹⁷

Canadians were also very active diplomatically in the NATO chambers and in the early years contributed greatly to the creation and simplification of the alliance's organizational and administrative structure. Mr. Pearson, then Secretary of State for External Affairs in Mr. St. Laurent's government, was to be the chairman of two sets of groups of the so-called Three Wise Men, first in 1951 and again in 1955, commissioned to investigate respectively the meaning of the 'Atlantic Community' and means of improving and extending NATO cooperation in non-military fields in order to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.

In spite of her interest in the non-military aspects of the alliance, Canada had no quarrel with the basic idea of adopting nuclear arms for the NATO forces, which were advocated by the Americans.

Canadian officials participated in all the NATO debates on the subject and were well aware of the alliance's inevitable drift into the atomic age.

This drift was initiated by NATO's most powerful member. The United States had succeeded in developing a nuclear bomb during the Second World War, and exploded two such bombs over Japan in the summer of 1945. It had since developed an impressive nuclear technology, including a wide variety of low-yield nuclear weapons which could be fired from cannon and multi-megaton weapons to be dropped from heavy bombers. In the early 1950's, having suffered a prolonged and frustrating conventional armed forces conflict in Korea, that country was beginning to consider the advantages of using her powerful weapons in a quick and efficient preemptive or retaliatory attack. The growing awareness of the relative merits of nuclear weapons reached the NATO chambers at the very time when the allies were faced with the painful reality of being unable to fill the conventional forces quotas required by NATO strategy. It was suddenly realized that Europe did not need to be defended on the ground with a multitude of men and conventional arms, for nuclear weapons would become a sensible, full or partial, substitute. The intricacies of ownership, control, supervision and use of the atomic weapons by the NATO allies were to be worked out later, but by the time Mr. Diefenbaker assumed office, in the second part of June 1957, NATO had committed itself to the acquisition of nuclear arms and Canada went along with the idea.

Soon the country was also to be involved in another nuclear dilemma, this time with respect to NORAD, which tied Canada and the United States in a common effort to defend the North American air space. The formation of this alliance would be formally announced six weeks after Mr. Diefenbaker assumed office, but negotiations leading to its formation, as well as the choice of weapons to be used (an American Bomarc missile whose efficiency depended entirely on its being equipped with nuclear warheads) took place during the last two years of the St. Laurent administration. Mr. Diefenbaker would only give his final verbal approval of the scheme to the American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.¹⁸ Thus, the decision to bring in nuclear weapons was never put to a formal vote in either NATO or NORAD, or approved by a special treaty, but rather evolved gradually during discussions and negotiations among countries which called themselves allies. Considering the gravity and importance of the issue, there was a certain informality in the manner in which this obligation was undertaken, but many considered it understandable under the circumstances.

The issue-area of NATO, if seen in its historical perspective, thus embraces a variety of issues related to the alliance's strategy and tactics, weapons to be used, responsibilities to be shared, and fiscal burdens to be borne. All the issues which fit this description will now be considered for the years 1957-1967.

NATO ISSUES DURING THE DIEFENBAKER ADMINISTRATION

Prime Minister Diefenbaker's first act in office vis-a-vis NATO was to be a fateful one. In December of 1957 he travelled to Paris to attend the annual meeting of the NATO Council, and placed his signature on the document which specified that:

NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear war-heads which will be readily available for the defence of the alliance in case of need. The Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.¹⁹

For years afterwards it was claimed, at home and abroad, that this act obliged Canada to equip its forces in Europe with atomic weapons. Some of its forces in Canada were to be similarly equipped because a few months earlier the Diefenbaker government agreed to establish with the United States the integrated North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). The American strategy for the defence of the North American continent at the time envisaged the use of nuclear weapons.

The agreements heralded a temporary curtailment of the indigenous Canadian defence industry. In the early 1950's the production of Canadian built planes and missiles had begun only to be discontinued in the late 1950's on grounds of obsolescence. An air-to-air missile known as the Velvet Glove, and such manned airplane programs as Astra and Sparrow were all discontinued as the impending revolution in warfare decreed that the manned airplane was outdated, and the Canadian missile would be replaced with a more advanced American one.

In September of 1958 Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced that a decision on the future of the fighter aircraft CF-105, also known as the Avro-Arrow, the last vestige of Canadian defence production, would be made in the spring of the following year. Much depended on the willingness of the Americans and other NATO allies to find a role for the plane in the overall strategy of the alliance and to purchase it, as domestic consumption alone would not recover the enormous investment that went into designing and manufacturing of the plane. But the NATO Council meeting in December of 1958 once again stressed nuclear retaliation, and as a result, at the end of February 1959 the government decided to cancel the Avro-Arrow program on grounds that it was too expensive and that there was no future for manned interceptors.

The development of an independent Canadian defence industry, and the research and industrial establishment that had grown around it was thus arrested. Instead, Canada would depend on foreign-manufactured, mostly American hardware, which would be cheaper and more up-to-date. Canada's air power in NORAD and in NATO would now be based on American inventions: the Bomarc, a long range ground-to-air missile, the Lacrosse, a ground-to-ground missile which was later found deficient and replaced with the Honest John rocket and launcher capable of using either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, as well as the Voodoo interceptor, also designed to be either conventional or nuclear. All launching equipment and a new guidance system required for the missiles' efficient operation was also to be purchased in the United States.

In fulfillment of the NORAD agreement Canada would build several missile bases in Ontario and Quebec using American hardware and Canadian and American personnel.

NATO's nuclear strategy called for the switching of the roles of Canadian air divisions in Europe from air defence to air offence, often called "strike and reconnaissance role", which involved the dropping of nuclear bombs on predetermined targets behind enemy lines. The change called for the twelve existing Canadian CF-100 and F-86 squadrons in Europe to be replaced by eight squadrons of Lockheed Starfighters, called CF-104, American made and designed exclusively for the delivery of nuclear warheads. They were to become operational by May of 1963.

In this way Canada was drifting into the nuclear age. Many Canadians were concerned that the fateful step was being taken in such a willy-nilly fashion, that the country was being dragged in by its allies, without ever having paused to consider the implications of the move. It was pointed out that there had never been any full-scale Parliamentary debate on the subject, nor any authoritative governmental pronouncement outlining the specific obligations undertaken and what they entailed. For example, Canadian Defence Minister Pearkes claimed that American nuclear warheads stored in Canada would be under joint control, with U.S. officers stationed at Canadian-manned bases, and that they would not be fired without the approval of the Canadian government. Questions were immediately raised as to what "joint control" would involve, because U.S. law clearly stipulated that nuclear weapons supplied by the United States must remain under American control.

Similarly, in 1959 it was announced that Canada and the United States agreed to exchange secret information on the military use of atomic energy, although what kind of information Canada had to exchange was not specified. The government was not eager to provide any answers and the White Paper on Defence, tabled in the House of Commons in May of 1959, claimed pompously that our forces were able to carry out defence commitments effectively and efficiently, but provided no details of any of the burning questions of the moment.

Public confusion regarding defence was further magnified when it was revealed that the Bomarc missile performed poorly in tests, failing seven tests in a row. In the U.S. fears were voiced that the missile was already obsolete, and in April of 1960 the U.S. House Appropriation Committee recommended complete elimination of the Bomarc program. The Diefenbaker government was in a difficult position, for it had abandoned the Canadian Arrow on grounds that it was obsolete, and presented the Bomarc as a better and cheaper substitute. Nevertheless, Canadian Defence Minister Pearkes defended both the utility of the missile and his government's intention to go ahead with plans to have it on Canadian soil, and equipped with nuclear warheads. Eventually, U.S. Defence Department's request for appropriation for the Bomarc development was approved in June of 1960 and the missile passed from the testing stage to full production.

The Canadian government's contribution to the growing dilemma of defence was to reluctantly heed the opposition's demand and create a parliamentary committee to examine defence expenditures.

The committee met in March of 1960 but its activities were severely circumscribed for its terms of reference permitted it to examine only expenditures from April of 1958 to April of 1959, but not questions of policy. Publicly, the government reaffirmed Canada's commitment to NATO in the Throne Speech in November of 1960, and in speeches by Mr. Diefenbaker and his ministers across the country. As for the actual acquisition of nuclear warheads, Mr. Diefenbaker made the decision dependent on the fate of the disarmament negotiations, and on the agreement with the United States for 'joint control' of warheads. The successful conclusion of neither was in sight. In this way Canada was committed, on paper, to acquire nuclear weapons for its forces in Canada and Europe, but had so far refused to accept any deliveries of these weapons.

The year 1961 was to see a full scale debate on the subject envelop the country. For one thing, opposition parties were beginning to publicly voice their opinion. The Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson, who had initially opposed any nuclear weapons, stated publicly in March 1961, that if the NATO Council so determined, he was in favour of equipping Canadian NATO forces with tactical nuclear weapons in accordance with international obligations undertaken, provided they remained under NATO control. He claimed that his support of NATO went hand in hand with his support of the United Nations. But while the Liberals were moving towards a conditional acceptance of nuclear warheads on grounds that Canada had made a commitment to this course of action, the NDP was unequivocally opposed to it and its leader Mr. T. C. Douglas advocated increased Canadian efforts to bring about a com-

plete and permanent nuclear disarmament.

More importantly, it was also becoming increasingly clear that the Diefenbaker cabinet itself was badly split on the issue. In October of 1960, in the course of a general cabinet reorganization, Defence Minister Pearkes was replaced with the former Minister of Agriculture Douglas Harkness, an enthusiastic proponent of nuclear weapons. He was to lead the nuclear wing of the cabinet, who expressed the views of the military establishment that Canada's commitment to the defence of Europe called for the use of the most modern and effective weaponry available. Mr. Harkness' views were to clash with those of External Affairs Minister Green, an opponent of nuclear weapons and a passionate advocate of disarmament. He had the backing of professional diplomats in his department, who were determined to maintain nuclear abstinence while there was any lingering hope of disarmament.

Adding to the general confusion was Mr. Diefenbaker himself who was reluctant to admit publicly that the acceptance by Canada of the strike reconnaissance role for the RCAF in Europe involved nuclear fire power, and justified his reluctance on grounds that he did not want to sabotage disarmament negotiations, which continued, on and off, in Geneva. With respect to NORAD, Mr. Diefenbaker was to maintain that in the absence of a "joint control" agreement with the U.S., Canada would not accept nuclear warheads, but if war came unexpectedly efforts would be made to bring the warheads to Canadian sites in a hurry.

Both the opposition parties and the press were quick to point out the absurdity of this argument, for while at that time it took a Russian ICBM seventeen minutes to reach this continent, it would take at least a day to transport a nuclear warhead from the nearest American base to the Bomarc site at North Bay, Ontario. When the Prime Minister continued to blame the Americans for the delay, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained that the custody of U.S. nuclear weapons made available for the allies must remain with the United States, and Canada could not share the physical custody over the weapons. She could, however, participate in deciding when and how they should be used. He implied that Canada was to blame for the stalemate.

In the meantime NATO was equally confused on the subject of nuclear weapons. At the NATO Council meeting in mid-December 1962 all the allies jointly decided not to tackle any controversial questions of NATO's strategy and nuclear requirements and sharing. A week later, during a meeting in the Bahamas between President Kennedy, British Prime Minister Macmillan and Prime Minister Diefenbaker, it became obvious that the Kennedy administration was eager to discourage allied aspirations to an independent nuclear deterrent, but encourage them instead to combine their forces into a common NATO force to which the United States would later contribute the necessary Polaris submarines. Mr. Diefenbaker reportedly pronounced himself ready to consider nuclear weapons for the Canadian air divisions in Europe but insisted that they not be on Canadian soil under the NORAD arrangement unless there was an emergency.

Immediately after Mr. Diefenbaker's return from Nassau, General Lauris Norstad, the retired NATO supreme commander, came to Ottawa and bluntly asserted that Canada was already committed to a nuclear role, thus contradicting government statements that a nuclear decision for the NATO forces was yet to be taken. Mr. Diefenbaker made no reply but when the defence debate opened in the House of Commons later in January 1963, he reported that the projected NATO nuclear deterrent was being discussed among the allies, but made no commitments one way or another. He insisted that he had not repudiated any international undertakings and that our defence policy should be fluid and flexible due to the fluid nature the nuclear deterrent, which, according to the Prime Minister, would lose its importance in the future in favour of conventional weapons. He explained that the meeting in Nassau left the nuclear future of NATO open to debate, and placed the strike reconnaissance role once envisaged for the Canadian air force in jeopardy. He thus cast doubt on the future of nuclear weapon carriers as well as the validity of NATO's nuclear strategy. Stunned, Defence Minister Harkness, shocked by the anti-nuclear interpretation that had been given to the Prime Minister's speech, first took the unprecedented step of issuing a statement purporting to clarify Mr. Diefenbaker's words, and a few days later handed in his resignation. The American State Department, also stunned by Mr. Diefenbaker's interpretations of events and intentions, issued a statement challenging many of his points, blaming the Canadian government for delays in reaching the nuclear sharing arrangement for NORAD, and denying that the Nassau meeting in any way

modified Canadian commitments to acquire nuclear warheads for its forces in NATO and NORAD. Mr. Diefenbaker condemned the State Department's release as a rude intrusion in Canadian internal affairs and later was to stipulate that it was issued in order to destroy him in the forthcoming federal election, which he was to lose to Mr. Pearson.

In the meantime, the Liberals were playing to the hilt the government's confusion over defence, and made it into one of the most important election issues. In the second week of January 1963, Mr. Pearson unveiled a Liberal defence policy which called for the acceptance of nuclear warheads for those defensive tactical weapons which would not effectively be used without them but which Canada had agreed to use. However, he insisted that the whole basis of Canadian participation in NATO and NORAD should be re-examined with a view of possibly playing a non-nuclear role in the future. In this way Mr. Pearson reassured those who wanted Canada to fulfill her international obligations, and those who would prefer for Canada to play a non-nuclear role in both alliances.

Thus, the more important NATO issues of Mr. Diefenbaker's administration were: the alliance decision to go nuclear in December 1957, the validity of the Arrow program, Canada's dependence on U.S. military hardware, the White Paper on defence of May 1959, the utility of the Bomarc missile, the creation of the Commons Committee on defence expenditures in March of 1960, the adoption of nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces in Europe, the adoption of nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces under NORAD, the nuclear sharing agreement

with the United States, and the Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson's position on the question of nuclear arms.

NATO ISSUES DURING THE PEARSON ADMINISTRATION

The day Mr. Pearson took office on April 22, 1963, it was officially announced in Ottawa that existing weapon systems in Canada and in Europe would be armed with nuclear warheads. The new Prime Minister discussed the matter with British Prime Minister Macmillan during his visit to London in May 1963, and concluded an informal agreement to that effect with President Kennedy during his visit to Hyannis Port the same month. Shortly after Canada signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on August 8, 1963, negotiations were officially concluded with the U.S. concerning the acquisition of nuclear warheads for the existing weapon systems in NORAD. The executive agreement made provisions for a joint control of the weapons, so that while their custody would remain with American personnel stationed at Canadian bases, the warheads would not be used operationally without the authorization of the Canadian government. The establishment of a "hot line" between Ottawa and the White House was to facilitate communication between the two parties in case of emergency. The first nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles arrived at the North Bay, Ontario base on New Year's Eve. Within months other warheads would be delivered to the Canadian forces in Germany.

While the problem of NORAD was thus settled, the same cannot be said of NATO. During the annual spring ministerial meeting of the NATO Council in Ottawa, the alliance showed itself to be in disarray and confusion, especially concerning the problem of production, distribution and control of nuclear weapons. A proposal for the creation of a NATO force, composed of tactical nuclear elements

then in existence, was heard and would later be developed into the idea of a NATO multi-lateral force (MLF). When the NATO Council met again in Paris in December 1963, members of the alliance left all nuclear issues at a standstill. Calls for the maintenance of allied unity in the face of Soviet threat were also heard, but if anything, members showed themselves to be disunited on a number of issues, and it was clear that the alliance was due for an reassessment.

In the meantime Canada was reassessing its own defence policy, in accordance with Mr. Pearson's election promises. A motion to that effect was introduced in the House of Commons on May 30, 1963, and by the end of June, twenty four MP's began discussions of a wide range of issues and problems related to defence. An interim report of the Committee was presented to the House on December 20, 1963. One of its major findings was that Canada was allocating too little of the defence dollar to equipment. The problem had already been partially taken care of in the first week of December when Defence Minister Hellyer introduced the estimates of his department in the House. They included cuts in defence expenditures by cutting down the militia as well as the RCN and RCAF reserves, and using the extra funds thus made available for the purchase and production of modern defence equipment. Furthermore, the Committee recommended that Canada should produce no nuclear weapons, keep its forces in Europe under NATO and let the U.S. retain final authority over its nuclear arms made available to NATO, but that Canada should continue to share in the joint defence of North America in NORAD.

Certain technical recommendations were also made concerning redesigning and/or abandoning of certain military equipment.

1964 was the year when Canada allied itself with France against NATO's multilateral force. The previous year Canada had already agreed to move its French based squadrons to Germany to accommodate President de Gaulle's wishes not to have U.S. nuclear arms on French soil. In January 1964, Prime Minister Pearson visited Paris and discovered that President de Gaulle's stubborn hostility to the MLF was matched by his own reluctance to support a force which would be costly, of questionable long term utility, draw Canada deeper into the nuclear pond, and probably impede nuclear disarmament talks between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., which Canada was vigorously encouraging. At that stage the MLF was envisaged as a fleet of 25 surface ships, each carrying eight Polaris missiles and crews from three different NATO nations, to be managed by those NATO members who chose to contribute to the force. The ultimate control, however, over how and when the force was to be used would rest in Washington. This arrangement would allow member nations, especially Germany which was bound by treaty not to manufacture nuclear weapons, to be members of a nuclear force without becoming independent nuclear powers. The proposition so alarmed the French President that he threatened to break the special treaty relationship with Germany and withdraw France from NATO altogether. As a result, American pressure to proceed with the force subsided and by the end of the year Canada was openly insisting that she would not accept any NATO nuclear formula which was not acceptable to France.

This was widely interpreted at home and abroad as an act of betrayal of NATO and collusion with France, a contention which was hotly denied by government spokesmen. External Affairs Minister Paul Martin, for example, claimed that Canada's only concern was to prevent divisions and disintegration of NATO, and that those who were looking for a greater share of nuclear responsibility would profit more if existing NATO nuclear machinery was reorganized in the direction of a greater sharing in the military decisions of the alliance. At the December 1964 NATO Council meeting the Minister was able to obtain member approval of his proposal that the alliance examine itself, its purposes and objectives, as accepted or rejected by all members. A year later the proposal was dropped for it was feared that the examination would become a with hunt against France. In the meantime, the Canadian government continued to hope that as soon as the existing nuclear devices became obsolete, a new NATO strategy would allow Canada to play a purely conventional role. This long term ambition was confirmed by Prime Minister Pearson in a major TV interview in January 1964.

It was also reflected in the recommendations of Defence Minister Paul Hellyer's White Paper on defence released in March 1964. Its major recommendation called for the unification of the entire defence establishment in order to create a single chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff, to replace the three existing separate units: the army, the navy, and the air force. The Paper's contention was that the unification would result in a more effective defence posture as well as a very considerable financial savings.

In line with Mr. Pearson's position, the Paper did not recommend the abandonment of any of Canada's nuclear carriers before they had fulfilled their allotted roles in NATO, but hoped that in the future Canada's contribution would be to add to the alliance's mobility and flexibility in its conventional operations. For now, the RCAF strike role in Europe would be implemented, but when the eight Starfighter squadrons in Europe became obsolete, the Paper hoped, they would be replaced not by other strike aircraft, but, with the allies' approval, by a conventional contribution.

Canada's policy vis-a-vis NATO was further clarified in two major speeches. In February 1965 Prime Minister Pearson, addressing Ottawa's Canadian Club, put much stress on the development of the political and economic (as opposed to military) unity among the NATO allies, and expressed doubts whether defence arrangements as well as the emphasis on defence matters suitable for 1945 still applied in 1965. He clearly saw the alliance "less as a defence coalition and more as a foundation for a closely cooperating political and economic community."²⁰ A month later External Affairs Minister Martin supplemented the Prime Minister's thoughts in a speech to the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, by stressing that, contrary to misinterpretations published in various corners, Canada considered her continued participation in the defence of Europe through NATO as a cornerstone of her foreign policy, and favoured such nuclear sharing arrangement within NATO which would be acceptable to all members, including France.

During a NATO meeting in London in May 1965 and two more meetings in Paris in November and December, External Affairs Minister Martin and Defence Minister Hellyer concentrated on helping to create a climate of consensus among the allies, and their diplomatic approach received much praise among the allies, especially for bringing France and the United States closer together. But no decisions were made concerning nuclear sharing.

In June 1965, with the fall election only a few months away, it was announced that the agreements to accept nuclear weapons for the four existing weapons systems Canada had bought, two in NATO and two in NORAD, had been fully implemented. But NATO was to be shaken when President de Gaulle decided to withdraw French troops from NATO's command, and asked that all foreign troops move out of France, including NATO command headquarters. When the 20 year old NATO treaty expired in April 19, 1969, all French military units at present under NATO command would revert exclusively to French control and France would claim sovereignty over all foreign military bases on French soil. France's participation in NATO would thus be purely nominal. President de Gaulle did not question the utility of the alliance itself and did not intend to withdraw from it, but claimed that conditions prevailing in the world at the present time were so different from those of 1949, specifically, the Soviet threat had so subsided, that such a move on France's part was fully justified. Canada joined other nations in criticizing France's move and took steps to vacate its two air bases in France by April 1, 1967.

The ministerial meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels in June 1966 was devoted completely to the practical arrangements connected with getting NATO headquarters and military installations out of France. Mr. Martin played crucial mediatory role during heated sessions, and reportedly averted a final break between France and other NATO members. Prime Minister Pearson, in a widely quoted speech delivered at the time in Illinois, stressed the importance of France as an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance.

At home the unification of the armed forces proceeded so well that by 1966 all Canadian army, navy and air force bases had passed out of existence and Canadian Forces Bases appeared in their place. What remained to be done was to unify the three services into one, with one uniform and one system of rank designation, and to iron out and synchronize various problems related to the inequities regarding terms of service, promotion and commissioning policies, retirement ages and benefits, etc. The confusion and inevitable unfairness which accompanied the process resulted in discontent among some of military personnel. Some people were forced to retire prematurely, others left voluntarily. Some senior military men publicly voiced their criticism of the unification, as wrong for the country and a gross mistake which would not bring any financial savings. Defence Minister Hellyer defended his program, which no other NATO country was attempting, claiming savings of over \$300 million to be made available for new capital equipment for defence. The government's position was that unification would in no way detract from Canada's position in NATO and NORAD, for "our force is a force for the 1970's,

a force which can contribute to NATO and NORAD as well as to UN operations or to any other demand placed on it by the Government of Canada."²¹

The opposition parties were not so sure about the validity of this claim. Conservative defence critics claimed that unification would make it impossible for Canada to fulfil her obligations in the two military alliances, and argued that "we should keep our plans flexible so that our forces are tailored to our commitments instead of our commitments having to be tailored to the kind of defence force this bill /unification bill/ ...will force on us."²² The NDP supported unification with the hope that it would eventually lead to substantial Canadian withdrawals from NATO and NORAD, especially from air and ground responsibilities in NATO, with only some kind of mobile force, stationed in Canada, being made available to NATO in case of emergency. Instead, the party advocated increased Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping. It was disappointed when the government firmly maintained that any reduction of forces could only come about after some of Europe's outstanding political problems had been solved.

During the remainder of 1967 there ranged in the country a noisy debate about the future course of Canada's foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis NATO and NORAD. It was opened on August 10, 1967, by Dalton Camp, National President of the Progressive Conservative Party and a representative of a vocal minority in the party, who called for a transfer of spending from defence to foreign aid, and the rejection of the country's association with such organizations

as NATO, NORAD, UN and the Commonwealth, in favour of an open ended functional policy favouring disarmament, non proliferation and foreign aid to the underdeveloped countries. He argued that the "psychological, political and military reasons for Canadian Military presence in Europe may have already disappeared,"²³ and that the Europeans should solve their own problems. In response, Foreign Minister Paul Martin, in several speeches, defended Canada's participation in NATO and claimed that foreign aid to underdeveloped countries could be increased without sacrificing NATO. He defended NORAD on grounds that it gave Canada a say in the defence of North America which would otherwise be entirely in the hands of the Americans, and explained that NORAD was basically a defence system against a bomber attack, and would not necessarily require Canada's participation in any anti-missile defence network. However, in September U.S. Defence Secretary Robert S. McNamara announced that an anti-ballistic defence system (ABM) would have to be constructed for protection against Chinese missiles. No satisfactory explanations were received from Mr. Martin or Mr. Pearson concerning Canada's role in this system. Both were evasive on the issue and no clear statement of Canada's policy towards NORAD was received to the end of Mr. Pearson's term in office.

The December 1967 meeting of the NATO Council was the last one during Mr. Pearson's tenure as Prime Minister and took place among a great national and international uproar concerning the value of the alliance. External Affairs Minister Martin repeatedly denied that Canada contemplated a withdrawal or reduction of its commitment.

The new Defence Minister Leo Cadieux stated in Brussels, on December 11, that Canada was considering switching its nuclear air force role to a conventional support role in Europe, but would continue to maintain its NORAD nuclear role. At home the three major parties were confused and divided. The Liberals were divided between Mr. Pearson's camp which favoured reduced military participation in NATO and the extension of its economic and political ties, and those who favoured keeping the status quo. The Conservatives were divided between Mr. Camp's supporters favouring withdrawal and turning more to peacekeeping and foreign aid, and those who wanted Canada's military contribution in NATO strengthened. The NDP was divided between those who favoured token participation and those advocating complete withdrawal. That the press was also divided will be illustrated later on. By the end of the year, it became clear that Canada would remain in NATO but phase out its air divisions from the original 12 squadrons to six and then to four, and that further in 1968 the Canadian 6,300 member infantry brigade in West Germany would be cut by 500 men. A reduction of Canada's contribution to NATO and the maintenance of status quo in NORAD was Mr. Pearson's answer to the dilemmas of his foreign policy.

Thus, the more important NATO issues of Mr. Pearson's administration were: the decision to accept nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in NATO and NORAD, the MLF for NATO and Germany's participation in it, the internal disunity among the NATO allies, the report of the Commons Committee on Defence, the unification of Canadian armed forces as recommended by the White Paper, France's decision

to withdraw from NATO's integrated command, and the final reduction of Canada's military contribution to NATO.

FOOTNOTES

1. Peter J. T. O'Hearn, Peace, Order and Good Government (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1964), 172. For a good overview of the subject see also J. Peter Meekison, "Federal-Provincial Relations," in John H. Redekop, ed., Approaches to Canadian Politics (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice Hall of Canada, 1978).
2. Peter J. T. O'Hearn, Peace, Order and Good Government, 11.
3. John Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), 54.
4. Ibid., 55.
5. Canadian Annual Review for 1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 24.
6. Ibid., 23.
7. Ibid., 65.
8. Canadian Annual Review for 1966 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 67.
9. Ibid., 72
10. Ibid., 76.
11. John Gellner, Canada in NATO (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1970), 30.
12. Ibid., 22.
13. Ibid., 22-23.
14. Ibid., 41.
15. Ibid., 41.
16. Ibid., 44.
17. Ibid., 30.
18. Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power, The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd, 1968), 347.
19. "What NATO Did - and Didn't" in the Globe and Mail, Dec. 20, 1957, 4.

20. Canadian Annual Review for 1965 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 215.
21. Canadian Annual Review for 1967 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 264.
22. Ibid., 264.
23. Ibid., 266.

CHAPTER 4: MOTIVATIONAL INTENSITY:
EDITORIAL REACTION OF NEWSPAPERS TOWARDS ISSUES

The first hypothesis, based on Rosenau's reasoning, is that the domestic area is likely to stimulate a lower intensity of newspaper reaction toward issues than the foreign area. This is because, according to Rosenau, domestic issues cast members of a given political system in opposition to each other so that they bring to the issues a multiplicity of affiliations and loyalties. As a result their goals become confounded and their aspirations may not be clear cut. The resulting complexity curbs the intensity of their feelings. In the foreign area, on the other hand, members of a given political system deal with circumstances outside of the system, which they view in a simple "we" versus "they" dichotomy. Their motives, therefore, are not as likely to be confused by cross-cutting interests, but are bound to be less complex and ambivalent and more clear cut and undiluted in intensity.

The first indicant of motivational intensity will be the overall number of editorials printed. This is on the assumption that if a newspaper prints an editorial on a subject it displays a motivation to deal with that subject. It is, therefore, interesting to look at the overall ratio of domestic and foreign editorials under both administrations. The curious finding is that the foreign area (NATO) generated a considerably greater number of editorials than the domestic area (federal-provincial fiscal relations) throughout the entire time span under investigation.

Table 4.1

OVERALL RATIO OF DOMESTIC VERSUS FOREIGN EDITORIALS

		GM	MS	WFP	MEAN
Dief.	Dom.	34%(21)*	14%(8)	23%(10)	23%
	For.	66%(40)	86%(49)	77%(34)	76%
Pears.	Dom.	45%(39)	42%(35)	47%(45)	45%
	For.	54%(46)	58%(48)	53%(39)	54%
	MEAN	40% 60%	28% 72%	35% 65%	

*All percentage numbers have been rounded off to the nearest full number. The figure in brackets refers to the number of cases in that particular category.

In all cases for the three newspapers combined as well as for each newspaper separately, the number of foreign editorials is greater than the number of domestic editorials. This is particularly true of Mr. Diefenbaker's time when the foreign area produced, in one instance, six times as many editorials as the domestic area (MS 86% vs. 14%). Altogether, while the Conservatives were in power, foreign editorials outnumbered domestic ones by a ratio of three to one. Under the Liberal regime a relative balance was maintained between the two, with foreign editorials slightly tipping the scale over the domestic ones.

The finding is further substantiated by the test of statistical significance which was performed on the data in order to determine whether differences between the frequency of domestic and foreign editorials could be called statistically significant.¹ The results were as follows:

Table 4.2

STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RATIO OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN EDITORIALS

Newsp./PM	# of dom. edit.	# of for. edit.	SIGNIFICANCE
GM/Dief	21	40	0.0150
MS/Dief	8	49	<u>0.0000</u>
WFP/Dief	10	34	<u>0.0000</u>
GM/Pears	39	46	0.4480
MS/Pears	35	48	0.1540
WFP/Pears	35	39	0.6420

The table above clearly illustrates that during Mr. Diefenbaker's time in office there was a significant difference in the ratio of domestic versus foreign editorials for two of the three newspapers (low values under SIGNIFICANCE have been underlined). This phenomenon must be attributed to the heated controversies generated in the foreign area by the question of nuclear arms for Canadian armed forces in NATO and NORAD. The Montreal Star printed nearly 50 editorials on the subject as compared with only 8 editorials on the subject of federal-provincial fiscal relations. The discrepancy was nearly as wide in the case of the Winnipeg Free Press. It is clear that the foreign issue during Mr. Diefenbaker's administration produced a high degree of newspaper's involvement.

By comparison the domestic issue produced hardly any involvement at all. While no burning controversies arose during Mr. Pearson's time in office and as a result there is no statistical significance in the domestic and foreign ratios, it is interesting to note that under both administrations the three newspapers were more likely to print a NATO editorial than a federal-provincial editorial. If the propensity to print editorials is taken as an indicant of the newspapers' motivational intensity of involvement in issues, then it can be claimed that, in line with Rosenau's reasoning, the three newspapers exhibited a greater motivational intensity in the foreign area than in the domestic area.

While the decision to print an editorial on a subject is, in itself, indicative of the newspaper's motivational intensity, a better indication of this intensity can be obtained by investigating the content of the editorial. In this thesis the newspaper's propensity to take stands on issues is considered to be the main indicant of that newspaper's motivational intensity. The assumption here is that if a newspaper makes a judgment of or takes a stand on the issue, it manifests its intensity of feelings about that issue. Consequently, if Rosenau is right, then the foreign area should have a higher frequency of editorial stands on issues than the domestic area. The statistical results obtained do not support this conclusion.

Table 4.3

FREQUENCY OF EDITORIAL STANS ON ISSUES

		GM	MS	WFP	MEAN
Dief.	Dom.	76% (16)	100% (8)	100% (10)	92%
	For.	85% (34)	80% (39)	47% (16)	71%
Pears.	Dom.	74% (29)	71% (25)	49% (17)	65%
	For.	91% (42)	83% (40)	90% (35)	88%
MEAN		75% 88%	86% 83%	74% 68%	

Table 4.4

STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RATIO OF EDITORIAL STANDS VERSUS
NO-STANDS ON ISSUES

Newsp/PM	# of stands	# of no-stands	SIGNIFICANCE
GM/Dief			
Domestic	16	5	
Foreign	34	6	0.6201
MS/Dief			
Domestic	8	0	
Foreign	39	10	0.3693
WFP/Dief			
Domestic	10	0	
Foreign	16	18	<u>0.0094</u>
GM/Pears			
Domestic	29	10	
Foreign	42	4	0.0727
MS/Pears			
Domestic	25	10	
Foreign	40	8	0.3060
WFP/Pears			
Domestic	17	18	
Foreign	35	4	<u>0.0003</u>

The results obtained fail to provide a consistent pattern of substantial differences² between the frequency of editorial stands on domestic and foreign issues. There are, however, some interesting discrepancies between the two administrations and the three newspapers. The discrepancy of stands under Mr. Diefenbaker's administration is erratic. But during Mr. Pearson's time in office all the three newspapers were consistent in having a higher frequency of editorial stands on foreign than on domestic issues, thus lending support to Rosenau's reasoning. The Pearson era thus tends to support the hypothesis that foreign issues are likely to generate more clear cut editorial stands, or judgements, than domestic issues.

With respect to the three newspapers only the Globe and Mail has a consistently higher frequency of foreign than domestic stands under both administrations. The Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press under Mr. Diefenbaker were more likely to take an editorial stand on the domestic than the foreign issue, thus contradicting the hypothesis. It is necessary to examine their wayward performance in greater detail in order to understand the phenomenon.

If a newspaper took a stand on an issue, that stand was coded according to three different coding categories: 1) In favor/Approbative; 2) Split/Ambivalent and 3) Against/Critical of. For example, if a newspaper took a stand on the issue of nuclear arms it could either approve of nuclear arms for Canadian armed forces, or be against the acquisition of nuclear arms, or be split and maybe approve of the acquisition of the arms for NATO but not of storing nuclear warheads in Canada.

If it discussed numerous complications and implications of the nuclear arms phenomena without committing itself either way then the editorial was coded as having No stand. A comparative assessment of the three newspapers' foreign stands under Mr. Diefenbaker will now be undertaken in order to understand why the performance of the Globe and Mail differed from the performance of the other two newspapers.

The Globe and Mail took a stand in the foreign area during Mr. Diefenbaker's time in office in 85% of its editorials. The newspaper approved with great enthusiasm of the Avro Arrow, calling it "one of the best - perhaps the very best - potential fighter aircraft in the world." (GM 25.9.58), and pointed out the numerous advantages of having the project in Canada:

One of the virtues of the Arrow's development has been its contribution to Canada's industrial diversification. With the Arrow (and CF-100) expenditures we have bought new skills, new techniques, new industrial processes and plants which otherwise would not exist, but which today range far beyond the needs of the Arrow program in their service to Canada. (GM, 17.12.58)³

Equally definitively the newspaper disapproved of Canada's excessive dependence on U.S. military hardware, the utility of the Bomarc missile and the subservient role Canada was playing in NORAD.

We are becoming unhealthily dependent on another country for the means to defend ourselves. (GM, 3.10.58).

The Arrow decision illustrated Canada's growing subordination to the U.S. not only in defense itself, but in defense production.... Meanwhile, defence production facilities in Canada stand idle; Canada's weapons are being made in the U.S. This sort of integration leads, step by step, to a domination which cannot help but be noted by other countries of the world. (GM, 14.5.59).

Whatever military significance the Bomarc missile may have had, it has long since been disposed of. It is inefficient and unreliable against the manned bomber; useless against the ballistic missile, since the Bomarc operates from a fixed site. The Bomarc's significance is now entirely political.... (GM, 5.5.60)

To be realistic we must recognize that we are very much a junior partner to the United States in terms of the contribution we make to NORAD strength. But a junior partner is not a servant.... We have not committed our forces to joint command to be mere appendages of U.S. strength and tools of U.S. policy. (GM, 3.1.63)

But most important of all, the Globe and Mail, after an initial period of soul-searching and indecision, came to approve of the acquisition of nuclear arms for Canadian armed forces in NATO and NORAD and did not hesitate to state so frequently:

. . .this newspaper believes that our obligation to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of the North American Air Defence Command require us to accept defensive nuclear weapons.... (GM, 11.12.62)

If we are to be part of an alliance with an integrated force, we must equip our forces with the appropriate weapons - with nuclear weapons if necessary. (GM, 11.12.62)

The harsh facts of geography make isolationism or neutralism, impossible for Canada.... All NATO nations possessing nuclear strength will be expected to contribute to the multi-national force and to share in the joint planning and selection of targets for the force.... As long as we remain members of an alliance depending upon nuclear strength - and we must remain in NATO - we share responsibility for the employment of that strength.... (GM, 12.4.64)

It follows that if we share responsibility we should also share power. That means contributing our nuclear strength in Europe to the NATO pool so that we should have a voice...in the organization and control of the multi-national force. (GM, 12.4.63)

It is evident that the Globe and Mail was deeply involved in the NATO-related issues as illustrated by its very high frequency of unequivocal stands on practically every issue.

With practically no ambivalence or hesitation the Globe knew very well where its preferences lay and stated so with seemingly clear cut and undiluted intensity.

The Montreal Star had a frequency of stands on foreign issues during Mr. Diefenbaker's time in office not much lower than the Globe and Mail, 80% versus the Globe's 85%. The newspaper took more time to take stands and tended to reserve judgement more often than the Globe and Mail, but finally took a critical posture vis-a-vis the Arrow, approved of the defence sharing agreement with the U.S. and agreed that Canada should, for the time being, acquire nuclear arms for its forces in NATO and NORAD.

. . . the military virtues of the Arrow...are considerable, but not as considerable as they once thought to be.... In fact, the Arrow was dropped because of its much reduced value in the light of advances in other weapons, its inordinate cost in relation to our defence dollar, and the sad fact that nobody else wanted to share it with us. (MS, 25.2.59).

The...announcement of the news agreement/the nuclear sharing agreement with the U.S./should be regarded with satisfaction by Canadians.... It represents a step ahead in the next phase of Canada's defence program.... (MS, 27.5.59)

Perhaps we are too small a power to have the strategic needs the Times mentions for Britain, but we do have to settle our tactical role in the light of NATO's strategic needs.... Above everything, we are honour-bound to fulfil whatever responsibilities to the Western alliance we may have accepted. (MS. 14.1.63)

It is a sorrowful fact that Canada has struck a body-blow at the whole concept of collective defence.... In the circumstances of the hour we find the position taken by Mr. Pearson/to accept nuclear arms for the time being/ the only honourable way out of this impasse. (MS, 2.2.63)

The performance of the Winnipeg Free Press was quite different from that of the other two newspapers.

The Free Press took a stand on foreign issues under Mr. Diefenbaker in only 47% of its editorials, which was considerably less frequently than the Globe or the Star. It took a definite stand only on the issue of the Arrow aircraft, which it criticized on grounds that it "would be obsolescent even before it got into the air in any numbers .../and/ the appalling high cost of the new aircraft...." (WFP , 24.9.58), and on the expansion of political and economic, as opposed to military, links among the NATO allies, of which it approved wholeheartedly, claiming that the creation of an Atlantic Community "is the most practical politics and the most vital task before the free peoples of America and Europe today." (WFP, 20.12.62). But on the issue of whether Canada should accept nuclear arms for its forces in NATO and NORAD the newspaper made no stand at all to the very end of Mr. Diefenbaker's administration. As will be shown later it condemned the Prime Minister's indecision, and printed numerous editorials on the subject pointing out the pros and cons of either course of action, but committed itself to neither. The key to the Winnipeg Free Press's performance thus lies in its inability to take a stand on the crucial issue of nuclear arms. This inability may be the result of the newspaper editorial staff's indecision, timidity or the belief that an important issue like that should be decided by the government itself. Whatever the reason, the Winnipeg Free Press's performance contradicts Rosenau's conviction that in the foreign field it is simple to adopt the "we" versus "they" dichotomy and take stands easily.

The foreign frequencies which have just been discussed must now be compared with the frequencies of stands on domestic issues under

Mr. Diefenbaker. According to the hypothesis the domestic frequencies should have been lower than the foreign ones. This is so only in the case of the Globe and Mail which had the frequency of domestic stands of 76% and thus slightly lower than its foreign frequency of 85%.

The other two newspapers both had the frequency of 100% of domestic stands versus 80% of foreign stands in the case of the Montreal Star and 47% in the case of the Winnipeg Free Press. They thus contradict the hypothesis.

Just under a quarter of the Globe's domestic editorials had no stand but simply outlined the various implications of the different fiscal arrangements and proposals. The remaining 76% of editorials had a stand. For example, the paper approved of the increase in provincial rebates announced in January 1958, and of the growing financial needs of the provinces. On the other hand, it was very critical of the entire range of transfer payments, such as equalization payments, tax rental agreements, and all unconditional grants from the federal government to the provinces. The following comments will illustrate its stands:

It is wrong that Provincial Government should be dependent upon transfer payments from Ottawa. It is still more wrong... that the payments transferred to the Provinces by Ottawa should represent such a small proportion of the amount Ottawa collects. (GM, 26.7.69)

The tax-rental agreements, and their accompanying equalization payments, have reduced most of the Provinces to a state of servile dependency on the Dominion Treasury, a state which could surely have horrified the Founders of Confederation. (GM, 1.11.60)

What we complain about is the system of so-called equalization grants. Because the system is based only on the three standard taxes (individual income, corporation income,

succession duties), and only on the average per capital return produced by these three standard taxes in Ontario and British Columbia, the effect has been to channel huge equalization payments into wealthy Provinces like Alberta - with Ontario paying half the shot. (GM, 24.2.61)

The newspaper accepted the tax deal, which abolished the tax-rental system and modified equalization payments, with great reluctance "not because it is sound but because it has to be accepted: (GM, 27.2.61) and was pleased that "a move - albeit a small one - has been made back to the principle of fiscal autonomy...for the Provinces" (GM, 27.2.61). Thus, in an overwhelming majority of its editorials the Globe and Mail did not hesitate to offer a definite opinion about the value of programs and arrangements, and its stands displayed a protective attitude towards its home province of Ontario, which was supplying the federal treasury with most of the fiscal resources which were then used to pay out the various transfer and equalization payments to the poorer provinces. By taking stands against these payments and by approving of the principle of fiscal autonomy for the provinces the Globe and Mail was rather selfishly defending the interests of the province of Ontario, without much regard for the fiscal needs of the other provinces.

The Montreal Star took a stand on domestic issues in 100% of the cases. The newspaper was ambivalent about the validity of provincial demands on grounds that they are by nature insatiable, and the increase in provincial rebates of January 1958. But it approved wholeheartedly of the special grants to the Maritime provinces, and in particular of the Quebec Premier Lesage's demands vis-a-vis Ottawa:

If such "favoritism" /towards the Atlantic provinces/ is in principle open to criticism...it is made necessary by the facts of national life in Canada. Regional standards of services cannot be left markedly below the national average. The same facts, indeed, justify the expenditures the Federal Government proposes to make to provide the Atlantic provinces with an adequate supply of electric power. (MS, 29.11.57)

. . .but the real star of the occasion was Quebec's Premier Lesage. He too made demands.... But his assertions of provincial rights, responsibilities and needs was made in terms which no one could find unacceptable.... The approach of Mr. Lesage is different, positive and cooperative. It deserves to bear fruit. (MS, 27.7.60)

The newspaper disapproved of the final deal offered to the provinces by Mr. Diefenbaker on grounds that it did not fulfill Quebec's fiscal demands, but went a long way to satisfy Ontario where the provincial Conservative government was in great friendship with the Diefenbaker's Conservatives:

Premier Lesage can hardly be blamed for his outburst of disappointment at the nature of the new tax-sharing proposals.... Broadly speaking, Quebec will be no better off in the next years than it was in the last five.... The new formula appears to freeze the payments to Quebec but provides substantial additional sums to Ontario. Mr. Lesage probably smells some political game in this... for Mr. Lesage is a Liberal while Premier Frost of Ontario is a Conservative who gave substantial help to the federal Conservatives in 1957-58. (MS, 25.2.61)

In this way the Montreal Star also took stands on issues depending whether or not they benefited Quebec and, with the exception of its charitable stand vis-a-vis the needs of the Atlantic provinces, displayed a lack of concern regarding the needs of the other provinces.

The Winnipeg Free Press also took domestic stands in 100% of its editorials. It was ambivalent only in the case of the unexpected increase in provincial rebates announced in January 1958. In all

other cases it either approved or disapproved. It was extremely critical of the financial demands of the provinces vis-a-vis the federal government and the ultimate abandonment of the tax rental system. It spoke with hostility about "the greedy demands of Ontario and British Columbia" (WFP, 16.6.60), and called their demands "outrageous". (WFP, 27.7.60). It sarcastically pointed out that all the provinces were by nature too greedy:

. . . /the federal government/ can only fight and drag out of the process of yielding to the provinces' demands that inevitably follow. To those demands there is, of course no practical limit. The fact... is that the provinces will never be satisfied. Why should they be? Every dollar from Ottawa is a politician's idea of utopia. It is money he can spend on services for the voter without himself having to tax the voter for it.... The device is so wonderful that there is no reason whatever why the provincial politician should ever feel that he has enough of it. (WFP, 26.11.57)

On the other hand the newspaper felt very approving about the systems of tax rental and equalization payments and vigorously defended both:

The equalization payments... are not a matter of charity but a matter of right. They are the means of making sure that the less favoured provinces, get the money that is rightly theirs. (WFP, 16.6.60)

Scrapping tax rental agreements would mean that the less favoured provinces, Manitoba among them, would suffer financially as Ontario benefited. The profits from money spent on goods and services in the less favoured provinces cannot be taxed in these provinces. They flow to Mr. Frost's province where the head offices of the large corporations are located. With no tax rental agreements, Mr. Frost would be free to tax these profits and keep all the proceeds.... It is inconceivable that the federal government will pay any attention to the greedy demands of Ontario. (WFP, 16.6.60)

The newspaper was extremely negative about the 1960 deal especially the provision that froze the equalization payments, on grounds that the move would "abolish the central principle underlying dominion-provincial fiscal relations for the past 20 years." It asked whether "the prime minister should be taken seriously at all?" (WFP, 27.10.60).

Thus, the Winnipeg Free Press also jealously guarded the interests of its province and its stands on issues were determined by how these issues affected Manitoba. There is little evidence to show that the paper brought to the domestic issues a multiplicity of affiliations and loyalties which diluted its ability to express judgements. On the contrary, the newspaper's affiliation and loyalty, just like the affiliation and loyalty of the other two newspapers, seemed to belong to its home province, whose interests the paper defended. Its frequency of stands versus no-stand on domestic and foreign issues was found to be statistically significant - the only newspaper among the three to exhibit such difference (see Table 4.4 above). The Winnipeg Free Press's performance in the domestic area is diametrically opposed to its performance in the foreign area, where the newspaper failed to take a stand on the crucial issue of nuclear arms and had a low frequency of stands on foreign issues in general. It is clear that the domestic area was much more important to the Winnipeg Free Press, partly because the province of Manitoba was poorer than Ontario or Quebec, and had been for decades on the receiving end of many federal payments and subsidies. Mr. Diefenbaker's policy of freezing the equalization payments and generally making the provinces more autonomous and thus more responsible for their own fiscal problems would

affect Manitoba negatively and make it fall back on its own meager resources. In these circumstances the Winnipeg Free Press took it upon itself to defend federal subsidies of the provinces and the interests of Manitoba in general. Its performance clearly contradicts the hypothesis and shows that in certain circumstances a newspaper can afford to ignore foreign issues but bring to domestic issues an undivided loyalty and a determined judgement. The performance of the other two newspapers also points out that the domestic area newspapers need not be torn by a multiplicity of affiliations and loyalties and thus perform timidly, but, on the contrary, they see themselves as defenders of their home province and take stands boldly. The choice of the domestic issue may have something to do with this. The nub of federal-provincial fiscal relations is how much money can the provinces squeeze out of Ottawa. Every province is out to demonstrate its enormous needs and point out previous injustices committed by the federal government in order to substantiate its demand for more money. In this situation newspapers might feel honour bound to take a partisan stand supporting their home province.

Turning now to the Pearson era, the frequency of domestic and foreign stands was always substantially higher for the foreign area: 74% v. 91% for the Globe and Mail, 71% v. 83% for the Montreal Star, and 49% v. 90% for the Winnipeg Free Press. The discrepancy of frequencies of the Winnipeg paper was also found to be statistically significant. It can therefore be said that the performance of the three newspapers under Mr. Pearson's administration tends to confirm the hypothesis.

The frequency of foreign stands exceeds 90% in the case of the Globe and the Winnipeg Free Press, and exceeds 80% in the case of the Montreal Star. Thus, at least eight out of ten editorials, and most often nine out of ten editorials had a stand on the foreign issue. The performance of the Globe and Mail is typical in this respect. With great daring and without much ado, the newspaper quickly made up its mind and stated unequivocally where its preferences lay. It was ambivalent only about Canada's role in NORAD and especially about the adoption of the ABMs for the alliance, and at the beginning hesitated about the MLF for NATO and Germany's participation in it, but eventually approved of both. It also approved of the bringing of nuclear weapons to Canada in fulfillment of commitments undertaken by the previous government, the Canada - U.S. defence production sharing agreement, as well as a series of NATO-related happenings in Canada, such as the report of the Commons Committee on Defence, the reforms proposed by Mr. Hellyer's White Paper, and the subsequent integration and unification of the Canadian armed forces. It took a critical stand on the issue of the internal disunity in the alliance, and consistently on anything done or said by President de Gaulle of France. The following quotations will illustrate the newspaper's stands:

Trimming of the reserve forces will also produce cries of outrage, but it is common knowledge that some reserve units have become little more than social clubs maintained at public expense.... The only sensible answer is to cut the waste and the unnecessary from the establishment. (GM, 7.12.63)

The committee/special all-party Commons committee on defence/ in fact, has demolished most of the myths about nuclear weapons which have bedevilled Canadian politics. It has shown that when MP's get together to examine facts, most of their partisan differences disappear.

The defence committee, in other words, has provided a splendid example of committee work at its best. (GM, 23.12.63)

The White Paper shows boldness and imagination in the decision to unify Canada's three armed services under one Commander in Chief. No doubt shellfire of outraged protest at the change will pour down ... but when the dust clears the wisdom of the action will be manifest. (GM, 27.3.64)

West Germans must not be made to feel like second-class members of the Western Alliance. Either Germany is with us or she isn't. If she is, she must be given a meaningful role in the defence apparatus she is helping to man and maintain. (GM, 16.21.66)

In this sense, building a ABM system would be an offensive (rather than defensive) move. It would therefore be provocative, and would lead to further escalation in the nuclear arms race Since an ABM race would imperil further agreements between them / the two super-powers /, as well as reviving all the fears and dangers of the Cold War at its worst, both have strong reasons to pull back from the brink. (GM, 5.3.67)

Equally boldly, the Winnipeg Free Press enthusiastically approved of the review of the Canadian defence policy and the proposed unification of the armed forces, as well as the MLF for NATO, and Germany's nuclear aspirations. It just as strongly criticized President de Gaulle's withdrawal from the NATO's command and the alliance's internal disunity. These examples will illustrate its stand:

The White Paper approaches the whole defence problem with exemplary logic and clarity. First, it defines the objectives of Canadian foreign and defence policy. This is followed by a brief history of the evolution of the services.... Finally, there is a broad outline of the structural and organizational changes which must be made (WFP, 30.3.64)

...the unification reforms are soundly conceived and deserve the full support of the public. (WFP, 9.7.64)

The force /MLF/ is not a mere "gimmick" - as its opponents have claimed - aiming at giving the Germans a say in nuclear weapons.

On the contrary, it would fill an urgent strategic need by countering Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles targeted on Western European cities; and of course, it would give a say to the Europeans in the nuclear defence of their countries. (WFP, 18.11.64)

The Germans feel that the only deterrent to such an action /Soviet invasion/ would be the knowledge that American nuclear weapons would be used immediately The Germans have a valid point.... (WFP, 17.11.65)

President de Gaulle...would weaken Europe by splitting it into a league of completely independent, quarrelsome states, precisely the kind of continent that produced the two world wars.... In short, his own grandeur and mystique disguise a grand misconception of power in the modern world. (WFP, 31.3.66)

The Montreal Star was more hesitant about foreign issues than the other two newspapers. It approved of the unification of the Canadian armed forces, but took no stand on the issue of the MLF for NATO and was extremely patient with President de Gaulle, pronouncing no judgement on his anti-NATO activities and eventually agreeing with him that the NATO Treaty was due for a revision.

The type of unified, compact and mobile armed forces of which the White Paper outlines the structure is designed from the ground up.... It is also the type of force that will allow Canada to play a word military role without a big power budget.... When the change is completed there will no longer be situations in which the services are pursuing unrelated goals by land, sea and air, and doing so with a spendthrift waste of the citizen's tax dollars. (MS, 30.3.64)

General de Gaulle is a difficult partner at any time... but his mind is precise and logical. His arguments fall naturally into the pattern of his convictions. He believes in Europe which is economically, politically and militarily independent. (MS, 12.11.64)

But de Gaulle, no matter how complicated his views may be on the "grandeur", rightly seized on the fact that NATO, as originally conceived has lost its purpose.

The newspaper was of a similar opinion and wholeheartedly approved of the idea of expanding NATO's political dimension and playing down the military side:

Mr. Martin, ...spoke wisely of the gradual evolution of the Soviet attitude toward the West and the lessening risk of war. He repeated with vigor, ...that the alliance must reshape its concept and "concentrate increasingly on the search for solutions to the problems in Europe." Thus, the emphasis was, refreshingly, on the political rather than the military side of NATO. (MS, 8.6.66)

It is thus evident that all the three newspapers had very few difficulties with the foreign issues under Mr. Pearson's administration and took stands promptly and firmly. Only the MLF, constituting as it did a major addition to the alliance's military arsenal, caused some doubts. The major challenge to NATO's existence posed by the President of France was summarily condemned by the Globe and Mail and the Winnipeg Free Press, but excused away and eventually condoned by the Montreal Star, which, as will be shown in the next chapter, was an enthusiastic supporter of Prime Minister Pearson's NATO policy which called for patience with France. The newspaper's stand on this issue may have had something to do with the growing rapport between the Province of Quebec and France, which was to culminate in the controversial visit of President de Gaulle to Montreal in 1967.

In the domestic area under Mr. Pearson, stands were somewhat less frequent and were to be found in seven out of ten domestic editorials of the Globe and Mail and the Montreal Star and about five out of ten editorials in the case of the Winnipeg Free Press. The latter newspaper's discrepancy between its foreign and domestic stands was also found to be statistically significant.

The Globe and Mail went through a prolonged period of doubt and hesitation regarding the issues related to federal-provincial fiscal relations. In the first months of Mr. Pearson's time in office, in fact throughout 1963 and well into 1964, the paper approached the different innovations and programs with great caution. The modifications of the municipal loan fund, the proposed pension plan, the shared cost programs, and the provincial demands for increased share of taxes, were all greeted with ambivalence, as the newspaper could not decide whether or not they had merit:

In general, the changes agreed upon for the municipal loan legislation recognize the proper authority of the Provinces over the municipalities.... One alteration in the legislation must be greeted with reservations, that which will allocate funds to the Provinces in proportion to Provincial population.... The money was raised in the Provinces. If it is now to be turned back to them on a basis of population, there will be little recognition of the differing employment needs of the different parts of the national community. It will be merely another handout. (GM, 29.7.63)

The Federal/Pension/ plan was conceived in haste and drafted in haste, and its details are still far from clear.... A national plan...cannot be whipped up like a pot of instant coffee. It must be studied.... (GM, 6.9.63)

As time went by the newspaper adopted a more definite posture vis-a-vis nearly all the issues. It tended to be critical of many of them with the exception of the two major social welfare schemes, the Canada Pension Plan and the Medicare, of which it approved:

... medicare proposal is a considerable diplomatic achievement...a plan which would meet the country's most important medical needs, which is capable of expansion on a priority basis, which disarms Quebec's constitutional objections while maintaining a national standard, and which has apparently gained the approval in principle of all the Premiers.... It is a package with which it is difficult to quarrel. (GM, 21.7.65)

The legislation...which produces pensions for Canadians will be the most important in this country since the Second World War.... We want the best pension plan that Canada can afford, however many minds it may take to distil it. We want, if at all possible, the same basic plan for all Canadians. (GM, 16.4.64)

Most of the remaining issues were judged very critically, especially the \$10.00 interim increase in pensions announced in 1963, the modifications in the tax split and equalization formula of 1963 and the secrecy surrounding federal provincial conferences. Moreover, the surrender of the tax on utilities and the increase in the federal transfer payments to the province of Quebec was also met with great criticism:

...This new /Nov. 1963/ rejuggling of the federal-provincial tax split scheme is the fourth in the past seven years. Like its predecessors, it is purely ad hoc - a hasty patch-up job to meet an emergency. The basic problem of re-allocating revenues - and, as necessary, responsibilities - between the provinces and the Dominion remains unsolved. (GM, 20.11.63)

But nobody, save the ministers and their aides who actually sat at the conference / in Quebec City, Ap.64 / knows what happened at it. The press, as always, was barred. What information it got during the discussions was secondhand, sketchy, sometimes confused and sometimes conflicting.... The situation is...absurd.... (GM, 4.4.64)

The decision / to surrender fed corporation tax on power utilities to the provinces / is wrong in principle because it punches a hole in a sound taxation rule. This rule was that publicly owned utilities did not pay corporation tax and privately owned utilities did.... But the evils flowing from the original wrong decision are limitless. The provinces...have been presented with a weapon which they can use to direct the activities of a large portion of private industry...or to use for political pork-barrelling. (GM, 23.7.65)

... it is discouraging that Quebec Premier Daniel Johnson should feel it necessary to perpetuate Jean Lesage's we-they philosophy in his approach to Ottawa. Quebec is a part of Canada.... Yet Mr. Johnson's language is that of a man dis-

cussing a foreign power; and an inimical foreign power at that.... Mr. Johnson/is/brandishing, once again, the threat of separation, of Quebec withdrawing into a ghetto. A ghetto where it would find economic disaster and almost certainly, eventual loss of cultural identity and political independence. (GM, 24.10.66)

Very much in the same vein, the Montreal Star printed many domestic editorials which simply gave pros and cons of the various issues and possible solutions but had no editorial stand at all. The newspaper eventually approved of the major welfare schemes of the Pension Plan and Medicare. It also continued its support of Premier Lesage's dealings with Ottawa and when the provincial Liberals lost an election to Daniel Johnson's Union Nationale in June of 1966, the newspaper became a supporter of the new Premier's approach to the subject of federal-provincial fiscal relations.

The provinces are taking their time to study the revised proposals for the Canada Pension Plan.... Obviously a universal pension plan, fully portable, can be most simply organized by a single national authority. But this also holds true of many other plans and policies projected in this country which are affected by the constitutional jurisdictional limitations. (MS, 23.1.64)

The reaction of the provincial premiers would indicate that medicare is on its way. How soon and in what form we do not know, but coming it certainly is, and nothing that can be foreseen appears likely to stop it. (MS, 20.7.65)

What in part sparked the present negotiations is the basic fact that Premier Lesage came up with a provincial pension plan with merits and advantages.... Thus the possibility exists that Mr. Lesage will be the instrument to give the whole of Canada a scheme of general acceptability....(MS, 16.4.64).

In addition, Premier Johnson's pragmatism in accepting the so-called "adult education" projects is excellent. There is, in this province, a strong and lengthy tradition that the survival of French Canada rests upon the foundation of complete educational autonomy. (MS, 29.10.66)

The domestic performance of the Winnipeg Free Press was considerably more timid than that of the other two newspapers. Only half of its editorials had a stand. The newspaper approached many issues with reserve and caution, especially those concerning the major welfare programs of the Canada Pension Plan and the Medicare. It approved of both only after the bills were passed by Parliament and only with great reluctance. A large number of its editorials simply asked pertinent questions and discussed the pros and cons of various possibilities, without approving or disapproving of either. The following examples will illustrate the point:

It is clear that the pension scheme, however sound it may be in theory, has not yet been subjected to anything like sufficient actuarial examination in detail. Are the proposed contributions... enough to pay the future costs when the present generation retires from active work?.... Again, how is the government scheme to be meshed in with the numerous private schemes now in successful operation? These and other important questions have not been satisfactorily answered and cannot be answered without many months of expert inquiry. (WFP, 26.7.63)

The new equalization formula / of November 1963/ appears to be a substantial improvement on the formula contained in the present agreements. Until more of its details are known, however, it would be premature to say whether the new proposal comes close to meeting provincial needs. (WFP, 29.11.63)

Even the third revision of the scheme / Canada Pension Plan / - which is an improvement over earlier versions - is not without serious drawbacks. (WFP, 25.1.64)

An even larger issue will loom, however, over any debate on medicare this year. That is simply if this is the right time to be going ahead with such a costly program, desirable as the objective of that program (though not necessarily the method) may be. (WFP, 29.1.66)

It is evident that all three newspapers had some difficulties in deciding whether to support or oppose certain domestic issues.

The major social welfare programs initiated by Mr. Pearson caused the most difficulties, and resulted in the newspapers' suspending judgement until all details of the programs were released. This was partly due to the incremental way in which these programs were introduced. A bare outline of the program, stating purposes and basic structure, would be released first and would be followed a few months later by a more detailed blueprint, which would then be revised several times. Both Medicare and the Canada Pension Plan were announced in this manner. It is not surprising, therefore, that the newspapers found it difficult to decide right away whether these programs had merit or not, and therefore postponed their judgment until a later date. It does not appear that they suspended judgment because they were torn by conflicting loyalties, but because they lacked information on which to base their decision. They all took definite stands on the final drafts of the programs. The issue of Quebec caused surprisingly little hesitation as all three newspapers adopted a definite and consistent stand regarding Quebec's demands and aspirations. The Globe and Mail and the Winnipeg Free Press were hostile and had little empathy for Quebec's unique position in Confederation, while the Montreal Star was patient and friendly and always found something good to say about Premier Lesage and Johnson and their efforts to secure for Quebec a greater share of federal revenues. The newspaper's sensitivity to the problem of French Canadians was clearly evident.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion it must be pointed out that the research results discussed in this chapter leave the hypothesis in a dim light. The Diefenbaker era produced little support for the hypothesis that domestic issues are likely to generate less clear cut editorial judgments, or stands, than foreign issues, because they bring to the fore a multiplicity of affiliations and loyalties which curb the intensity of feelings. This process is deemed not to be present in foreign issues, which is to cause . undiluted intensity of feelings and therefore more frequent stands. The foreign area under Mr. Diefenbaker produced a high frequency of editorial stands in the Globe and Mail and the Montreal Star but not in the Winnipeg Free Press. The issue of nuclear arms was of crucial importance here because it dragged on for many years and was not resolved till the end of Mr. Diefenbaker's time in office. Both the Globe and the Star got deeply involved in it and repeated their stands several times. The Free Press refused to take a stand. The domestic area under Mr. Diefenbaker produced a 100% frequency of stands in the case of the Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press, and a relatively high frequency of stands 76% in the case of the Globe and Mail. It thus offered very little evidence that the domestic area confounds goals and dampens aspirations, as Rosenau would have us believe. It does cast members of the system, in this case the three newspapers, in opposition to each other. But this does not make them timid and reluctant to take stands. On the contrary, during Mr. Diefenbaker's time in office it made them defensive of their own province and very bold in expressing opinion.

It must be kept in mind, however, that Mr. Diefenbaker attempted a radical restructuring of federal-provincial fiscal relations in the direction of greater provincial fiscal autonomy and weaker provincial dependence on payments from Ottawa. Given their provincialism it ought to have been expected for the newspapers to become bold and defensive and reluctant to give in an inch to the opponents. Rosenau's hypothesis does not stand the test of this experiment.

The Pearson era offers limited support for the hypothesis, for it produced consistently higher foreign frequencies than the domestic ones, in one case even a statistically significant frequency. However, of crucial importance here was the nature of domestic issues under consideration. Some of them were nation-wide welfare programs never before attempted in Canada. They took shape gradually and required time and thoughts to assess their merits. They caused newspapers to pause and ponder and make up their minds bit by bit. Both Medicare and the Canada Pension Plan were such programs and both caused a lot of hesitation. The nature of these programs was also such that they did not cast members of the system in opposition to each other. The financing of the programs was designed in such a way that Ottawa would contribute a large sum of money and the provinces would contribute some, depending on the size of their population. These programs required provincial cooperation but very little inter-provincial give and take. There was thus little competition involved. This fact may have contributed to the newspapers tendency not to take firm stands rapidly but wait and see how the issues developed, for provincial rights did not have to be defended aggressively.

The fact that domestic frequencies under Mr. Pearson were lower than foreign frequencies might be due to the two factors mentioned above and thus leaves Rosenau's hypothesis very much in question.

FOONTONES

1. In order to determine the statistical significance it was assumed that the overall ratio of domestic and foreign editorials in all Canadian newspapers (called population) is 50:50. The ratio of domestic and foreign editorials used in this thesis was then tested against this assumption. In this method of measuring significance if the significance obtained is a low number, then most likely the population is not split 50:50, and it can be said that there is a significant difference in the ratio obtained. If the significance obtained is a high number then the population is most likely to be split 50:50 and thus there are no significant differences in the ratio obtained. The range of significance values obtained was from 0.0000 to 0.9099. How the intermediate values are classified is of course relative. For the purpose of this study a number 0.0099 or less will be arbitrarily considered a low number, while any number higher than 0.0099 will be arbitrarily considered a high number.
2. At this point it is necessary to decide how the computer data will be interpreted, and specifically what will be considered a significant difference between frequencies. A difference of 5-10% between a domestic and a foreign frequency will be arbitrarily called a noticeable difference, A difference of 10-15% will be called a substantial difference, and anything over 15% will be called a very substantial difference.
3. In order to simplify the reading of the material the source of every newspaper quotation will be given immediately following the quotation in the following order: the abbreviated title of the newspaper first (GM, MS, WFP), followed by the day, followed by the month, followed by the last two digits of the year. Thus, WFP, 15.9.66 means that the quotation comes from the editorial published in the Winnipeg Free Press on the 15th of September 1966.

CHAPTER 5: MOTIVATIONAL INTENSITY:
EDITORIAL REACTION OF NEWSPAPERS
TOWARDS GOVERNMENT POLICY

In addition to testing the newspapers' propensity to take stands on issues, the research design also allowed for the testing of the newspapers' propensity to take stands on the federal government/Prime Minister's policy towards those issues. This was done in order to see whether the factors which were supposed to constrain the motivational intensity of newspapers to take stands on issues in the domestic area also constrained their willingness to pronounce judgment on the government's policy. If the complexity of domestic issues curbs the intensity of newspapers' feelings it might, conceivably, also curb their willingness to take stands on the government's domestic policy. This is an interesting question which applies particularly to our form of government, under which the media in general, and the newspapers in particular, are supposed to play the role of a watchdog over government's policies, i.e. pronounce frequent judgments on their merit. The second hypothesis, therefore, based on Rosenau's reasoning, was that the domestic area was likely to stimulate a lower intensity of newspaper reaction regarding the government/Prime Minister's policy towards issues than the foreign area, because in the domestic area the newspapers might be more inhibited to pronounce judgment on what the government is doing, while in the foreign area, which involves dealings with an actor outside of the system, it is easier for them to judge quickly. The newspapers' propensity to take stands on the government/Prime Minister's policy towards issues was considered to be an indicator of that intensity of reaction.

Table 5.1.

FREQUENCY OF EDITORIAL STANDS ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT/PRIME MINISTER'S
POLICY TOWARDS ISSUES

	GM	MS	WFP	MEAN
Dom.	86%(18)	63%(5)	70%(7)	73%
Dief.				
For.	70%(28)	53%(26)	71%(24)	65%
Dom.	67%(26)	46%(16)	77%(27)	63%
Pears.				
For.	59%(27)	54%(26)	62%(24)	58%
MEAN	76% 64%	54% 54%	73% 66%	

Table 5.2

STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RATIO OF EDITORIAL STANDS VERSUS-NO STANDS
ON THE GOVERNMENT/PRIME MINISTER'S POLICY TOWARDS ISSUES

Newsp/PM	# of stands	# of no-stands	SIGNIFICANCE
GM/Dief			
Domestic	18	3	
Foreign	28	12	0.3017
MS/Dief			
Domestic	5	3	
Foreign	26	23	0.9099
WFP/Dief			
Domestic	7	3	
Foreign	24	10	0.7231
GM/Pears			
Domestic	26	13	
Foreign	27	19	0.5975
MS/Pears			
Domestic	16	19	
Foreign	26	22	0.5926
WFP/Pears			
Domestic	27	8	
Foreign	24	15	0.2347

The results obtained fail to provide a consistent pattern of substantial differences between the frequency of editorial stands on the government's policy regarding domestic and foreign issues. None of the ratios were found to be statistically significant. By comparing the means for the three newspapers combined it is evident that under both administrations newspapers were more likely to take stands on the government's domestic performance than the foreign one. This finding runs counter to the hypothesis. The difference between the two administrations is that Mr. Diefenbaker merited more stands in both areas than Mr. Pearson. Looking at the separate means of the three newspapers it is also evident that the Globe and Mail and the Winnipeg Free Press were also more likely to take a stand on the government's policy in the domestic than the foreign area, while for the Montreal Star the two means are exactly the same and also the lowest for the three newspapers. The hypothesis, therefore, is clearly disproved.

Taking a closer look at the stands, it is evident that in the domestic area under Mr. Diefenbaker, at least six out of ten editorials, and often more, had a stand on the government's policy. The Globe and Mail scored the highest, as 86% of its editorials had a stand. An overwhelming majority of them approved of what Mr. Diefenbaker was doing in the area of federal-provincial fiscal relations. With very few exceptions the newspaper endorsed most of the government's policies:

Recognizing (to an extent the Liberal Government never did) the needs of the Provinces, the Conservative Government of its own free will proceeded to do as much as it could, as promptly and efficiently as it could, to help them....In keeping that

promise...the Diefenbaker Government has done the decent and honest thing. (GM, 29.1.58)

...the Provinces have the new deal that was promised to them.... This is perhaps the biggest single change the Diefenbaker Government has brought about during its two years in office, and one for which it deserves the highest credit. (GM, 8.7.59)

Later the newspaper criticized the government for keeping too much of the tax money for itself, claiming that "there are things /the government/ can do without, there are economics it can make along this line" (GM, 31.10.60), and for giving the provinces unconditional grants, which it called "unconditional handouts" (GM, 1.11.60). It accepted Mr. Diefenbaker's last deal, which included the scrapping of the tax rental agreements, with ambivalence, pointing out that although Mr. Diefenbaker meant well and thought out the deal wisely, it would not give the provinces as much income as they needed. (GM, 24.2.61)

The Montreal Star, by comparison, took stands in the domestic area in only 63% of editorials. At the beginning of his administration it approved of Mr. Diefenbaker's sensitivity to the needs of the Maritime provinces, claiming that the economic shortcomings of the region "justify the expenditure the federal government proposed to make to provide the Atlantic provinces with an adequate supply of electric power." (MS, 29.11.57). But it was very critical of the government's final tax deal:

Premier Lesage can hardly be blamed for his outburst of disappointment at the nature of the new tax sharing proposal proposed by Prime Minister Diefenbaker....Mr. Diefenbaker claims that in killing of the tax rental principle, he is returning to the true meaning of the constitution. Politicians always like to find great and eternal principles on which to base their policies. The fact is there has never been...any basic principle on which to base proposals for the sharing of common tax fields in this country. (MS, 25.2.61)

The Winnipeg Free Press took a stand on the government's policy in 70% of the cases, and it was consistently critical about everything Mr. Diefenbaker did. It did not have a single approbative stand on any government policy:

What Mr. Diefenbaker did on Monday, therefore, was, inevitably merely to throw out some morsels to the wolves....Mr. Diefenbaker's response appears to be simply to seek postponement. (WFP, 26.11.57)

Yet Mr. Diefenbaker, after a brief preliminary conference with the provinces, that ended with him promising another meeting soon, now simply sends out telegrams telling them what they are to get. This is a highhandedness for which there is no precedent since Confederation. (WFP, 27.1.58)

The one-sidedness of the government's attitude was strikingly evident....The suggestions which have been mooted do not have a particularly hopeful ring....(WFP, 26.10.60)

Indeed, the question the provincial premiers should be asking themselves today is whether the prime minister should be taken seriously at all. Coolly overlooking the fact that his own administration in less than three years has spent approximately \$2 billion more than it has collected, Mr. Diefenbaker solemnly told them that "the government that spends money ought to collect the money". What premier could have repressed the simile? (WFP, 27.10.60)

In conclusion, it can be said that while the Globe and Mail was basically friendly to the Diefenbaker government's efforts in the area of federal-provincial fiscal relations, the Montreal Star was basically ambivalent, while the Winnipeg Free Press was implacably hostile. This variety of stands may be the function of the newspapers partisanship or of the orientation of Mr. Diefenbaker's reforms. The Globe and Mail could have been expected to be basically friendly towards the government's policies both because it is known as a Tory paper and because the fiscal changes introduced were very much in line with the thinking of the government of Ontario and benefited the province financially. The

Winnipeg Free Press could have been expected to be hostile both because it is known as a Liberal newspaper and because Mr. Diefenbaker's reforms ran counter to Manitoba's financial aspirations. The position of the Montreal Star cannot be easily diagnosed both because the newspaper's ideological orientation is problematic and because of its unique position as a minority newspaper in the province of Quebec, whose relationship with Ottawa at that time was strained.

Of particular significance, however, is the extremely high frequency of stands for all the three newspapers, which makes it impossible to argue that the newspaper felt in any way constrained to comment on the government's performance in the domestic area. On the contrary, they felt very uninhibited and commented frequently on most of the government's policies, taking partisan stands and praising or condemning the government depending on how its policies affected the newspaper's home province.

Turning now to the foreign area under Mr. Diefenbaker, the frequencies of stands were somewhat lower than in the domestic area in the case of the Globe and Mail and the Montreal Star, and almost identical in the case of the Winnipeg Free Press. The Globe and Mail took a stand in 70% of its editorials and an overwhelming majority of them were critical of Mr. Diefenbaker's policies. The Globe was ambivalent about the government's policy regarding the Arrow program and regretted the fact that it would make Canada entirely dependent on the United States for its weapons. But it did not hesitate to blame the Prime Minister for approaching the question of nuclear arms "in a dilatory and indecisive fashion." (GM, 1.2.63) With the progress of the 1963 election

campaign, the newspaper's attacks intensified and its condemnations of the government's policy were both numerous and explicit:

...Mr. Diefenbaker...should be hanging his head in shame.... It is his policy that has been proved wrong....What makes it even worse is that Mr. Diefenbaker...is deliberately throwing a smokescreen over the fundamental issues of defence policy.... The voters are entitled to hear from the Prime Minister at this late date in the campaign straight answers to two questions of defence. Is he or is he not willing to use nuclear arms in the defence of Canada? Is he or is he not ready to have this country play a full and responsible role in the Western alliance, which depends upon nuclear weapons for defence?

In his attempts to evade and confuse these questions Mr. Diefenbaker has descended to prevarication that degrades his office and must repel thoughtful voters. (GM, 4.4.63)

Attempting to justify this ambiguous position, he /Mr. Diefenbaker/ produced a number of arguments, some of which were contradictory, some at variance with known military opinion, and some which appear to rest on premises out of sight and unknown to the public. (GM, 28.1.63)

But when a Prime Minister fails to conduct himself with dignity and, above all, with integrity, the criticism of him must be forthright. For then the Prime Minister has twice offended: Against the honorable tradition of his office and against the standard of political debate in Canada. (GM, 4.4.63)

The Montreal Star took a stand on the government's policies in only 53% of its editorials, again the lowest score among the three newspapers, and most of them were also negative. The Star began by approving some of Mr. Diefenbaker's policies such as his cancellation of the Arrow program, and the conclusion with the United States of a defence sharing agreement. With respect to the Arrow the newspaper praised the government for making "a tough political decision...to reverse a policy rather than to blunder on in a costly attempt to justify a weapon that science had left behind." (MS, 25.9.58) As for the defence sharing agreement it felt that "the Prime Minister announcement should be greeted with satisfaction....It represents a step ahead in the next phase of

Canada's defence program....the thing to do is to share in the Prime Minister's obvious satisfaction that the government's patient negotiations with Washington have reached this new phase." (MS, 27.5.59) However, the government's policy regarding the acquisition of nuclear arms was "a matter of shame and humiliation." (MS, 28.1.63) The paper sneered at Mr. Diefenbaker's "frayed self-justifications" (MS, 13.2.64) and summed up its judgment in the following way:

You do not have to be nuclear or non-nuclear in this country to decide whether Canada is, or is not, playing any role in continental defence. When Mr. Diefenbaker says that there are no commitments, the answer is clear. We are playing no role at all. We are waiting to decide. We are waiting until we are offered a role that is suitable for the immediate purposes of Mr. Diefenbaker.

There was a time in Canada when our defence policy carried a large majority of the people with it. We sent and maintained forces overseas....In this role we are doing nothing at all - with the confused endorsement of Mr. Diefenbaker. (MS, 1.4.63)

The Winnipeg Free Press took a stand on the government's policy in 71% of its editorials and again an overwhelming majority of them were negative. The newspaper was critical of Mr. Diefenbaker's policy regarding the Arrow (although it approved of the cancellation itself) on grounds that Mr. Diefenbaker kept the public and the defence industry waiting for too long for his decision, and did nothing to lessen the impact of cancellation on the suddenly unemployed employees of the company. It was upset with the "confusion and petulance and an extraordinary disposition on the part of the Prime Minister to blame everyone but himself" for the problems the cancellation created. (WFP, 24.2.59) It matched the other two newspapers in the frequency and intensity of its criticism of the Prime Minister's nuclear policy:

...the government is plainly at fault for refusing to take the country into confidence on a matter of the highest importance....
(WFP, 16.9.61)

Mr. Diefenbaker is now engaged in a stragedy of diversion, deception and desperation....Irresponsibility can go no further but Mr. Diefenbaker evidently thinks that he will win votes by diverting the Canadian people's mind from the facts....What is the Canadian government's defence policy? Does it include the installation of nuclear weapons? (WFP, 4.2.63)

The foreign area under Mr. Diefenbaker evolved a very critical response from all three newspapers, with all agreeing that the government's inability to come to terms with the question of nuclear arms for Canadian armed forces in NATO and NORAD was a disaster and blaming Mr. Diefenbaker personally for the stalemate. However, the overall frequencies of stands were lower than those in the domestic area, indicating that even with an explosive issue like the question of nuclear arms, the newspapers were still less likely to take stands on the government's performance in the foreign area than the domestic one. The hypothesis, therefore, clearly does not stand the test of analysis.

Turning now to the Pearson era, the domestic area produced great discrepancies in the frequency of stands among the three newspapers: 67% for the Globe and Mail, only 46% for the Montreal Star and 77% for the Winnipeg Free Press. The Globe and Mail was mostly negative about Mr. Pearson's policies. Although, as pointed out in the previous chapter, the social welfare programs introduced at that time met with editorial approval of the newspapers, the government's policy with respect to these programs was often criticized on various grounds. The following quotations from the Globe and Mail will illustrate the point:

The Federal Government's decision to ask Parliament...to approve an immediate \$10.00 a month increase in old-age pension... re-

presents a surrender to irresponsible...pressure.. (GM, 10.9.63)

Miss LaMarsh /Health and Welfare Minister responsible for the Pension Plan/ seems concerned only with forcing her own plan through - however unconsidered - and with aiding her Liberal confreres in Ontario. (GM, 12.9.63)

...it seems pertinent to ask why Miss LaMarsh and her colleagues in the federal government insist on making an upside-down cake of the provinces' wishes....The federal government has turned the list /of the provincial Medicare suggestions/ around, and put last what the provinces put first. (GM, 25.9.65)

The Montreal Star, which took a stand on Mr. Pearson's domestic policies in only 46% of its domestic editorials was extremely enthusiastic about what the government was doing. An overwhelming majority of its stands were approbative.

The negotiations now so obviously going on about pensions between Ottawa and Quebec, and the readiness of Prime Minister Pearson to make changes, are good auguries for the future. Mr. Pearson will doubtless be criticized for changing his mind, but he, like a good many of the rest of us, is learning what "cooperative federalism" really means. (MS, 16.4.64)

Side by side with the resounding success of the pension negotiations has been the readiness with which the Pearson government has accepted the fact that the revenue needs and priorities of the provinces are valid. (MS, 21.4.64)

Mr. Pearson's /Medicare/ proposals are a considerable diplomatic achievement; constitutional problems have been avoided: the medical needs of the country, again as far as the public is concerned, will be met. (MS, 22.7.65)

The Winnipeg Free Press, which registered the highest score in this area, 77%, was surprisingly enough mostly critical. It commented negatively on the government's handling of many issues:

...The government's proposed "Canada Pension Plan" is still under negotiations with the provinces....Rather than increase the universal pension now, the government would have been wiser to wait a few months...until the picture is clearer. (WFP, 19.9.63).

Seldom has more haste made less speed than in the case of the Canada Pension Plan.... (WFP, 8.4.64)

The obvious conclusion is that the Liberal government intends to use its medicare proposal as the major plank in its next election platform. If this is the case, then it must be considered as a proposal that is motivated more by politics than by a realistic appraisal of this country's needs. (WFP, 22.7.65)

The discrepancies in the frequencies of stands and the types of stands taken cannot be easily explained. The only thing that can be safely said about that, is that they were extremely one sided. Just as the Montreal Star was overwhelmingly approbative of everything the Pearson government was doing in the domestic areas, so were the other two newspapers overwhelmingly critical. This is all the more surprising because the very same newspapers approved of the major issues of the time, especially the major welfare initiatives. Yet, the government's policy regarding those issues was often found wanting. The Winnipeg Free Press, in particular, found very few policies worthy of praise and its Liberal orientation did not make it friendly to the Liberal government. It was even more critical than the Conservative Globe and Mail.

In the foreign area, stands on the Pearson government's policies towards issues were relatively infrequent: 59% in the case of the Globe and Mail, 54% in the case of the Montreal Star, and 62% in the case of the Winnipeg Free Press. The Globe and Mail was very enthusiastic about Mr. Pearson's NATO/NORAD policies and commented with approval on many of his efforts:

Mr. Pearson seems to have succeeded admirably. New reports from Hyannis Port/ suggest that the atmosphere of the discussions /with President Kennedy/ ...was much warmer than the normal pleasantries of diplomatic occasions. (GM, 13.5.63)

Defence Minister Paul Hellyer was wise to announce cuts in the military Establishment without waiting.... (GM, 7.12.63)

Defence Minister Paul Hellyer has offered Canada a defence framework that has lost some of its fatty tissue but none of its muscle. The Defence White Paper tabled in the House of Commons is a thoroughly workmanlike job and probably the most realistic assessment of defence needs that the nation has had since the end of the Second World War. (GM, 27.3.64)

But Mr. Hellyer has been true to his word. He has set down guidelines and followed them through with vigor and determination. (GM, 6.11.64)

Canada's offer /to double her contribution to NATO's mobile force/ is also well-timed....At the time when France has pulled out of NATO's integrated military command...Canada is at least making a small gesture in the in the opposite direction. (GM, 27.7.66)

Thus a newspaper which was basically critical of the Pearson government's policies in the domestic area, found many policies to praise in the foreign area and was a supporter of the Prime Minister and his Minister of Defence in many cases.

The Montreal Star was overwhelmingly approbative of Mr. Pearson's policies. There was hardly a critical or an ambivalent comment at all. In fact its enthusiastic endorsement of Mr. Pearson's foreign policies matched its approval of the Prime Minister's domestic policies, as these quotations will illustrate:

They /the talks with President Kennedy/ show that Mr. Pearson has done no more than he had promised during the election campaign....Mr. Pearson was not giving things away in Hyannis Port - nuclear or otherwise....This is the new Canadian-American diplomacy of frankness....(MS, 14.5.63)

Defence Production Minister Drury has, at the least, kept things going in the joint defence purchasing arrangement between Ottawa and Washington. He may have succeeded in opening a new door just a little. (MS, 7.12.63)

Mr. Hellyer...has had the courage to tackle the military vested interest head-on. (MS, 10.6.63)

The taxpayer will be excused if he thanks heaven - and the Prime Minister - for giving us a minister of national defence with the guts to ask questions about the golden-braided Establishment. (MS, 11.1.64)

Paul Martin's remarks on the future of NATO and its relationship with France were both statesmanlike and reflective of the constructive role Canada can play in international affairs. (MS, 8.6.66)

The Winnipeg Free Press was also basically friendly to Mr. Pearson's policies, as a majority of its stands were approbative.

Whatever else they may accomplish Mr. Pearson's first sixty days in office already have given Canada an entirely new position in the historic Atlantic triangle. The long and bitter dispute with Britain and the United States has ended. (WFP, 13.5.63)

It is to the government's credit that it decided to go away anyway /with defence cuts/ and for doing so it can count on broad general support from Canadian taxpayers. (WFP, 9.12.63)

Mr. Hellyer, who showed great courage and imagination in proposing the reforms in the first place now faces the delicate task of putting them into effect.... (WFP, 9.7.64)

Reports from Ottawa this week that the defence partnership between the United States and Canada as it concerns the North American Air Defence Command may be ending should occasion no surprise....Canada, wisely, has decided not to get into the very costly business of defence against space missiles. (WFP, 28.5.65)

Thus, the Pearson era produced a series of very puzzling results, in that the government and the Prime Minister, whose policies in the domestic area were often found wanting, were invariably praised for their efforts in the foreign area. The finding speaks well for the integrity of the newspapers which, it seems, can rise above their partisan tendencies, and express a critical judgment of the government's policy on its merit. The Conservative Globe and Mail as well as the Liberal Winnipeg Free Press were very critical of the Pearson government's policies regarding the various issues related to federal-provincial relations. The

same two newspapers were very enthusiastic about the government's policies related to NATO. It does not seem that their partisanship affected their ability to judge. The domestic area produced a higher frequency of editorial stands on the government's policy than the foreign area, just as it did during the Diefenbaker era, so that the hypothesis can be said to be disproved under both administrations.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion it can be said that the research results discussed in this chapter offer little evidence to suggest that the factors which supposedly constrained the motivational intensity of newspapers to take stands on issues in the domestic area also constrained their willingness to pronounce judgement on the government/Prime Minister's policy in this area. The domestic area under Mr. Diefenbaker as well as Mr. Pearson produced a higher frequency of editorial judgments of the government's policy than the foreign area. The hypothesis, therefore, is clearly contradicted. It appears that, basically, newspapers feel free to comment on the government policy quite frequently - as on the average about six out of ten editorials would contain a judgment of some sort. The lowest frequency was 46% but the highest was 86%. It can, therefore, be said that the three newspapers have fulfilled their function of being the watchdog over government's policy. This is particularly true of the domestic area which produced a higher frequency of editorial judgments of the government's policy than the foreign area.

The one surprising findings of this chapter were that the frequency of editorial stands on the government's policy does not parallel the frequency of editorial stands on the issues. Thus a newspaper can be sympathetic to such issues created by the government as Medicare or the Pension Plan, but at the same time be very critical of the government's handling of these issues. Furthermore, the same newspaper can approve of the government/Prime Minister's policy in the domestic area but at the same time disapprove of their policy in the foreign area, and

vice versa. No pattern of solid partisan support of the government in both areas emerges from the study.

CHAPTER 6: MOTIVATIONAL COMPETENCE:
EDITORIAL PROPENSITY TO OFFER
SUGGESTION OR ADVICE

In addition to postulating hypotheses in the field of motivational intensity Rosenau also speculated on the possible existence of differences between the domestic and the foreign area in the field of motivational competence. He claimed that there may exist different levels of competence of political involvement in domestic and foreign issues because of the dissimilar levels of competence that the involvement requires. In the domestic area citizens may feel more capable of influencing the outcome of situations and disputes, because these situations and disputes are more immediate and familiar to them, and thus make citizens feel more capable and willing to get involved in their resolution. The foreign area, on the other hand, concerns situations and disputes in a foreign political system, and involves events and disputes which lie beyond the control and jurisdiction of ordinary citizens. As a result they may feel less competent to deal with these situations and disputes, and believe themselves less capable of influencing their outcome. In other words, citizens are more likely to want to influence the outcome of domestic issues than foreign issues and display more competence in dealing with the former than the latter.

The hypothesis was applied here to newspaper editorials, and postulated that newspapers may consider themselves more capable of influencing the outcome of domestic than foreign issues. The propensity of newspapers to offer independent editorial suggestion/advice regarding the resolution of various issues was taken here as an indicator of this competence. The assumption was that if newspapers offer unsolicited editorial suggestions regarding how issues should be resolved they must feel competent to deal with these issues. The results obtained were as follows:

Table 6.1

FREQUENCY OF EDITORIAL SUGGESTION/ADVICE

		GM	MS	WFP	MEAN
Dief.	Dom.	43%(9)	13%(1)	20%(2)	25%
	For.	70%(28)	25%(12)	21%(7)	38%
Pears.	Dom.	33%(13)	37%(13)	46%(16)	38%
	For.	46%(12)	24%(12)	56%(22)	42%
MEAN		38% 58%	25% 25%	33% 39%	

Table 6.2

STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RATIO OF EDITORIAL SUGGESTIONS VERSUS NO-SUGGESTIONS

Newsp/PM	# of sugg.	# of no-sug.	SIGNIFICANCE
GM/Dief			
Domestic	9	12	
Foreign	28	12	0.0204
MS/Dief			
Domestic	1	7	
Foreign	12	37	0.2288
WFP/Dief			
Domestic	2	8	
Foreign	7	27	0.4840
GM/Pears			
Domestic	13	26	
Foreign	21	25	0.1254
MS/Pears			
Domestic	13	22	
Foreign	12	36	0.1183
WFP/Pears			
Domestic	16	19	
Foreign	22	17	0.1807

Generally speaking, the data indicate that newspapers do not offer suggestions too frequently. In the three newspapers analyzed, on the average three out of ten editorials would contain a suggestion or advice regarding the resolution of issues. The lowest frequency was 13% in the case of the Montreal Star under Mr. Diefenbaker, and the highest was 56% in the case of the Winnipeg Free Press under Mr. Pearson. In all cases but one, which is the Montreal Star under Mr. Pearson, the foreign frequencies are higher than the domestic ones, indicating that the three newspapers were more likely to offer editorial suggestions/advice in the foreign than in the domestic area. This finding runs counter to the hypothesis. However, none of the ratios of suggestions versus no-suggestions was found to be statistically significant, and therefore it is difficult to claim that the hypothesis is definitely not sound.

A brief discussion of the content of editorial suggestions will, hopefully, explain why the hypothesis could not be confirmed. Looking at the Diefenbaker period first, it is evident that the performance of the Globe and Mail in the domestic area differed greatly from the performance of the other two newspapers. The Toronto paper was more than twice as likely to offer editorial suggestions/advice (46%) than the Winnipeg paper (20%), and more than three times as likely as the Montreal paper (13%). The newspaper had very definite ideas on what should be done about federal-provincial finances. It called several times for the thorough reexamination and a total revamping of the entire tax system in Canada:

The result should be a comprehensive study and overhaul of the Canadian tax structure, a task which is long overdue.... One of the fields of investigation, for example, should include a study of the effect of taxes on various regions and on the development of these regions. (GM, 6.7.59).

The time has come to do away with stop gaps, to put the Provinces in a fiscal position where they can support themselves and plan their own future. The talks which start today in Ottawa must end with a completely new deal. (GM, 25.7.60)

It is our view that neither unemployment nor Dominion-Provincial fiscal relations, nor any other economic problem, can be solved without thoroughly investigating, and then thoroughly reforming Canada's entire tax system. (GM, 31.10.69)

The newspaper further felt that an integral part of the revamping of the tax system should be the abandonment, or at least a total revision, of the system of equalization grants, which, according to the Globe and Mail, were unjustly milking the richer provinces, especially Ontario:

Ontario must make clear that it is willing to see other Provinces helped according to need, but that it is no longer willing to serve as a milch-cow for other Provinces, to subsidize their flights into "abundance". Ontario must demand a new formula which puts an end to such nonsense - failing which Ontario should claim the full return of its own taxes. (GM, 10.6.60)

In place of the equalization payments the newspaper suggested the following solution:

It seems to this newspaper that Ottawa would do better to establish a capital fund for the Provinces / rather than pay equalization / for - and only for - industrial development.... It would be better than handouts, above all it would put an end to handouts, and make Canada once more a true Confederation. (GM, 1.11.60)

All of the Globe and Mail's suggestions were of such nature, that, if implemented, they would have strengthened the fiscal independence of the provinces, resulted in less give from the richer provinces to the poorer ones, and thus benefited Ontario in many ways. The total revision of the tax system in Canada, in the direction of greater fiscal autonomy for the provinces and the possible abandonment of the system of equalization grants, would have enabled Ontario to preserve much of its income for itself without sharing it with Ottawa and indirectly with other, poorer provinces. The Globe and Mail had no hesitation to advise Mr. Diefenbaker that this would be a wise course to follow, and one which would make Canada a true Confederation, in the Globe and Mail's understanding of the terms. The newspaper's propensity to offer suggestions much more often than the other two newspapers indicates that it felt quite competent to deal with the issue of federal-provincial finances and quite determined to push its own point of view. The fact that the Globe was a Conservative newspaper which at that time was dealing with a Conservative Prime Minister might have had something to do with the newspaper's unhesitant performance in this field.

The Montreal Star's performance stands out as the most timid one of all, producing only one suggestion (out of a total of 8 editorials), which called for a flexible system of balancing needs and resources between the two levels of government:

It has become clear that no permanent formula can be found to achieve this end /to divide national wealth equally among the provinces/. Conditions change, needs change. The agreement must therefore be open to amendment from time to time.... The need can be established in dollars and cents and can be balanced against the amounts of money available to meet it, account being taken of federal needs as well. (MS, 5.7.59)

As a result of the small number of editorials in the sample it is impossible to generalize about the Montreal Star's performance in this field.

The Winnipeg Free Press had a suggestion/advice in one out of five of its editorials (20%), which amounted to only two suggestions (out of 10 editorials) and both of them called for the maintenance of equalization payments:

The equalization payments...are not a matter of charity but a matter of right. They are the means of making sure that the less favored provinces get the money that is rightly theirs. (WFP, 16.6.60)

What is important, however, to the taxpayers of the less wealthy provinces is that the principle of equalization should be maintained. This is the principle which ensures that each province gets its share of the tax funds.... The assurance from Mr. Diefenbaker that the principle of equalization will not be changed or tampered with in the new agreement should be the primary objective of the Manitoba's delegation. (WFP, 23.7.60)

Thus the newspaper also offered suggestions which would have benefited Manitoba, but because of the small number of editorials in the sample it is very difficult to generalize about the newspaper's performance in this field.

It is very difficult to make any meaningful generalizations about the three newspapers' performance in the domestic area under Mr. Diefenbaker because of the small number of editorials and because of the low frequencies obtained. It is, however, obvious that only the Globe and Mail felt bold and competent enough to offer a string of suggestions for the benefit of the province of Ontario. The Montreal Star either considered itself incompetent or was paralyzed by the po-

litical situation in the province of Quebec, for it had nothing substantial to say. The Winnipeg Free Press fought for the preservation of equalization payments which constituted the backbone of Manitoba's finances. The suggestions offered were then, by and large, few and far between, and mostly partisan and partial to the newspaper's home province, and only the Globe and Mail delivered a performance which in terms of quantity and quality of suggestions can be considered a bold one.

The foreign area under Mr. Diefenbaker also produced great disparities in the frequencies of suggestions, and again the Globe and Mail's performance stands out. Seven out of ten of its editorials offered a suggestion of some sort (70%), which is nearly three times as often as the Montreal Star (25%), and more than three times as often as the Winnipeg Free Press (21%). The Globe and Mail's most vociferous and determined campaign was in favor of maintaining and developing native Canadian defence industry, so that the country would not become excessively dependent on foreign, mostly American, weapon manufacturers:

Canada should insist on such an arrangement /a genuine production sharing deal with the U.S./ as this newspaper has consistently urged. We must not let ourselves become completely dependent on outside sources for our defence. We must produce these American...weapons ourselves. (GM, 25.9.58)

Here we have an extreme example...of the determination of the U.S. industry to monopolize the defence system of the West. This is something Canada does not have to accept. Certainly, Canada should not accept any integration that entails economic subordination or impoverishment. (GM, 17.12.58)

The Globe and Mail's campaign in favor of Canadian defence industry was only intensified by the cancellation of the Arrow program:

But, given that decision /the cancellation of the Arrow/ the national interest still requires that the great and important industrial establishment which developed the Arrow be maintained. (GM, 21.2.59)

...the rescue and retention of the establishment that produced the Arrow is all we care about. This newspaper is not trying to set itself up as an expert on defence.... It simply believes that the asset - in people and plant - which this industry represents, goes far beyond the importance or other wise of a particular weapon. (GM, 25.2.59)

With respect to NATO itself the Globe and Mail had several suggestions for the improvement of the alliance:

Two things must be done.... Firstly, the fundamentals of economic federation of Western Europe must be hastened and assisted in all forms. Secondly, the North American continent must take a good look at itself....(GM, 20.12.57)

There is only one thing that will avert...a deadly break-up of the Western Alliance - a policy made by all, for the benefit of the United States. (GM, 21.12.57)

With respect to the crucial issue of nuclear arms, for a while, the Globe and Mail urged the government to initiate a nation-wide debate on the subject, and only after a prolonged hesitation suggested an independent course of action which it felt should be followed:

Firstly, the Canadian people and Parliament should have a thorough discussion of the matter /of nuclear arms /.... (GM, 28.7.59)

... the idea of a free vote /is/ attractive. The Government could say for example - as this newspaper believes - that our obligations to our allies...require us to accept defensive nuclear weapons, and explain that if we do not choose to accept them we should withdraw from the alliance. (GM, 1.12.62)

If we are to be part of an alliance with an integrated force, we must equip our forces with the appropriate weaponry - with nuclear weapons if necessary. (GM, 11.12.62)

It follows that if we share responsibility we should also share power. That means contributing our nuclear strength in Europe to the NATO pool so that we should have a voice - perhaps a restraining voice - in the organization and control of the multinational force. (GM, 12.4.63)

But the newspaper's feelings about NORAD were different. Upset by Canadian subservience to the American military establishment, and the reluctance of the Americans to consider Canada an equal military partner in the alliance, by the end of Mr. Diefenbaker's reign the Globe and Mail advocated Canada's withdrawal from NORAD:

If...the United States Government does not recognize our right to be consulted before our forces are committed we might consider withdrawal from NORAD.../It/would certainly save us a great deal of money. (GM, 3.1.63)

The above quotation shows that the Globe and Mail felt extremely competent to offer suggestions on just about every NATO-related issue. Its performance clearly contradicts the hypothesis, for it shows the Globe, without inhibitions and hesitations, offering advice on how issues should be resolved time and time again. The newspaper had many suggestions in the domestic and the foreign area, but in the foreign area in particular it conducted a truly independent policy campaign of its own. This campaign was basically nationalistic in its orientation. The Globe took up the cause of the Canadian defence establishment, and the native weapon manufacturing industry, as well as the cause of Canada's sovereignty, and defended them against the overbearing influence of the United States. It has placed itself in a position of a defender of Canada's national interest, and did so boldly and convincingly.

This boldness was nowhere near as evident in the case of the Montreal Star, which offered suggestions in only 25% of its editorials. The newspaper advised the government that its decision regarding the Arrow "must be a political one, based on the best military and economic advice it can muster." (MS, 3.12.58), and when the program was cancelled it suggested that "there must be serious efforts to mitigate the upheaval. . . Sound alternative schemes are needed." (MS, 25.2.59). But its concern with the future of the native Canadian defense establishment was almost nil by comparison with that of the Globe and Mail.

With respect to NATO the newspaper advocated the expansion of the Alliance along the lines outlined by Article II of the NATO Charter, which called for cooperation in economic and social fields:

... if there is to be an Atlantic community some day, the logical place to start is by the creation of economic co-operation on each side of the Atlantic. (MS, 20.12.58)

So little has been done in respect of pursuing the Charter's Article II....Until there is a more clearly detectable aggressive effort in this direction, NATO's communiques are likely to have a hollow ring. (MS, 9.5.60)

In spite of these peaceful sentiments the newspaper did not hesitate to call for the acquisition of nuclear arms for Canadian armed forces, in accordance with obligations undertaken by the government:

Above everything, we are honor-bound to fulfil whatever responsibilities to the Western alliance we may have accepted. (MS, 14.1.63)

If we cannot ourselves provide that defence, we should co-operate to the best of our ability in that program / NATO's nuclear force /. (MS, 28.1.63)

If that collective decision involves the use of modern, nuclear weapons, we must have them.... We must not commit ourselves to a non-nuclear role. (MS, 14.2.63)

In terms of content, the Montreal Star's suggestions centered around the seemingly contradictory aims of accepting nuclear weapons and at the same time expanding NATO in the non-military direction. However, their frequency was very small. While none of the boldness and decisiveness of the Globe and Mail was evident here, the frequency of foreign suggestions outnumbers the domestic frequency by a ratio of two to one, and thus again contradicts the hypothesis.

The Winnipeg Free Press's performance was not very different from that of the Montreal Star, as 21% of its editorials had a suggestion/advice to make. This foreign frequency was, however, almost identical with the Winnipeg Free Press's domestic frequency and thus a bit of a puzzle. The Winnipeg paper was also very much in favor of extending NATO's economic and social ties:

...with the Americans thinking essentially along military lines and Europeans along political and economic lines, Canada has a special opportunity and an obligation to try to bring the two on to convergent paths. The Paris conference...may...make a very important contribution to the unity of the Atlantic powers if the concept of the NATO community is given precedence over the narrower concept of NATO as a simple military alliance. (WFP, 17.12.57)

But unlike the other two newspapers the Winnipeg Free Press never offered any specific suggestions or advice on how to handle the issue of nuclear arms, and instead urged the government over and over again to launch a thorough investigation of Canada's defence policy:

For two reasons a full parliamentary investigation of defence in its broadest aspects has been imperative....If an inquiry is launched both parties in Parliament should pursue it without partisan motives. (WFP, 5.5.59)

...it would surely diminish the committee's effectiveness if it is to be prevented from examining something more than military expenditures. Defence problems are matters of extraordinary complexity....This surely is an argument for

a committee with wide powers for examining (when necessary in camera) the dilemmas imposed upon a nation of limited financial resources by the speed and sweep of technological progress. (WFP, 27.1.60)

In a word the nation must re-examine defence policy from top to bottom and accept the expert verdict.... (WFP, 10.12.62)

The Winnipeg Free Press thus basically limited itself to prodding the government and encouraging it to review the entire Canadian defence policy. Its frequency of foreign suggestions was the smallest among the three newspapers, and also almost identical with its domestic frequency. It seems therefore that in this case the domestic/foreign dichotomy made no difference in the newspaper's propensity to offer suggestions.

The Diefenbaker's era thus produced extremely disparate performances in the three newspapers under investigation. The Globe and Mail exhibited high competence to offer suggestions/advice in both areas, but in the foreign area in particular. It very clearly contradicted Rosenau's reasoning and demonstrated that no matter how distant and foreign the issue, a newspaper can tackle it intelligently. The Montreal Star also had almost twice as many foreign suggestions as domestic ones, but its overall frequencies were less than half of those of the Globe. The newspaper thus gave a much more timid performance. So did the Winnipeg Free Press which gave an identical performance in both fields. Its frequencies were also low, about a third of those of the Globe and Mail.

Turning now to Mr. Pearson's time in office the results obtained are in some ways similar to those found under Mr. Diefenbaker, but in some crucial ways also very different.

They are erratic and difficult to diagnose, and just as in the previous time period, in the case of two newspaper foreign suggestions/advice outnumber the domestic ones, while in the case of the third the opposite is true. The Globe and Mail lost its preeminent position in terms of high frequencies in both areas to the Winnipeg Free Press, which registered the highest scores in the domestic area (46%) and the foreign area (56%). As far as the overall means are concerned there is much less difference between the domestic and the foreign means under Mr. Pearson (4%) than there was under Mr. Diefenbaker (13%).

The Globe and Mail had a domestic suggestion or advice to offer in one out of three of its editorials (33%), and it was more likely than not to urge the preservation of a strong central government in the face of the challenge posed by the provinces, Quebec in particular:

At the very least, the Dominion must control fiscal and monetary matters, foreign policy, defence, external tariff and trade policies, and jurisdictions which cross Provincial boundaries.... The Federal Government must continue to perform essential national functions and at times to assume new ones.... (GM, 13.7.63)

The Federal Government has a responsibility not just to Quebec but to all the provinces to define the areas which must remain under federal authority if Canada is to remain a nation. And it must not only tell them - it must show them, particularly Quebec why such federal control would work to their advantage. (GM, 19.9.66)

If we are to remain one country and not two or ten Ottawa must retain control of the economy. (GM, 24.10.66)

The newspaper's pet project was the insistence that federal provincial conferences be more open to the public and the press:

Considering the large number of subjects discussed nowadays at full scale Dominion-Provincial conferences, and considering their great importance to Canadians, these gatherings should in general be as open to the press as Parliament itself. (GM, 4.5.64)

Canada is supposed to be a democracy, but those /federal=provincial conferences behind closed doors/ 'are not' democratic proceedings....These consultations should at least be open to press and public, so that the wheeling and dealing, the threats and the compromises may be known to and judged by the governed. (GM, 19.10.64)

The doors of that secret conference room should be dismantled because they have become a serious block to responsible government in this country.... (GM, 28.10.66)

With respect to the actual tax split formula the newspaper advised caution and restraint until the findings of the Carter Royal Commission on Taxation, then in progress, became known, so that a completely new tax deal would take into consideration the Commission's findings:

But first all the figures and facts of the tax jungle must be assembled. The Royal Commission on Taxation is doing it federally; similar commissions are doing it provincially. When these investigative bodies have reported, the partners in Confederation must work out a tax-sharing arrangement which is simple, practical and durable. (GM, 30.11.63)

The Premiers and the Prime Minister should proceed with exceeding caution. The best thing they can give the country at this time is an interim agreement that does not change the ground rules. (GM, 25.10.66)

The Globe and Mail's overall performance in the domestic field can be termed as timid. The absence of any concrete suggestion /advice on how the tax formula should be rearranged is a particularly glaring omission. Also missing are any concrete suggestions on what kind of Medicare or Pension formula would be best for the country. Beyond urging the preservation of a strong central government the Globe and Mail advocated basically a wait and see attitude and contributed very little in terms of solid advice.

The Montreal Star offered suggestions in slightly more than third of its editorials (37%).

These suggestions were carefully balanced between ones calling for the assertion of federal powers and ones urging more room for provincial initiatives. The position of the newspaper was a difficult one, it being an English newspaper in a French milieu at the time of a great nationalistic surge of the French speaking people of the province. The Montreal Star did its best to preserve an equilibrium of some sort between the two extremes of federal powers and provincial rights. It urged, first of all, that the federal government must be preserved:

Whatever the consequences, Ottawa must not denude itself of revenues sufficient to meet its national and international obligations, its responsibilities to our allies and friends and to the needs of defence. (MS, 23.11.63)

If there is to be a Canada at all, if Confederation is to be real, there must be some voice somewhere, which can assert itself nationally. No province, great or small should deny that need. If it is wrong to erode provincial power, it is equally wrong to erode federal power.... Confederation came into being as a compromise. It can never be anything else. Rationality and modernization remain virtues essential to our continued existence. (MS, 27.11.63)

...we are getting to the point at which federal power should be protected against possible encroachment by the provincesThe erosion of federal power might set in. Let this be guarded against. (MS, 17.7.65)

Such exhortations in favor of federal strength were matched by similar calls for the strengthening of provincial finances and respect for provincial rights:

But the modernized Canada should now return to the pattern of divided powers laid down in the Constitution, and the provinces must be financially equipped to take them over.... (MS, 27.11.63)

A central government is ill-adapted to cope with these regional and local needs....But in local matters the provinces know better. A substantial abdication by federal ministers and their bureaucrats is called for. (MS, 31.3.64)

...what must remain important to Ottawa is that it must retain the power to see that every province in Canada can provide for its citizens, inside its own constitutional rights, revenues sufficient to see that a general generous minimum of services is available to every citizen of Canada....No province can be allowed to go it alone without its citizens recognizing a general debt to the citizens of other provinces from east to west....But unrestricted provincial autonomy is no more possible than unrestricted federal autonomy. Both have limits and must compromise....(MS, 18.4.64)

Finally, the Montreal Star's pet project was the increase of revenues for education. The newspaper felt that the province of Quebec lagged far behind other provinces in this respect and urged a speedy financial remedy:

More funds must be found for education, and nothing emanating from the conference makes us confident that this fact has been sufficiently recognized. (MS, 23.7.65)

Economically speaking, all depends on higher and higher educational standards. Other nations provide them; we must also or fall behind in the race for higher production and markets. (MS, 25.10.66)

It is evident that the newspaper was also relatively disinterested in the major social welfare schemes promoted at that time and had no independent suggestions to offer regarding the Canada Pension Plan or Medicare, its energies being completely absorbed by the Quebec-Ottawa struggle. It clearly attempted not to take partisan stands between the federal and provincial opposites and stood a middle ground.

By comparison with the other two newspapers the Winnipeg Free Press delivered a stunning performance - nearly half of its editorials (46%) had a suggestion/advice to offer. The newspaper had very definite suggestions on how the fiscal aspect of federal-provincial relations should be handled: by means of fiscal austerity

and restraint of appetites:

In the developing financial clash between the federal and provincial governments the most obvious and, in the end, the inevitable solution is largely overlooked. It is simply to hold the expenditures of all governments within the nation's capacity to pay them....The federal government could set a good example by freezing the cost of its proliferating bureaucracy.... (WFP, 8.7.63)

Thus any reconsideration of federal-provincial business must start with a reckoning of means, not appetite....They should first consider how much money they will have to distribute. (WFP, 15.7.63)

...it would be folly to undertake any large increases in cost before the responsibilities of government, at its two levels, are reclarified....But a sound reassessment cannot be confined to additional cost. (WFP, 22.7.63)

The newspaper was further urging a total revamping of the federal-provincial relations and had quite specific suggestions in what direction the revamping should go:

...the federal-provincial conference of November should not confine itself to the customary squabble about the details of revenue. It should begin to consider a fundamental redistribution of responsibilities....It is high time...to review the basis, not merely the periphery, of the federal-provincial system; and while preserving the principle of equalization, to make all governments directly responsible to their own taxpayers so far as their unequal means permit. (WFP, 7.8.63)

First, within the bounds of its resources it /the federal government/ should be ready to go a long way in satisfying the legitimate aspirations of Quebec. Second, it must apply any new financial formula equally to all provinces, as Quebec agrees. Third, it must retain the powers and revenues needed to support its own proper functions....Fourth, it must make sense that the principle called equalization be maintained in any redistribution of revenue to support the weaker provinces. (WFP, 25.11.63)

The newspaper was aware that the forthcoming revamping of the system might weaken the central government and urged that it should not be allowed to happen:

The government of Canada must remain strong and dynamic, both in its effective jurisdiction and in finance. (WFP, 18.3.64)

...the provinces, Quebec included, must recognize that the national interest in the largest sense can only be served by a strong central government, with effective powers in such fields as finance, communications, trade, defence, and so forth. (WFP, 2.4.64)

The first requirement of whatever changes are to be made ...is that the essential powers of the federal government remain intact.... (WFP, 22.10.64)

Canada is a Confederation and if it is to continue to exist as a nation at all, the needs of the national government must have priority over the needs of the regions. (WFP, 19.9.66)

With respect to the two major social welfare programs, the Canada Pension Plan and Medicare, the Winnipeg Free Press, mindful of the enormous expenditures these programs would entail, urged caution and delay and careful examination of alternatives:

All these dangers /of having a rush Pension Plan/ can be forestalled if the government will submit its policy to the fullest inquiry...invite the advice of the provinces and seek the cooperation of the opposition parties, which will refuse it as their peril. (WFP, 13.4.64)

It may be that a gradual approach /to Medicare/ along the lines approved by some of the provinces (that is a plan which starts with coverage of persons on low incomes and those who face excessively high medical expenses) is the wise course at the present time. (WFP, 29.1.66)

The economic argument for delay /of Medicare/ speaks for itself. The political argument...is almost equally convincing. (WFP, 20.11.67)

It was a strong performance by the Winnipeg newspaper, filled with suggestions and advice on nearly all the facets of federal-provincial fiscal relations. The newspaper clearly felt very confident about its competence to offer advice and displayed little hesitation in approaching even the most difficult issues. Its performance

clearly stood out among the three newspapers. The common theme linking the three performances was the identical approach of the newspapers to the issue of the power of the federal government vis-a-vis the provinces. All three agreed that the federal government should remain strong, that its powers should not be eroded by provincial aggression, and all three warned of the possible disintegration of the country if the federal government was allowed to be left in an inferior position vis-a-vis the provinces.

In the foreign area frequencies of suggestions/advice were higher than in the domestic area in the case of the Globe and Mail and the Winnipeg Free Press, and lower in the case of the Montreal Star. The hypothesis is thus disproven in two out of three cases. The Globe and Mail had a foreign suggestion/advice in nearly half of its editorials (46%). With respect to NATO itself the newspaper urged that it transform itself into something more than a military alliance, and advised the Canadian Government to pursue this goal:

Now may be the time for one country to translate the talk into action...to bring about an Atlantic Community. Canada ...could be in an ideal position to undertake such a dramatic initiative. (GM, 24.4.63)

The Ottawa declaration was intended to produce a true Atlantic Community...Now is the time to renew the spirit of the Declaration and to make it effective. (GM, 21.5.63)

Canada was once in the forefront of urging that NATO should transform itself from a purely military alliance into an organization forming the foundation of an Atlantic Community, with common political and economic goals...The Canadian Government should renew its efforts in this direction. (GM, 19.12.63)

As far as Canada's relationship with the United States was concerned the newspaper urged a frank and open relationship based on full equal-

ity of the two partners. It cautioned against acquiring any new equipment for NORAD unless implications of its deployment had been thoroughly investigated:

We have to be frank /with the U.S./ without being acrimonious. We have to get rid of suspicions that when we disagree it is because Canadians are anti-American.... We have to accept that although one nation is large and the other small, we are mutually interdependent. (GM, 13.5.63)

Just as the military defence of North America is now a joint undertaking, so must production for military use be shared on a basis of full equality. Canadian industry should have the same freedom to compete for military orders as U.S. industry, with no question of political interference to steer the contracts one way or another. (GM, 3.6.63)

The Government should present a clear cut account of these implications /of deploying ABM/ before it undertakes any new commitments to NORAD. (GM, 29.8.67)

With respect to problems caused by other NATO members the Globe and Mail was very patient with the disruptive policies of France and urged the allies to "make every effort to avert the possibility" of France's leaving the alliance (GM, 19.6.66). It advised that the allies "should take a long-range view /of the alliance/, rather than lapse into angry retaliation" against France. (GM, 15.3.66). It also advocated making Germany a full fledged participant in NATO's nuclear strategy:

West Germans must not be made to feel like second class members of the Western Alliance. Either Germany is with us or she isn't. If she is, she must be given a meaningful role in the defence apparatus she is helping to man and maintain. (GM, 16.12.66)

With respect to Canada's overall policy vis-a-vis NATO the Globe and Mail urged a reexamination of Canadian foreign policy with a view of reducing our military commitments in NATO and strengthening

our peace-keeping capacity:

There is not much point...in arguing about how many troops we should maintain in Europe, or whether our aircraft should be armed with nuclear or conventional weapons, until we have decided what sort of role we wish to play in NATO in the years ahead....It is to be hoped that it is these and other political questions and not simply military matters which are engaging the attention of Mr. Hellyer and his colleagues as they work out defence policy. (GM, 24.11.63)

In line with NATO's shifting strategy we should be working toward the eventual withdrawal of all our forces on the continent and the commitment, if necessary, of more air-mobile contingent based in Canada....Our whole foreign policy is becoming increasingly involved with peace-keeping and with economic and technical assistance to the developing world. These are worthy purposes. They could be pursued even more diligently with the extra manpower and the extra money that would be available with the withdrawal of our forces from Europe. (GM, 13.5.67)

And if he /External Affairs Minister Martin/ believes that our air contribution in Europe is obsolescent, he ought to be seeking ways to negotiate Canada out of this role as soon as decency and security permit. (GM, 8.12.67)

It is evident that the Globe and Mail was motivated to offer more suggestions/advice in the foreign than the domestic field. Regarding NATO the newspaper did not hesitate to offer advice on any or all matter under consideration. Its editorial stance in the foreign field is more solid and more extensive, and makes the domestic one look pallid by comparison. It clearly contradicts the hypothesis.

The Montreal Star differed from the other two newspapers in that it was less likely, during Mr. Pearson's time in office, to offer foreign suggestions/advice than domestic ones. Its score in the foreign area was 25% and thus about half as frequent as either of the other two newspapers. Most of its suggestions called for a reorganization of NATO along economic and political lines, and when this proved futile, for a reappraisal of Canadian foreign policy with a view of

possible withdrawal from both NATO and NORAD:

Thus the ministers should be concerning themselves increasingly with the political and economic challenges of Europe.... (MS, 14.12.66)

One obvious thing to do is, of course, to adjust our defence policy to the new facts of life....Quite apart from the development of weapon, the politics of Europe are not what they were in the first decade after the war. And this means re-thinking on our part. (MS, 26.5.65)

...we believe that, as far as Canada is concerned, the day of NATO and NORAD is over. (MS, 15.3.65)

If the latter role /peacekeeping/ is the one we want we should think in terms of withdrawal from NATO and perhaps even from NORAD, whose military hardware in the future will be outside the range of a unified Canadian force. (MS, 27.5.67)

The performance of the Montreal Star is very much different from that of the other two newspapers. It is clearly timid and suggests that the newspaper may have indeed felt inadequate to cope with the NATO related issues, as Rosenau would have one believe. It compares unfavourably with the newspaper's domestic performance which was bolder and clearly illustrated the newspaper's motivational competence to deal with the federal-provincial fiscal hassle.

Finally, the Winnipeg Free Press repeated its spectacular domestic performance in the foreign area as well, as 56% of its foreign editorials had a suggestion to offer. It was again the highest score for the three newspapers. The suggestions were also definite and pointed. With respect to NATO itself the newspaper hoped to see it expanded to an Atlantic Community:

No...answer to NATO's predicament will be possible until the allies achieve a much stronger unity they possess today, in political and economic, as well as military terms. The more these problems are examined the clearer it becomes that

they can be solved by nothing less than a true Atlantic community, interdependent in machinery as it already is in fact. (WFP, 21.5.63)

There is also a need for NATO to become an instrument by which its individual members can concert their politics with regard to problems arising not only within the NATO area but anywhere in the world....It must be hoped that when the reorganization of NATO is being discussed that this aspect is not again overlooked or ignored. (WFP, 12.5.64)

...a political European unity...must be the foundation stone of an effective Atlantic alliance. (WFP, 24.3.66)

The newspaper also offered definite suggestions on how the reorganization of Canadian armed forces should proceed, including advice on how to proceed with the unification of the forces:

The government would be wise, if it wishes to avoid the costly mistakes of the past, to place strict limitations on the powers to be vested in the proposed new defence staff. It should avoid giving the chief of the defence staff authority which would make him a supreme commander. Consideration should also be given to creating at the top of the structure a defence council...responsible... for co-ordinating and planning overall policy. (WFP, 30.3.64)

Instead of being made supreme commander he should be considered merely the first among equals on the defence council, senior in rank to his colleagues but equal in terms of responsibility. (WFP, 9.7.64)

A more sensible system...would have the various senior military and civil staff personnel share equally in the decisions of the defence staff instead of tending to become shadows of their commander-in-chief. (WFP, 20.8.66)

With respect to the two members of NATO who were causing some controversy in the alliance the Winnipeg Free Press advocated allowing Germany to participate in NATO's nuclear force, and making an effort to satisfy France's ambitions:

Germany should have the right to defend herself with these weapons, without necessarily having nuclear weapons of her own or the exclusive right to decide when they are to be

used. (WFP, 17.11.65)

...compromise will have to be sought /with France/.... The Canadians...who also by heritage can comprehend France's legitimate ambitions should be well placed to help...establish guidelines towards future compromise. (WFP, 29.11.65)

Finally, with respect to the future direction of Canada's policy vis-a-vis NATO, the Winnipeg Free Press advocated a strong military posture on all fronts, and was not anywhere as enthusiastic about the value of peacekeeping as the Globe and Mail:

...skillful Soviet diplomacy...would like to see the disintegration of NATO, so that the Soviet giant could deal with each of the European nations separately. This is what NATO must prevent at all cost...there should be no Western unilateral /military/ reductions... (WFP, 17.12.66)

Canada cannot withdraw /from NATO/ even under the disguise of a troop reduction, without betraying its basic commitments and accepting the defence offered by its allies while making no serious contribution of its own. (WFP, 24.3.67)

Canada must remain in NORAD. We cannot simply wash our hands of any joint responsibility in the defence of this continent. (WFP, 27.4.67)

If this /ABM/ is to be the next step in the higher lunacy of our times then Canada must also consider the anti-missile defence of its own cities, at astronomical cost....Canada cannot escape its geographical position. It cannot be neutral. (WFP, 11.5.67)

Peacekeeping as a national Canadian policy, will have to be thoroughly revised. At present such operations have favoured the aggressor demoralized Canadian troops, provided a convenient excuse for the great powers to shrug off their responsibilities. (WFP, 2.12.67)

Thus, it must be pointed out that the Winnipeg Free Press gave a very consistent performance in both areas, but in the foreign field in particular. Its suggestions were frequent, concrete and to the point. The newspaper dealt with nearly every NATO-related

issue with great confidence and apparent knowledge of the complications involved. Its performance in the foreign area was in many ways much better than than of the other two newspapers.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it must be stated that the data obtained with respect to the frequency of editorial suggestions or advice fails to support the hypothesis, which stipulated that the domestic area would elicit more suggestions than the foreign area, because the former is more immediate and familiar and more amenable to being influenced. The results indicate that in a majority of cases newspapers were more likely to offer foreign rather than domestic suggestions. Two results stand out: that of the Globe and Mail under Mr. Diefenbaker and that of the Winnipeg Free Press under Mr. Pearson. In both cases their frequency of suggestions was considerably higher in both areas than those for the other two newspapers. This may indicate that there may exist some kind of correlation between the newspaper's propensity to offer independent editorial suggestions or advice and its ideological affinity with the regime in power. The Globe and Mail, a Conservative newspaper, felt most competent to offer suggestions when the Conservative administration of Mr. Diefenbaker was in power, just as the Winnipeg Free Press, a Liberal newspaper, felt most competent to offer suggestions when the Liberal administrations of Mr. Pearson was in power. In other words, if a newspaper feels an affinity with the government in power, because that government's political orientation agrees with that of the newspaper, then that newspaper may also feel more sure of being listened to and therefore more motivated to offer editorial suggestions. The desire to help political friends rather than adversaries is clearly evident and

applies to the domestic as well as to the foreign area.

There remains the question of why the foreign area elicited on the whole more editorial suggestions than the domestic area, contrary to what Rosenau would have expected. It appears that generally, newspapers displayed a high degree of familiarity and competence with the NATO-related issues in spite of the fact that these were not as immediate and seemingly not as easily amenable to influence as the domestic issues. In the era of advanced communication technology, the geographic distance between the home country and the action center of the foreign issue, which in this case was either Washington, D.C. or Western Europe, may not be of great importance. For a Toronto editor, Victoria B.C. is just as distant as Paris, and there is no reason why an intelligent editor should not be able to familiarize himself with NATO-related issues as thoroughly as with federal-provincial issues, if he wants to. He will then be able to offer suggestions as he sees fit. He may also realize that foreign issues are as important to the well being of the country as domestic issues, that they also must be resolved to the satisfaction of the government and the population, and the distance, in itself, is not a matter of great importance, and certainly no handicap to intelligent thinking. On the whole all foreign suggestions found were quite astute and displayed a fair amount of knowledge of NATO and its problems.

In the domestic area, on the other hand, the newspapers seemed constrained by the computations of federal-provincial

finances. They thus were generally inclined to offer suggestions which would most benefit the home province, and this somewhat limited their freedom to offer advice. It appears, therefore, that factors other than capacity to influence the outcome of situations, and the familiarity with the situations because of their immediacy, play a part in the newspaper's propensity to offer editorial suggestions and advice. The give-and-take involved in federal-provincial finances seems to play a restraining role, while the psychological remoteness of most NATO-related issues and the relative absence of responsibility for their resolution seem to leave the newspapers more free to suggest and advise.

To sum up, the question of differences in motivations between domestic and foreign issues remains unresolved as both hypotheses are left in a very thin light indeed. Neither motivational intensity nor motivational competence appear to follow the path of Rosenau's reasoning. The multiplicity of affiliations and loyalties does not appear to be an overriding factor, negatively affecting motivational intensity as Rosenau postulated. Goals are not confounded nor are aspirations dampened in the domestic field. On the contrary, the goal is to defend one's own province, and the aspiration is to get as much money from the federal government as possible. Thus many of the explanations offered by Rosenau do not apply or they work at cross-purposes. If domestic issues do indeed cast members of a given political system in opposition to each other, this state may result not in the confounding of goals by the multiplicity of affiliations and loyalties

as Rosenau would have one believe, but in the consolidation and strengthening of parochial goals in the face of encroaching competitors, producing more rather than less motivational intensity. And if foreign issues make members of a given political system deal with circumstances outside of the system, there is no reason to believe that these issues are necessarily less complex and ambivalent, and that they will therefore result in more rather than less motivational intensity.

Similarly, motivational competence in the foreign field is not weakened by the properties of the field considered crucial by Rosenau, namely its being alien and remote and beyond the control and jurisdiction of Canadians. Authors of the editorials did not appear to be intimidated by these attributes at all. On the contrary, they seemed quite competent to deal with the various situations which arose by offering sensible advice on how they should be handled. On the other hand, the domestic field, in spite of its being seemingly immediate, familiar and quite amenable to being influenced, did not produce the expected flood of editorial suggestions. I may be that the domestic field, especially one as complicated and "impossible" as federal-provincial fiscal relations, may require such a high degree of specialized knowledge and competence that few editorial writers would venture to tackle it seriously by offering suggestions and advice. The field of NATO by comparison may look simple and straightforward and encourage suggestion-giving. Explanations different from those offered by Rosenau might account for the difference or

lack of it in the editorial treatment of domestic and foreign issues.

But even more importantly, the source of motivation of editorial writers, both in the realm of intensity as well as competence, could be searched and found somewhere else. One possibility is that editorial writers basically respond to the perceived preferences and sentiments of the public. In any competitive marketplace this sensitivity to the consumers demands is an important guide of action, and there is little reason to believe that newspapers are exceptions to this rule. Toronto, Montreal and Winnipeg are all multi-newspaper towns, and the three newspapers have to compete fiercely with their respective rivals, both print and electronic, for the loyalty of their readers. It is inevitable, therefore, that they must, in some measure, give the readers what they want to hear, appeal to their biases, and meet their expectations. However, the exact extent of their responsiveness to the audience is a task for future researchers to tackle.

Another possibility is that newspapers make very little effort to tailor their editorial views to the preferences of their readers, but instead leave their writers and editors free to determine what individual decisions and commitments should be made about public issues discussed in editorials. The doctrine of the freedom of the press and the corresponding view of the press as a guardian of public good plays an important part in our political culture. It is no doubt reflected in the way in which

young people in this country are trained for their future media jobs, and in the way they perform them. Thus, individual writer's conceptions of press freedom, press responsibility and the public good, might hold the key to the content of editorials. If empirically assessed they might be a better guide to the performance of the press regarding domestic and foreign issues than the rather simplistic explanations postulated by Rosenau.

CHAPTER 7: DIRECTION OF INTERACTION
VERTICAL VERSUS HORIZONTAL

The fourth hypothesis was that editorials on foreign issues are more likely to be directed vertically (toward the government) than horizontally (toward other national actors taking part in the debate of the issue), while editorials on domestic issues tend to be directed horizontally. This is so because, in addition to motivational differences, Rosenau also asked whether there were any differences between domestic and foreign areas in terms of patterns of interaction through which issues are sustained or resolved. Specifically, he was interested in the direction of interaction, i.e. to what extent it unfolds vertically, through hierarchical channels, or horizontally among relatively equal actors. He speculated that foreign policy calls for decisive and unified action, which tends to concentrate the responsibility in the hands of a relatively few top officials. In addition, foreign issues focus on resources or relationships that are to be rearranged in the foreign environment and therefore members of the national system do not compete among themselves for scarce resources, but are able to contest each foreign issue independently, without regard to other national parties participating in the dialogue. As a result, foreign issues will involve more vertically directed interaction.

Domestic issues, on the other hand, involve bargaining over scarce resources, so that what one actor gains another has to give up. The process makes national actors into rivals who participate in a zero sum game. They must interact among themselves in order to find an accommodation. As a result domestic issues will involve more horizontally directed interaction.

The operational difficulty encountered here was that practically all editorials, since they concerned issues of public policy, contained a reference to the government. It was therefore decided to choose a different political actor as an indicant of the pattern of interaction through which issues are resolved. The Opposition Parties/Leaders were chosen because they form an integral part of the Canadian governmental structure and are, so to speak, a government-in-waiting, and thus can be subsumed under Rosenau's concept of vertical. Other national actors, such as provincial governments, columnists, intellectuals, pressure groups, etc. were subsumed under the concept of horizontal and coded accordingly.

The hypothesis tested, therefore, was that foreign editorials are likely to have more references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders than domestic editorials, and that foreign issues are more likely to involve the Opposition Parties/Leaders than domestic issues, which are in turn more likely to involve other national actors taking part in the resolution of the issue, especially those who have a material stake in the resolution of that issue and must compete with other actors for scarce resources.

The statistical results obtained were as follows:

Table 7.1

FREQUENCY OF EDITORIAL REFERENCES TO THE FEDERAL OPPOSITION PARTIES/LEADERS

	GM	MS	WFP	MEAN
Dom.	14%(3)	0%(0)	0%(0)	5%
Dief.				
For.	25%(10)	41%(20)	44%(15)	37%
Dom.	15%(16)	6%(2)	6%(2)	9%
Pears.				
For.	22%(10)	25%(12)	18%(7)	22%
MEAN	15% 24%	3% 33%	3% 31%	

Table 7.2

STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RATIO OF EDITORIAL REFERENCES VERSUS NO-REFERENCES TO THE FEDERAL OPPOSITION PARTIES/LEADERS

Newsp/PM	# of refer.	# of no-refer.	SIGNIFICANCE
GM/Dief			
Domestic	3	18	
Foreign	10	30	0.5244
MS/Dief			
Domestic	0	8	
Foreign	20	29	0.0677
WFP/Dief			
Domestic	0	10	
Foreign	15	19	0.0201
GM/Pears			
Domestic	6	33	
Foreign	10	36	0.6415
MS/Pears			
Domestic	2	33	
Foreign	12	36	0.0446
WFP/Pears			
Domestic	2	33	
Foreign	7	32	0.2139

The data indicate considerable differences between domestic and foreign editorials in terms of the frequency of editorial references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders. While most frequencies are low, that is less than 25%, the domestic frequencies are definitely lower than the foreign ones in all cases without exception. However, no statistically significant ratios of foreign and domestic references versus no references have been discovered. The lack of statistical confirmation places the validity of the hypothesis, which on the surface appears to be confirmed, in doubt. Nevertheless, it appears that the Opposition Parties/Leaders are more likely to be editorially involved in the resolution of foreign than domestic issues. What their position is, should be disclosed by a more detailed examination of the content of the editorial references.

To begin with the Conservative administration of John Diefenbaker in the domestic area, neither the Montreal Star nor the Winnipeg Free Press had any references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders at all, while the Globe and Mail had three of them which amounted to 14% of its domestic editorials. All three were extremely critical of the Liberals:

...Liberal Leader Pearson attacked the Diefenbaker Government proposal to scrap the present Dominion-Provincial tax rental agreements...making the provinces levy their own direct taxes instead....It is... a sad day for Canada when a national Liberal Leader denounces Ottawa for suggesting that the provinces should be given back some of their financial autonomy and responsibility. (GM, 1.11.60)

...points out the absurdity of Mr. Paul Martin's assertion in Parliament that the Ontario Government is conspiring with the Dominion Government against the rest of Canada. In fact it was Mr. Martin and his fellow MP's, holding cabinet rank in the former Liberal regime who produced the fiscal problems....(GM 3.2.61)

It appears, therefore, that the Globe and Mail, being a supporter of Mr. Diefenbaker's fiscal reforms, used the Liberals as a whipping boy to give credence to the soundness of Mr. Diefenbaker's approach to federal-provincial relations. The references were partisan attacks, designed to discredit the Opposition.

In the foreign area, under the same administration, the frequency of editorial references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders was very considerably higher and amounted, in the case of the Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press to almost half of their editorials, 41% and 44% respectively. The same two newspapers had no domestic references at all. The Globe and Mail on the other hand nearly doubled its frequency of references from 14% in the domestic area to 25% in the foreign area. At first the newspaper was critical of the Liberals blaming them first for not having a nuclear policy, and then for advocating a wrong policy:

The Government, with the passive support of the Opposition, has remained silent on the whole vital question of whether Canada should or should not become a nuclear power. (GM, 27.5.60)

Opposition Leader Pearson was plainly playing to the gallery.../when he suggested/ that all the arms of all the North Atlantic countries...should be placed under the collective authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization....This was an extreme and unrealistic statement.... (GM, 20.1.60)

The Liberal Party has backed and filled on the question /of whether to adopt nuclear arms/ and now appears to have no firm policy. It claims to be against nuclear weapons on present information, but wishes to reserve freedom of action if it becomes the Government party.... The Liberals do not press /the government/ seriously for a decision for fear of revealing their own weakness. (GM, 11.12.63)

But as time passed and the Diefenbaker government was still undecided

on the issue, references to the Liberals became more friendly:

Mr. Paul Hellyer, the Liberal defence critic in the House of Commons is probably right in asserting that the Diefenbaker Government is preparing the country for the acceptance of nuclear weapons and that Defense Minister Douglas Harness's speech on Monday was a contribution to this campaign. (GM, 14.9.61)

The Liberal Leader Mr. Lester Pearson took a long step toward resolving the nation's confusion about defence policy, particularly in relation to nuclear arms.... While stating his own opinions firmly, he rejected any temptation there may have been to make defence a party political issue, and called instead for a bipartisan approach to the problem. Coming from Mr. Pearson this attitude is doubly welcome. He is widely regarded by members of all parties as an eminent authority on foreign affairs....Mr. Pearson...has indicated his willingness to raise defence about the level of party squabbling, and the Government would be well advised to take advantage of his offer. (GM, 14.1.63)

The Globe was, however, firmly opposed to the defence views of the New Democratic Party:

The leader of the New Democratic Party Mr. T. C. Douglas rejects nuclear weapons in all their forms. He said that if NATO becomes an offensive nuclear force, Canada should withdraw from the Alliance. Mr. Douglas would have committed this nation to an unrealistic policy of renouncing nuclear arms for ever, regardless of the new danger and threats we might face in the future. (GM, 12.4.62)

Thus, while firmly rejecting the radical notions of the Socialists the Globe and Mail never really committed itself to the Liberals either. In spite of its blatant criticism of Mr. Diefenbaker's defence policy the newspaper never embraced the more clearly spelled out alternative propagated by the Pearson Liberals, not even in the last months of the Conservative regime, when the entire country was in an uproar over the Prime Minister's inability to make up his mind on the question of nuclear arms, and when the Liberals had already arrived at a policy which advocated temporary acceptance of nuclear weapons.

The Montreal Star had foreign references in 41% of its editorials and they were, with few exceptions, very friendly to the Liberal Leader Pearson and his ideas of expanding the non-military aspects of NATO:

The decision to broaden the base of NATO's hitherto purely defensive undertaking to include diplomatic negotiations is, in the view of Nobel Prize winner Lester B. Pearson, the most important development of this week's meeting in Paris. (MS, 21.12.57)

Lester Pearson has never really lost hope for the famous but almost forgotten Article 2 of the Treaty...which provides for economic cooperation among the member nations, aside from military and political aspects....It would be heartening if there were concrete signs of this coming about....It does not seem so long ago that Mr. Pearson as one of NATO's Three Wise Men, was the major author of a report which sought to find ways of expanding the alliance's activities....He still feels, and rightly so, that the concept should be promoted for all its worth. (MS, 4.12.58)

The Liberal Leader Mr. Pearson...has always been a believer in the need to widen the Western alliance into something more durable than a military pact - an alliance with an economic base....He said clearly enough that time was running out. His experienced judgement on this commands respect. (MS, 28.2.59)

As the nuclear debate dragged on inconclusively, the Montreal Star decided that "the Liberals share the same responsibility as the Conservatives for skirting the main points" (MS 5.1.63), but continued to quote Mr. Pearson frequently, pointing out the correctness of his reasoning:

Everybody realizes that, as Mr. Lester Pearson puts it "an accident" could so easily trigger an irrevocable step. (MS, 5.9.61)

Mr. Pearson caught in this dilemma, as indeed we all are, continues to present schemes the effect of which would be to limit, as much as possible, the equipment of our forces with these devastating weapons. He deserves public attention. (MS, 18.9.61)

From the moment the Liberal Opposition committed itself to accept nuclear weapons, the Montreal Star approved of the decision and gave it a wide

exposure till the very day of the election.

Mr. Pearson has committed the Liberal Party to acceptance of nuclear warheads. This is not a reversal of policy so much as a formulation of one....Mr. Pearson has now put the Diefenbaker government on the spot. (MS, 15.1.63)

In the circumstances of the hour we find the position taken by Mr. Pearson the only honourable way out of this dilemma. (MS, 2.2.63)

The reason why we approve Mr. Pearson's policy of fulfilling our commitment is that it is both honourable and sensible....(MS, 14.2.63)

Not bothering to pay any attention whatever to the views of the opposition in the domestic area, the Montreal Star exhibited extreme partisanship in the foreign area and tried to resolve the conflicting points of the NATO issue by frequently referring to the Liberal opposition, and particularly its leader, Mr. Pearson. Nearly all of its references were friendly and approbative and clearly attempted to give Mr. Pearson's views the widest possible exposure regarding the future shape of NATO as well the current question of nuclear arms.

The Winnipeg Free Press had foreign references in nearly half of its editorials (46%) and very much like the Montreal Star agreed with Mr. Pearson's ideas and gave wide exposure to them:

Mr. Pearson saw the writing on the wall long before....In Parliament...the Liberal leader said: "I do not know a more important or any greater vision...than trying to build up the Atlantic area as a free trade...NATO has been the sheer anchor of our defence and our security in the last ten years, but NATO is not going to survive, I am afraid, merely as a military alliance..." It is to be hoped that /the government/ will become frightened enough to take Mr. Pearson's advice before it is too late to do anything. (WFP, 16.7.59)

In the matter of defence, possibly the most disturbing issue before the country, Mr. Pearson enunciated two forthright principles.... (WFP, 20.1.60)

The Cuban crisis, says Mr. Pearson, showed that Canada's continental defence policy "is now futile and unequal to an emergency...." This statement may have been construed as a partisan attack on the government, but it cannot be.... (WFP, 4.12.62)

The newspaper gave Mr. Pearson's nuclear stand an unqualified support:

A defence policy based on this premise, honouring commitments already made, was a definite part of the remedial steps that must be taken - and would be taken - if a Liberal government were returned to power....Canadian voters who have become disillusioned with the "pie in sky" promises... will be willing to respond to the realism implicit in such a program. As the details are spelled out between now and April 8 /election day/ a revived respect for the Liberal party in Canada will take shape.... (WFP, 23.2.63)

The Winnipeg Free Press was firmly opposed to the New Democratic Party's policy of total nuclear abstinence and criticized it on several occasions:

The New Democratic Party has been seeking desperately in Parliament to cover its embarrassment over the foreign policy resolution written by its founding convention.... If NATO is as bad as /NDP/ believes or as irrelevant... one would think that the New Democrats would muster enough courage to recommend unconditional withdrawal. But they have not yet reached that stage. (WFP, 20.9.61)

It cannot be said that the executive /of the NDP/ has used its meeting in Ottawa for any fresh thinking about defence problems....New Democrats should make fewer policy pronouncements and put more thought into them, if they hope to be taken seriously by the public. (WFP, 22.9.64)

In summary it can be said that the results obtained for Mr. Diefenbaker's administration basically confirm the hypothesis that foreign editorials are likely to have more references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders than domestic editorials. With respect to federal-provincial fiscal relations one newspaper, the Globe and Mail, had but three references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders, while the other two newspapers had no references at all. With reference to NATO, on the other hand, all three newspapers had numerous references to the views and actions

of the Opposition Parties/Leaders, rejecting the anti-nuclear stance of the NDP, and approving of Mr. Pearson's efforts to expand NATO's non-military activities and accept, for the time being, nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces in the alliance. The Globe and Mail's references were either hostile or non-committal, and even when confronted with the bankruptcy of Mr. Diefenbaker's defence policy the newspaper found itself unable to desert the Conservative Prime Minister and go over to the Liberal side. The other two newspapers, on the other hand, were from the very beginning very friendly to the Liberals and extolled the defence ideas of their Leader Lester Pearson, juxtaposing them with the indecisiveness and confusion of the ruling Conservatives and their Prime Minister. It can be said, therefore, that the Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press were trying to resolve the defence issue by popularizing and praising the ideas of the official Opposition Party, which was the Liberals, and presenting them as a viable alternative to the lack of policy on the Conservative side. The pattern of interaction in the foreign area can, therefore, be said to have been directed vertically, toward the Opposition Party and its Leader. In the domestic area this direction was not evident. It now remains to be seen whether the same can be said about the Pearson era.

During the Pearson era the discrepancy in the frequency of references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders between the domestic and the foreign area was equally pronounced. The foreign frequencies outnumber the domestic ones by a ratio of as much as four to one in the case of the Montreal Star, but they were on the whole lower than those obtained during the Diefenbaker era. The highest frequency of foreign

references during the Pearson era was 25% as compared with 44% during the Diefenbaker era.

The Globe and Mail made domestic references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders in only 15% of its editorials (six references), and they consisted of negative comments about the Conservatives as well as the New Democrats:

This /the \$10.00 increase in Old Age Pensions/ did not satisfy the Conservative Opposition Leader Mr. John Diefenbaker. Having successfully used pensions in the past as a bribe for the votes, he saw an opportunity to make more party capital, and demanded that the government should pay the \$10.00 increase at once, without regard to the contributions to be collected from payrolls under the wider plan. Mr. Diefenbaker was joined in this cynical politicking by the New Democratic Party....(GM, 10.9.63)

He /the Prime Minister/ was immediately accused by Conservative Leader of performing another somersault.... In circles less prejudiced than Mr. Diefenbaker's such activities are often described as statesmanship. (GM, 16.4.64)

The Montreal Star, in the domestic field, had only two references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders, (6% of its editorials). Both were sarcastic references to Mr. Diefenbaker:

Mr. Diefenbaker, one of whose boasts must be that he won the 1957 election without help from Quebec, will be able to claim one more Pearson "capitulation" to Lesage "ultimatum". If he does he may have to try to win another election in the same way. (MS, 29.11.63)

Where Mr. Diefenbaker errs is that he appears to see Canada as a unitary state in which the provinces are necessary evils to be dealt with loftily....Mr. Diefenbaker ignores its /the country's/ dynamism and its capacity for change. (MS, 4.4.64)

The Winnipeg Free Press, also had only two references to the Opposition Party/Leader (6% of its editorials), one critical and one non-committal:

For this a good deal of blame rests...with those who have tried to use old age pensions for their own partisan political purposes: Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. Knowles threatening a non-confidence motion unless the \$10.00 was granted at once. (WFP, 10.9.63)

It is clear already...that a glittering opportunity is offered to the opposition. But whether the Conservative party is strong enough to seize it, and wise enough to deserve it, also remains unknown. (WFP, 8.12.67)

It is clear that by and large all references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders were negative and critical of the Conservatives and the New Democrats alike, and basically attempted to discredit Mr. Diefenbaker, his past performance as well as his present tactics. In this way the fiscal reforms advocated by Prime Minister Pearson as well as his method of promulgating them were, by contrast, presented as good and credible. Mr. Diefenbaker on the other hand, was pictured as a spoiler, and a bitter old man attempting to discredit legitimate and necessary programs.

The foreign area produced remarkably uniform frequencies of references, ranging from 18% in the case of the Winnipeg Free Press to 25% in the case of the Montreal Star. The Globe and Mail had references in 22% of its editorials and many of them were critical of the New Democratic Party, which by now had assumed a balancing role in the House in view of the fact that Mr. Pearson was governing with a minority government:

It is therefore annoying to find the New Democratic Party still prepared to make political capital out of the nuclear warheads. In a prepared statement it has condemned the Prime Minister for taking the action he could not in honour escape. (GM, 15.5.63)

The vote of confidence precipitated in the House of Commons on the nuclear issue by the New Democratic Party reflected no credit on any party in the House....The Opposition

parties were irresponsible....Canadians were...little impressed with his /NDP Leader Douglas's/ reasoning.... (GM, 23.5.63)

But Mr. Diefenbaker also came up for a fair amount of criticism throughout the entire duration of Mr. Pearson's administration:

His /Mr. Diefenbaker's/ harping on the nuclear arms question in the House of Commons can do the Conservative Opposition nothing but harm. Mr. Diefenbaker seems to have forgotten that it was his own chronic indecision on defence policy that brought about the defeat of his Government..../His harping/ looks suspiciously like deliberate obstruction of the Government's program....Mr. Diefenbaker and his colleagues are becoming crashing bores.... (GM, 8.6.63)

The Globe and Mail was particularly annoyed by the Opposition criticism of the integration of the Canadian armed forces, and both the Conservatives and the New Democrats were faulted for their critical attitude:

The attack on integration came from Opposition Leader John Diefenbaker....It is difficult to take those strictures seriously. Has anybody forgotten the noisy quarreling, the tangled confusion, the state of total deadlock which characterized Canada's Defence Department during the Diefenbaker's regime? (GM, 8.7.64)

...the situation /regarding the implementation of the unification bill/ did not seem to be so deplorable as...Opposition spokesman had made it appear....But even more important, the survey indicated that Opposition defence critics have simply not been doing their job. (GM, 3.8.66)

The Montreal Star had a reference to the Opposition Parties/ Leaders in one out of every four editorials (25%), and they were all critical references both to the Conservatives and the New Democrats:

...the New Democrats Party's conditioned reflex reaction that he /Prime Minister Pearson/ has contracted "new" nuclear commitments without the consent of Parliament is nonsense. (MS, 14.5.63)

The last, apparently, has not been heard of the nuclear arms issue. Mr. Diefenbaker has promised us another installment, but we suspect that Mr. Diefenbaker is a spent force. (MS, 23.5.63)

Mr. Diefenbaker tried to squirm off the nuclear hook of his own making by arguing that the Nassau agreement on a NATO deterrent force completely changed the picture.... This was nonsense.... (MS, 28.5.63)

Opponents of the defence policy have so muddled the waters of public debate that many people have become confused, and the confusion was greatly increased by the stream of half-truths which Mr. Diefenbaker used.... (MS, 4.1.64)

Nor can good be served by re-opening old wounds and permitting the navy to become a fishing expedition for ambitious Conservative politicians, which is what Mr. Diefenbaker's call for a Royal Commission...would mean. (MS, 21.7.66)

The only positive comment about the Conservatives was made by the Montreal Star in response to Dalton Camp's call for a total modification of Canada's foreign policy:

Dalton Camp came up with a stirring and highly intelligent analysis of what our role in the world should be. It is the clearest and most imaginative manifesto yet published by any Canadian in a position...to make changes. (MS, 12.8.67)

The Winnipeg Free Press had a reference to the Opposition Parties/Leaders in 18% of its editorials and they were all critical of the Conservative spokesmen:

The Conservative Party, which was charged in the recent election with inability to make up its mind in defence matters, is displaying a similar inability in respect to the special committee on defence. (WFP, 3.6.63)

Mr. Diefenbaker apparently is ready to risk the security of Canada, and the Western alliance, for his own political advantage. (WFP, 8.6.63)

Nor is the government's courage and good sense in making the reductions going to be dimmed in the public eye by the puerile criticism of Mr. Gordon Churchill, once defence minister himself. (WFP, 9.12.63)

It is thus evident that the foreign area, just as the domestic area, produced overwhelmingly negative references to the Opposition

Parties/Leaders, and to Mr. Diefenbaker in particular. It appeared that while Prime Minister, Mr. Diefenbaker had discredited himself in the foreign area so badly that his interference with Prime Minister Pearson's policies was consistently condemned by all the three newspapers. His views and tactics were consistently presented as mean and ridiculous and no merit was found in any of them. Mr. Diefenbaker and his party were editorially treated as a nuisance, and not as a source of alternative views which could help in the resolution of issues.

This last point appears to underline the major difference between the results obtained for Mr. Diefenbaker's and Mr. Pearson's era. While the Conservatives were in power and Mr. Diefenbaker was having difficulties in resolving the issue of nuclear arms, both the Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press used the Liberal Opposition and its Leader Lester Pearson as an alternative source of ideas on how the issue should be resolved. The references to Opposition were to be found in nearly half of their editorials. It can be said, therefore, that during that time the Opposition Party played an active part in the resolution of the various NATO-related issues. The views of its Leader regarding the expansion of NATO's non-military activities as well as the acceptance, for the time being, of nuclear arms for Canadian armed forces in NATO and NORAD, were often propagated in the editorials of the two newspapers, and presented as a viable alternative to the indecision of the ruling Conservatives.

The performance of these two newspapers constitutes an exception rather than a rule because in all the remaining cases, domestic as well as foreign, the views and activities of the Opposition/Parties and Leaders were presented in a critical way and portrayed as disruptive and without substantial merit. This is particularly true of Mr. Pearson's era, when references to the opposing Conservatives were all negative and critical.

In conclusion it can be stated that the hypothesis regarding the frequency of editorial references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders can be said to have been confirmed but with reservations. In all cases without exception, during the administration of Mr. Diefenbaker as well as Mr. Pearson, foreign references outnumbered domestic references, but generally speaking all frequencies were low. However, none of the domestic and foreign discrepancies obtained, under Mr. Diefenbaker or Mr. Pearson, were found to be statistically significant, and in only two cases, those of the Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press during Mr. Diefenbaker's time in office, were the Opposition Party and its Leader presented as positive contributors to the resolution of various NATO-related issues. In the remaining cases the Opposition Parties were presented as spoilers. The two wayward performances can be attributed to the combination of circumstances existing at the time, namely a Conservative Prime Minister in a state of confusion over defence, and two Liberally-oriented newspapers who seized the opportunity to publicize the views of the Liberal Opposition which they found more congenial.

In addition to noting references to the Opposition Parties/Leaders all editorials were also coded for references to other national actors contributing their views and actions to the resolution of issues. These actors could have been prominent citizens or academicians, pressure groups, authors, or the provinces - in fact any person or group of persons who chose to voice their opinions on an issue. Since Rosenau claimed that domestic issues are more likely to involve horizontal interaction, the hypothesis tested here was whether indeed domestic editorials are likely to bring to the attention of the public the views of actors other than the government, or the opposition, who might have opinions and demands concerning the domestic area. If so, the process of accommodation and consensus building, mentioned by Rosenau, would indeed be taking place in the domestic area more so than in the foreign area.

The performance of the provinces was of particular interest here because they are, in the domestic field, ten equal competitors for scarce fiscal resources, confronting the federal government which, in this case, is their superior. The Canadian Federal structure enables the provinces to act independently of and without any reference to the federal government in many areas of endeavor, but in the area of finances it is a very dependent relationship because the federal government is the major tax collector and the major money distributor. The relationship between the provinces and the federal government can, therefore, be called a hierarchical one. On the other hand, among themselves the ten provinces are independent and technically equal partners contesting a ruthless game for scarce

riches which makes them into competitors well aware of the fact that often what one of them gains another one has to give up and that an uneasy accomodation must eventually be reached. As national actors, therefore, they must get involved in a bargaining session and interact frequently for the accomodation to be reached. They are bound to be the most prominent national actors contributing to the resolution of the domestic issue.

The frequencies of editorial references to all national actors were as follows:

Table 7.3

FREQUENCY OF EDITORIAL REFERENCES TO OTHER NATIONAL ACTORS

		GM	MS	WFP	MEAN
	Dom.	67%(14)	50%(4)	90%(9)	72%
Dief.	For.	15%(6)	6%(3)	6%(2)	9%
	Dom.	74%(29)	74%(26)	83%(29)	77%
Pears	For.	13%(6)	19%(9)	21%(8)	18%
	MEAN	71% 14%	62% 13%	83% 14%	

Table 7.4

STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RATIO OF EDITORIAL REFERENCES VERSUS NO-REFERENCES TO OTHER NATIONAL ACTORS

Newsp/PM	# of references	# of no-referen.	SIGNIFICANCE
GM/Dief			
Domestic	14	7	
Foreign	6	34	<u>0.0002</u>
MS/Dief			
Domestic	4	4	
Foreign	3	46	<u>0.0037</u>
WFP/Dief			
Domestic	9	1	
Foreign	2	32	<u>0.0000</u>
GM/Pears			
Domestic	29	10	
Foreign	6	40	<u>0.0000</u>
MS/Pears			
Domestic	26	9	
Foreign	9	39	<u>0.0000</u>
WFP/Pears			
Domestic	29	6	
Foreign	8	31	<u>0.0000</u>

The data indicate the existence of considerable discrepancies in the frequency of editorial references to other national actors between the domestic and the foreign area. Specifically, the domestic references by far outnumber the foreign references. Also, the test of statistical significance shows that the ratio of editorial references versus no-references between the domestic and the foreign issues can be considered statistically significant in each and every case. This is the only piece of datum in this research to show such positive results. The results can be further illuminated if one considers in detail the identity of the other actors mentioned in the editorials.

To begin with the Diefenbaker administration, the Globe and Mail had editorial references to other national actors in the domestic field in 67% of its editorials. Overwhelmingly, these other actors were provinces other than the newspaper's home province - Ontario. The Globe was very critical of their demands in the area of federal-provincial fiscal relations, and had sympathy only for the Maritime provinces, which it considered genuinely deserving of fiscal assistance:

Obviously the Maritime economy is not stagnant. But the rate of increase is not nearly fast enough to give its people, within a reasonable time, the material benefits which most other Canadians enjoy....It is obvious, too, that tax sharing agreements in the past and present, have only superficially helped the Maritimes' economy....(GM, 13.7.59)

Ontario has never complained about this special assistance to four Provinces /the Maritimes/ which are genuinely in need. (GM, 24.2.61)

The Globe and Mail was particularly sensitive to the demands of

Saskatchewan, which was then experimenting with various socialistic policies:

For the fourth time in a row Saskatchewan voters have re-elected the Socialistic Government led by Premier T.C. Douglas. Mr. Douglas says his Government will show its gratitude by implementing its program of what he calls "abundant living": meaning...the compulsory, prepaid scheme for medical care...Where does the Saskatchewan Government get its general revenues?...In fiscal year 1957-58...\$19.6 million was a straight subsidy from Ottawa - the "equalization payment" which is supposed to bring the "have-not" Provinces up to the level of the "haves"....Where does Ottawa get the money to subsidize Saskatchewan in this fashion? From Ontario, which is deemed to be a "have" Province....Who are the "haves"? Who are the "have-nots"? As matters stand Ontario pays abundant taxes so that Saskatchewan can enjoy "abundant living". Ontario scrapes and pinches and does without so that Saskatchewan can spend high, wide and handsome on medical schemes, on low-cost housing projects, on providing farmers with indoor plumbing. Ontario "has not" so that Saskatchewan can "have". (GM, 10.6.60)

The third thing wrong with the present tax-sharing arrangement is that it treats Provinces as needy which are not.... Alberta, rolling in the returns from gas and oil, will get an equalization payment of \$16 million. Saskatchewan, which seemingly can afford the luxuries of the Welfare State, will be helped to the tune of \$21 million. (GM, 25.7.60)

But other provinces' demands also stirred a very antagonistic attitude on the pages of the Globe and Mail:

During the current fiscal year, these equalization payments will total \$178 million. The largest payment will go to Quebec, \$62.7 million. From there the payments run down to British Columbia \$8.6 million....In effect these payments are subsidies. Ontario pays half of them, because Ontario pays half of all the taxes that go into the Dominion Treasury. Thus, Ontario is subsidizing the other nine Provinces, including British Columbia, which...is deemed to be wealthy, deemed to be the other "have" Province. (GM, 29.7.60)

Nine Provinces, rich or poor as the case may be, have joyously lapped up the milk taken from the Ontario cow. Now the Ontario cow is running dry. (GM, 28.11.60)

The only actor, other than a province, recognized by the Globe was

its rival Toronto newspaper the Toronto Star, which was condemned for its critical attitude toward the Diefenbaker administration:

There are some people, however, who will never be pleased with anything the Diefenbaker government does. Happy as the Provincial Governments ought to be...the Toronto Star insists they ought to be in fact are - desperately disappointed.... As on many previous occasions the Star completely misinterprets the facts of the case. (GM, 29.11.57)

It was to be expected that the Toronto Star would try to belittle this week's Dominion-Provincial discussions in Ottawa....The Star cannot abide the thought that the Conservative Government...may restore the national unity which disintegrated under the Liberals. (GM, 8.7.59)

It is evident that the Globe and Mail adopted an extremely ethnocentric posture vis-a-vis the other provinces whose fiscal demands and aspirations it condemned and ridiculed. Its wrath was particularly severe against the province of Saskatchewan whose Socialist provincial government was ideologically repulsive to the Conservative inclinations of the Globe, but also against all other provinces which benefited from the system of equalization payments. These payments, the newspaper claimed, unfairly transferred Ontario money to those undeserving provinces who had a gall to call themselves poor and beg for handouts. There was very little willingness of the part of the Globe and Mail to understand the other provinces' point of view and fiscal dilemmas and practically no willingness to accommodate or give in. The only exceptions here were the Maritime Provinces which, according to the Globe, were truly deserving of federal subsidies. All other actors, be it a province asking for increased equalization or a newspaper criticizing Mr. Diefenbaker's conception of federal-provincial relations

were summarily condemned.

The Montreal Star, in the domestic field, had editorial references to other national actors in only 50% of its editorials. Like the Globe and Mail, the newspaper also sympathized with the precarious economic position of the Maritimes:

If such "favoritism" /to the Atlantic Provinces/ is in principle open to criticism...it is made necessary by the facts of national life in Canada. Regional standards of services cannot be left markedly below the national average. The same facts, indeed, justify the expenditures the Federal Government proposes to make to provide the Atlantic provinces with an adequate supply of electric power. (MS, 29.11.57)

But with respect to the other provinces' demands the Montreal Star was confused and undecided and offered neutral references like this one:

The wealthy provinces want tax resources that enable them to fulfil these responsibilities /of modern welfare state/. The poor provinces know that, no matter what taxes they get, their yield would be insufficient. The dilemma of the federal government thus becomes apparent. (MS, 26.11.57)

As a result the newspaper made friendly references to selected provincial view-points or actions:

Premier Fost of Ontario caught headlines for his flamboyant demands upon the federal treasury at Monday's meeting in Ottawa....(MS, 27.7.60)

The constitution was invoked to support what Premier Douglas of Saskatchewan has rightly called the tax jungle of the 1930's, and half the provinces of Canada nearly went broke under it. (MS, 25.2.61)

It is clear that the newspaper was confused and undecided what posture to adopt regarding provincial demands for more revenue, and appeared paralyzed by doubt and indecision. Much of it can be attributed to the difficult position of the Montreal Star due

to the excessive demands that the government of Quebec was making vis-a-vis Ottawa. It was difficult for the Star to adopt partisan pro federal or pro provincial postures without getting embroiled in an Ottawa-Quebec cold war. As a result, the newspaper seemed to prefer to sit on the sidelines and not make any decisive statements about the actors participating in the resolution of the federal-provincial fiscal issues.

The Winnipeg Free Press had references to other actors in the domestic field in 90% of its editorials, the highest frequency among the three newspapers. Most of them were hostile references to the rich provinces like Ontario, who wanted more money for themselves and advocated a modification of the equalization principle:

Now is the time for all good Westerners and Maritimers to break out their handkerchiefs and join the Toronto Globe and Mail in weeping over the parlous financial plight of the province of Ontario - a plight resulting, according to the Toronto Tory journal, from what it calls the "have-not" provinces milking Ontario dry. In other words the Globe and Mail is at it again - trying to scuttle the federal-provincial tax conference in Ottawa next month. (WFP, 14.6.60)

Living up to the advance billing given his act last Friday by the Toronto Globe and Mail, the Premier of Ontario has made public his attitude towards the forthcoming federal-provincial conference on fiscal relations....Now the Ontario Premier has announced that he is seeking much more than the \$100 million he previously asked for....It is inconceivable that the federal Government will pay any attention to the greedy demands of Ontario. (WFP, 16.6.60)

This is only our interpretation which can reasonably be attached to his /Ontario Premier Frost's/ remarks. Despite all the reassuring words, he is out to destroy the principle of equalization which is regarded in Toronto financial circles as a device for milking Ontario. (WFP, 26.6.60)

It appears that the battle lines were drawn very quickly between the rich province of Ontario, who favoured a return to

greater provincial fiscal self-sufficiency, and the poor province of Manitoba whose prosperity was very much dependent on subsidies from Ottawa, especially the equalization payments. Just as the Globe and Mail appeared impatient with the demands of the poorer provinces so did the Winnipeg Free Press appeared intransigent and extremely hostile to what is considered the arrogant and selfish attitude of Ontario, and the spokesman for the Conservative interests of the province - the Globe and Mail. As a result the two newspapers engaged in a war of words, each hurling accusations against the other, and neither willing to compromise or reconcile. It is difficult to say whether such antagonism played a constructive part in the process of accommodation and consensus building. Rosenau claimed domestic actors tend to get involved in, but it certainly contributed to the clarification of positions and viewpoints. The aggressive posture of the two newspapers vis-a-vis each other clearly indicated that when a distribution of resources is at stake, as it is in the area of federal-provincial fiscal relations, newspapers tend to adopt a hostile attitude regarding other actors making a claim on the limited resources available. They engage in a ruthless competition for scarce resources, and do it by trying to discredit the demands of other national actors, in this case other provinces.

Of additional interest is the total absence of any actors other than the provinces and the newspapers discussed above. Not a single pressure group spokesman or independent constitutional

or fiscal expert was ever mentioned or quoted in either of the three newspapers. The dialogue took place exclusively among the ten provinces and the three newspapers, with any other views clearly considered irrelevant or superfluous. The process of accommodation thus invites the participation of those actors only who have a very direct stake in the resolution of the issue. In this case these actors are overwhelmingly the provinces, and no third parties are allowed to interfere with their dialogue.

The results are considerably different in the foreign area. By comparison with the extensive frequency of editorial references to national actors, such as the provinces, in the domestic field, only 15% of the Globe and Mail's foreign editorials had parallel references. They all consisted of mentioning the views of impersonal critics or prominent columnists and speakers:

When Dr. Norman A. MacKenzie, President of the University of British Columbia, warned his students this week that in Defence matters Canada was becoming "a Northern projection of the United States", he put his finger on the one of the most difficult and dangerous problems confronting the Dominion today. (GM, 3.10.58)

For the second time in a few weeks Mr. George Hogan, national vice-president of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, has blown a fresh wind into politics by expressing a personal and challenging opinion....This is what makes Mr. Hogan's idea of a free vote attractive. (GM, 1.12.62)

Amateur strategist may argue that the military experts are wrong but they cannot carry much conviction....Moralists may moralize, but they offer no security. (GM, 2.2.63)

In a series of three articles...Mr. John Gellner has made an interesting attempt to outline a rational defence policy for Canada. It appears, however, that Mr. Gellner has based his ideas upon a false premise. (GM, 16.2.63)

The Montreal Star had references to other national actors in only 6% of its editorials, and they were references approbative or critical of prominent academicians and special interest groups:

In the current issue of the Canadian Forum James Eayrs discusses the Arrow in a thoughtful article....Mr. Eayrs takes a very dim view of the Arrow project and he spells out quite a case against it. (MS, 24.9.58)

A more valuable suggestion, although by no means new, is the one by Lionel Chevrier that the Government convince Americans they should also buy the Arrow. (MS, 3.12.58)

...the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Voice of Women...are pacifists; their views command the respect to which their courage entitles them....The pacifists reject every program of defence, nuclear or not - a position which relatively few Canadians accept. (MS, 25.1.63)

The Winnipeg Free Press also had references to other national actors in only 6% of its editorials (two references altogether) and they both referred to statements made by the Toronto Globe and Mail:

The Globe and Mail of Toronto, one of the leading Conservative newspapers in the country, excoriates Mr. Pearkes for making an important announcement of defence policy in the form of an "improvised postscript to a casual interview"The Toronto newspaper calls for a full explanation of Mr. Pearkes's remarks....If...a newspaper which worked hard in two elections to place the Conservatives in power, has no confidence in the Government's defence policy and doubts, indeed, that it has a defence policy. (WFP, 30.7.59)

The vital issue, as the Toronto Globe and Mail, a supporter of the government, rightly says, is whether Canada should become a full-fledged nuclear power. (WFP, 5.9.61)

The foreign area offers a small variety of miscellaneous references to prominent individuals and groups, whose views seem to be used more as an editorial decoration or a point of interest to the reader than source of ideas to be used in the resolution of

issues. The frequencies of references, by comparison with the domestic ones, are so small, that it is difficult to generalize, but it is evident that none of the hot exchanges of views evident in the domestic area can be seen in the foreign area.

The Pearson era lends further credence to this finding. The discrepancy in the frequency of editorial references between the domestic and the foreign area was just as pronounced. In all cases domestic references outnumbered foreign references by a ratio of 3 to 1 or more. The Globe and Mail had references to other national actors in the domestic field in 74% of its editorials. Most of them were references to the province of Quebec and its Premier Jean Lesage who confronted Ottawa with a series of firm fiscal demands, which the Globe thought were unfair and excessive, and tried to sabotage some federal social welfare programs:

Premier Jean Lesage of Quebec has attacked two sections of the national program proposed by the Government in Ottawa.... But he is unpleasantly arbitrary when he suggests that because Quebec Canadians do not care to participate in the plans, no Canadians should be permitted to participate.... In rejecting the hand of Ottawa Mr. Lesage appears to be spurning the hand that feeds a considerable portion of his electorate. (GM, 6.7.63)

In defence of Quebec's autonomy Mr. Lesage is therefore endeavoring to kill a program promised during the election campaign and presumably endorsed by the Canadian electorate. In that he is wrong. (GM, 13.7.63)

The parcel of demands and grievances presented by Premier Lesage runs to 48 large pages. It is militantly, sometimes passionately worded. Of all 10 provincial submissions, it calls on the Federal Government to provide the most money, make the most changes, surrender the most of its present functions. (GM, 28.11.63)

When Mr. Lesage lost the election to the Union Nationale's Daniel Johnson in June 1966, the Globe and Mail continued to criticize the new Premier for continuing the policies of his predecessor:

The most dramatic of those demands in from Premier Daniel Johnson of Quebec, who wants more than a billion dollars a year, including all the revenue from three tax fields, and a new "two nation" constitution. (GM, 15.9.66)

As this week's federal-provincial conference approaches it is discouraging that Quebec Premier Daniel Johnson should feel it necessary to perpetuate Jean Lesage's we-they philosophy in his approach to Ottawa. (GM, 24.10.66)

So preoccupied was the Globe with Quebec that its references to other provinces were few and far between:

Premier Manning's objections /to Medicare/ are understandable. The present Alberta plan is voluntary and includes commercial insurance carriers. Under the Pearson formula commercial carriers will be excluded; and as the Alberta hospital insurance plan is supported by taxation and available to all residents, the Alberta medicare plan would have to follow similar lines. (GM, 21.7.65)

Premier Duff Roblin of Manitoba...has announced that he will propose an immediate increase in old age pensions.... This is an irresponsible suggestion. (GM, 25.7.63)

It appears that the Globe and Mail took it upon itself to defend the federal government and the integrity of Confederation against the challenge of the government of Quebec. The newspaper was clearly of the opinion that Quebec's demands were unreasonable and calculated to provoke a confrontation with Ottawa and did not hesitate to say so in print. Its performance indicates that even if no distribution of limited resources is at stake but only abstract principles of federal-provincial cooperation, newspapers may get passionately involved in the resolution of issues and engage in a polemical debate with other provinces.

The Montreal Star had references to other actors in the domestic field in 74% of its editorials. Most often these were references outlining various provincial positions and demands, not ac-

accompanied by any value judgement on the part of the Star:

Mr. Robarts of Ontario regards some form of medicare as inevitable. The Maritimes are for it, though the position of the Atlantic provinces is dependent upon the size of the federal contribution. (MS, 20.7.65)

Five provinces - Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland - appear ready to cooperate / in the national medicare/. British Columbia has reservations, though it seems likely from Mr. Bennett's remarks that B.C. would join if other provinces did. Manitoba is still undecided. Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island find the federal offer inadequate and want greater per capita assistance. Only Mr. Manning appears unyielding in his opposition, but it is hard to conceive of the Alberta government staying out of a scheme which every other province had accepted. (MS, 22.7.65)

The newspaper was generally friendly to the province of Ontario and the views of its Premier John Robarts, and publicized them frequently:

In passing it may also be remarked that Premier Robarts was also right when he said he did not want to be accused of "wrecking Confederation", if Ontario decided to stay out /of the Canada Pension Plan/. (MS, 3.4.64)

Another important gain may be that Premier Robarts of Ontario, whose original views on a pension plan were not particularly impressive, may become a supporter of the revised scheme. (MS, 16.4.64)

The /Quebec/ premier's performance rates high marks....And he had great help from Mr. Robarts who, as premier of the wealthiest and most popular province in the country, carried special weight and prestige with him. (MS, 30.11.67)

There were also friendly references to other provincial premiers:

A more valid doubt was raised by Mr. Duff Roblin. The Manitoba Premier was not against Medicare, but he did feel that this country should establish a system of priorities, with education at the top of the list. (MS, 23.7.65)

A calculated effort not to provoke confrontations and to inject a note of moderation and good will is evident in the content of the Montreal Star's editorials. Its frequent and approbative references to the Premier of Ontario whose pro-Confederation outlook was

well known and generally respected indicate that the Montreal Star was anxious to bring to the attention of its readers the fact that other provinces were gradually coming around to the acceptance of this or that program, and that they are willing to cooperate and give in now and then. These references to other provinces contrasted well with the intransigent and stubborn attitude adopted by the government of the province of Quebec.

The Winnipeg Free Press had references to other actors in the domestic field in 83% of its editorials, and many of them were very critical of excessive provincial demands:

Some of the provinces, notably Ontario and Quebec, are rapidly increasing their expenditures and apparently assuming that the hard pressed federal government will pay them by withdrawing from certain tax-fields, as if Santa Claus lived in Ottawa. (WFP, 8.7.63)

...our eleven governments are trying to spend in total far more money than the taxpayers are providing. The provinces propose to cover their deficits and spend still more by getting additional money, or larger fields of revenue, from the federal government. (WFP, 15.7.63)

Premier Bennett of British Columbia for example, that bellwether of extreme English-speaking provincialism, is asking far more than Quebec has yet asked, in terms of federal money, though he insists that the federal government must balance its budget and he attacks Quebec's ambitions as dangerous. (WFP, 25.11.63)

But with time, the newspaper came to praise the spirit of compromise and cooperation that emanated from many federal-provincial meetings:

With the unimportant exception of the arch-provincialist Premier Bennett of British Columbia, all of the premiers have approached their mutual problems in a spirit of common sense and goodwill. Premiers Roblin and Robarts were particularly outstanding. Each rose above the kind of provincialism and political partisanship which could have been particularly damaging this time. (WFP, 29.11.63)

With respect of Quebec, the Winnipeg Free Press was at first friendly to its demands, but came to consider them outrageous at the end:

Until they prove otherwise, Premier Lesage of Quebec and Premier Robarts of Ontario cannot be accused of playing politics because the former rejects and the latter has not yet accepted the federal scheme. Mr. Lesage considers an independent provincial scheme essential to Quebec's autonomy....(WFP, 8.4.64)

That these demands /provincial demands for more revenues/ have not ended is clear from Quebec's brief to this week's conference, which says that within the next five years the province wants all personal income tax raised in the province. This demand is, of course, outrageous, and its implementation could, despite Premier Johnson's denials, lead to the destruction of Canada as a nation. (WFP, 15.9.66)

The Winnipeg Free Press was concerned also with the threat to Confederation posed by the province of Quebec as well as excessive provincial demands in general. It attempted to discredit those who made unreasonable demands and praise those who rose above their provincialism and attempted to take into account the interest of the country as a whole. Thus, a concern with the state of Confederation underlines the performance of all the three newspapers. Each one approached the difficult issue in a slightly different manner: the Globe and Mail by being very critical of the province of Quebec and its destructive behaviour, the Montreal Star by singling out and praising those provinces which adopted a moderate pro-federal attitude and were willing to compromise for the sake of the country as a whole, and the Winnipeg Free Press by criticising all excessive provincial demands, not only Quebec's, and by praising the spirit of compromise and cooperation whenever it could be found in provincial performances.

In contrast to the Diefenbaker period, this time all three newspapers had some references to actors other than the provinces. The Globe and Mail for example briefly referred to the medical profession and commercial health insurance companies which, it hoped, would approve of Medicare (GM, 21.7.65). It also quoted with approval the anti-separatist views of the editor of Le Devoir Claude Ryan, and condemned the separatist sentiments of Renaude Lapointe of La Presse (GM, 19.9.66). It referred to Claude Ryan again a year later when it quoted his criticism of the separatist views expressed at the meeting of the Estates General of French Canada (GM, 28.11.67).

The Montreal Star also referred to the medical profession, once by criticizing the Canadian Medical Association for its objections to Medicare (MS, 23.7.65), and by quoting estimates of increased cost of medical services prepared by the Association of Medical Colleges (MS, 24.9.65). It also had two references to journalistic opinions, blasting a Vancouver writer for his anti-Quebec views, (MS, 11.3.64) and quoting some thoughts on the French Fact prepared by its own correspondent in Ottawa W.A. Wilson (MS, 28.11.67).

Finally, the Winnipeg Free Press quoted Mr. Graham Towers, former Governor of the Bank of Canada, regarding the fiscal viability of the Pension Plan (WFP, 21.4.64), journalist Bruce Hutchinson regarding the state of hostilities between the provinces and the federal government (WFP, 21.10.64), and an article in the Canadian Tax Foundation Journal which documented a shift of funds from private to public sector of the Canadian economy (WFP, 21.7.65).

All the references were uniformly brief and used basically as anecdotes, with which the views and demands of the provinces could be compared or contrasted. The low incidences of references to actors other than the provinces and the anecdotal character of these references suggest that the newspapers regarded the provinces to be the principal actors in the federal-provincial fiscal game and devoted their almost total attention to their views, to the detriment of other actors.

Although the domestic frequencies under Mr. Pearson were very much the same as the domestic frequencies under Mr. Diefenbaker, the content of the editorials and the types of references to other provinces were very much different. During Mr. Diefenbaker's time, the basic restructuring of federal-provincial finances attempted by the Conservative Prime Ministers thrust the newspapers, or at least two of the, in a position of defenders of their own provinces, and forced them to adopt ethnocentric stands and engage in a vicious competition for scarce natural resources. The third newspaper, the Montreal Star, found itself paralyzed by indecision due to the hostile state of relations between the Government of Quebec and Ottawa. During Mr. Pearson's time in office, the fierce competition was nowhere to be seen as the domestic issues prominent at the time were not of the variety which demanded a fierce competition. Instead, general principles of federal-provincial cooperation were at stake, particularly the limit to which provinces could be legitimately expected to go to challenge the jurisdiction of the federal government. Other issues were the major national welfare programs, such as Medicare and

the Canada Pension Plan, and these did not involve the distribution of a fixed sum of money among the provinces. As a result, instead of bickering among themselves for scarce resources the three newspapers found themselves tackling the issue of how much strength should the federal government have vis-a-vis the provinces and what should be the limit to provincial demands vis-a-vis Ottawa. It was evident that all three were in favor of preserving a viable federal government and were ready to condemn those provinces who refused to approach the matter of federal-provincial powers in a spirit of co-operation and moderation.

The foreign frequencies under Mr. Pearson were considerably lower than the domestic frequencies. Globe and Mail had references to other national actors in only 13% of its editorials. A few of them were references to journalists:

The logic of this procedure was well illustrated in a recent article by our London correspondent Mr. Robert DuffyMr. Duffy suggested that the consideration of Canada's position in NATO should weigh heavily in Canada's decision on whether or not to take part in the multilateral force. (GM, 24.10.63)

On Monday, however, a group of reporters sent out by the Globe and Mail proved in their stories...that quite a few facts /about the progress of unification/ were obtainable, and that the situation did not seem to be so deplorable as admirals...had made it appear. (GM, 3.8.66)

As the controversy regarding the progress of the unification of the armed forces flared up, the Globe and Mail quoted the views of several military experts:

Admiral Landymore, whether his cause is just or misguided, obviously believes in fighting the issue of armed forces on its merit as he sees them. (GM, 16.8.66)

Vice Admiral Herbert Rayner went further: he said Mr. Hellyer had promised the armed forces would not be integrated until command integration was fully effective, and had broken faith. (GM, 1.4.67)

19% of the Montreal Star's editorials had references to other actors, who were a federal judge, some disgruntled army men as well as nameless opponents of official policy:

Mr. Justice J. T. Thorson, who is president of both the Exchequer Court of Canada and the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament says criticism of his public statements...is "ill-founded." This may or may not be so but his speech to a C.N.D.-sponsored meeting in Toronto at the weekend is open to criticism on a quite different ground: it stirred up the mud around the question which was just beginning to assume the first traces of clarity in the public mind. (MS, 28.5.63)

Opponents of this defence policy have so muddled the waters of public debate that many people have become confused... (MS, 4.1.64)

In all the smoke and fury engendered by ex-admirals and politicians over Canada's integrated defence policy, the central fact has been pushed out of sight....The die-hards who cite the examples of the last two world wars, and Canada's mustering of navy, army and air force, think of Canada's defending itself. (MS, 12.12.66)

20% of the Winnipeg Free Press's editorials had references to other national actors, and most of them were hostile or friendly references to several members of the military establishment who had views regarding the unification of Canadian armed forces:

Rear Admiral William Landymore showed a curiously distorted concept of the role of a commanding officer, when he undertook to speak out publicly against government policy. (WFP, 20.7.66)

The truth of the matter is that a vast majority of experienced officers, fully support a high degree on integration of the defence forces in all the various supply, support, administrative and directing facilities, but not to the level of combat units where esprit de corp would be destroyed. (WFP, 26.8.66)

Of particular interest are the views of Air Chief Marshall Frank Miller.../who/said that while unification might be the eventual result of integration, it would not at present be timely and that the orderly progress of integration of the armed forces requires more time than is being given to it. (WFP, 27.3.67)

The other two references were to prominent personalities: journalist Peter Newman whose ideas for Canada's neutrality the Winnipeg Free Press considered to be ridiculous (WFP, 1.5.67), and Conservative spokesman Dalton Camp, whose proposal for a complete reorientation of Canada's defence policy the Press judged to be contrary to the best interests of Canada. (WFP, 14.8.67)

It is evident that the foreign references to other national actors were few and far between in all three newspapers, and that content-wise they were chosen to provide an interesting point of view but had little to contribute to the successful resolution of the various NATO issues.

CONCLUSION

This chapter concerned itself with the identification of political actors who are mentioned in newspaper editorials and contribute their views to the resolution of issues. The hypothesis claimed that the domestic and the foreign area are likely to involve different actors because of the different nature of issues falling within the framework of each area. Two major groups of actors were looked for: one was the Opposition Parties/Leaders and the other one was any individual or entity whose views or actions pertaining to the issues were mentioned in the editorials. The results indicate that the Opposition Parties/Leaders are more likely to be mentioned in foreign editorials, while in domestic editorials they appear hardly at all. In the foreign area the Opposition Party/Leader might be used as a source of ideas and/or solutions, especially if the government is paralyzed by indecision and has no coherent policy to offer. If the government has a policy then the Opposition Party/Leader are more likely to be presented as spoilers, and their views and actions are criticized in such a way as to lend credence to the official policy. The differences in the content of editorial references between the Diefenbaker and the Pearson era support this finding. However, it must be pointed out that the particularly explosive nature of the nuclear arms issues under Mr. Diefenbaker and the inability of the Prime Minister to come to terms with it might have constituted a specific case which distorted the findings, which would have been different if a different foreign issue area had been chosen as a subject of investigation.

With respect to other national actors likely to be mentioned in newspaper editorials, the results clearly show that in the domestic area these are most likely to be the provinces and governments seeking to contribute their views to the resolution of federal-provincial issues. On the average seven out of ten domestic editorials contained references to the provinces. When the distribution of scarce resources was at stake these references were most likely to be hostile to those provinces which had substantial fiscal claims for themselves. In fact, a verbal war was conducted between two of the three newspapers investigated, each trying to discredit the fiscal demands of its opponent. But even when no distribution of scarce resources was at stake, editorial references to provincial viewpoints and demands regarding the principles of federal-provincial cooperation were also found to be very high. In fact the mean domestic frequency under Mr. Pearson was found to be higher than the mean domestic frequency under Mr. Diefenbaker: 77% versus 72%. These results seem to indicate that in the domestic area there is likely to be a lot of horizontal interaction, i.e. interaction among relatively equal political actors, in this case the provinces. This finding appears to confirm the hypothesis. By contrast, foreign references to other national actors were extremely infrequent - maybe one editorial in ten had one. The references were most likely to refer to a miscellany of academicians, journalists, and other public figures, who may have made a statement about a foreign issue which the newspaper found intriguing.

The low frequency of the references, as well as their vapid content, leads one to the conclusion that in the foreign area political actors other than the government or the opposition are not likely to be mentioned in newspaper editorials and are not likely to be involved editorially in the resolution of issues.

The seemingly clear cut discrepancy in the frequency of editorial references to other national actors may not be, however, as convincing as it appears. This is because the high frequency of references to the provinces participating in the resolution of the federal-provincial fiscal issues is guaranteed by the nature of the issue. Having to do with "provincial" and "federal" interaction, the issue brought in the provinces as the major and obvious actors. As a result it must be considered a very inappropriate issue to test the hypothesis about actor orientation. The choice of that issue leads one to an unrepresentative conclusion because of the distinct prominence of the provinces. Any other domestic issue would have, in all probability, produced results very different from those obtained in this study. For example, if the domestic issue chosen had something to do with national parks policy or traffic safety laws, a better cross-section of national actors would have probably found its way into the editorials. The issue of national parks policy would have probably drawn the opinions of environmentalists, tourists, travel industry spokesmen, lumber industry spokesmen, hunters, artists, and many others. No one group would have been able to monopolize the forum as well as the provinces were able to monopolize the forum on federal-provincial fiscal relations.

Their prominence, of necessity, pushed away other actors who may have had opinions on the subject, and thus distorted the overall picture of actor interaction regarding resolution of issues. The findings of this chapter, regarding the prominence of the provinces in the domestic fiscal dialogue, may be more of a comment on the state of Canadian federalism than a comment on the domestic/foreign dichotomy. The peculiar nature of the domestic issue chosen for this study thus makes it very difficult to generalize about actor orientation in domestic issues in general, and leaves the seemingly confirmed hypothesis in a rather dim light. However, it should be noted that the very importance of federal-provincial relations in this country weakens the relevance of Rosenau's model to Canada.

CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study derived its inspiration from several theoretical assumptions put forth by James N. Rosenau, who claimed that domestic and foreign issues are likely to be qualitatively different because each is unique and likely to generate motives, roles and interaction sequences different from the other. Rosenau's argument was based on the explicit assumption that the domestic and foreign can be separated and studied individually. Theoretically such a separation can be made, as indeed it was made in this thesis, where the issue of federal-provincial fiscal relations was considered domestic because it had to do with a discord over values or interests regarding the political process which takes place, generally, within the boundaries of Canada. The issue of NATO, on the other hand, was considered foreign because it had to do with a discord over values or interests regarding the political process which, generally, involved Canada in a relationship with political systems lying outside of its borders, namely other members of the NATO alliance. Empirically, however, such a dichotomy cannot be easily upheld. The research done in this thesis clearly illustrates that there is no clear cut distinction in the manner in which domestic and foreign issues are treated editorially by Canadian newspapers.

With respect to motivational intensity Rosenau claimed that foreign issues are likely to tap motives that are unfettered by cross-cutting interests and therefore undiluted in intensity, while domestic issues beget a multiplicity of affiliations, loyalties and cross-cutting interests, which curb the intensity of feelings generated by these issues. The propensity of newspapers to print editorials and to take stands on issues and the government's policy towards issues was taken

to be the indicant of motivational intensity. The first two hypotheses thus postulated that the domestic area would be likely to stimulate a lower intensity of editorial reaction than the foreign area and would result in (1) fewer instances of editorial stands on issues and (2) fewer instances of editorial stands on the government's policy towards those issues. The results obtained indicate that while generally speaking, newspapers were more likely to print an editorial regarding the foreign issue than the domestic one, they were not necessarily likely to take stands more often on foreign than domestic issues or on the government's policy towards foreign than domestic issues. The propensity to print an editorial may indeed be greater in the foreign than in the domestic area because the limitations and restrictions Rosenau saw operating in the domestic area are not present. As a result, newspapers may be able to tackle issues more freely. The data obtained for the Diefenbaker administration in particular show that when an explosive foreign issue like the one concerning the acquisition of nuclear arms arises, a great number of foreign editorials can indeed be expected to compete with relatively few domestic ones. Yet when not merely the propensity to print editorials but the propensity to take stands on issues is taken as an indicant of motivational intensity, the results are not that clear. In fact little statistical support has been obtained for the hypothesis. While the Pearson era did indeed result in a much higher frequency of foreign stands than domestic ones, the Diefenbaker era produced opposite results. The issue of nuclear arms produced no overwhelming chorus of positive or negative stands, as might have been expected, with the possible exception of the Globe and Mail. The conclusion, therefore, can be made

that although newspapers on the whole may find it easier to print a foreign editorial than a domestic one, the purpose of it is not necessarily to take a stand on the issue. In other words, newspapers might be motivated to tackle the issue but not necessarily to commit themselves to its resolution one way or another. For while in the domestic area they may feel constrained by the cross-cutting interests and affiliations, in the foreign area they may feel equally restrained by the limitations imposed by the international situation, or unwillingness to interfere with the decision making process of the federal government which has an exclusive jurisdiction in the area of foreign policy, or even timidity resulting from the awareness that many factors which go into the foreign policy making process are secret and, without knowing them, no hasty judgments ought to be made. The impact on the performance of the press of secrecy in the foreign area, as well as of powerlessness in the face of complicated foreign entanglements which often result in the lack of options to pursue, is yet to be investigated, for it no doubt plays a role in limiting the press's function.

The relative lack of motivation to take stands in the foreign area must be contrasted with the pronounced propensity of all newspapers to take domestic stands protective of the newspaper's home province. It appears that occasionally newspapers may indeed get temporarily crippled either by cross-cutting loyalties, as the Montreal Star was torn between Quebec and Ottawa during the Pearson era, or by the lack of precise information about grandiose programs and policies, as happened with Medicare and the Canada Pension Plan, also during the Pearson era. Eventually, however, they tend to throw their support behind their own province

in the scramble for fiscal resources and powers. They thus appear parochial, i.e. of limited and narrow outlook, and while in some way it is quite proper for a newspaper to be concerned mainly with the aspirations and interests of the geographical area and social milieu in which it functions, it is rather surprising to see that the defence of one's own province appears to be the main source of motivational intensity in the domestic area and in many cases outweighs any constraining influences of other cross-cutting loyalties.

Further with respect to motivational intensity, if the indicant of it is taken to be the newspapers' propensity to take stands on the federal government/Prime Minister's policy, the results obtained again fail to support the hypothesis. In fact under both administrations the incidence of domestic stands outnumbers the incidence of foreign stands. It appears that, contrary to the specifications of the hypothesis, newspapers do not feel constrained to pronounce judgment on the government's domestic policies; they do so frequently and boldly, giving vent to their parochial and partisan inclinations. Parochialism and political partisanship must be considered the most prominent intervening factors. Yet partisanship does not seem to prevent newspapers from being critical of the government's performance, as the three newspapers' assault on Mr. Diefenbaker's nuclear non-policy indicated. The Winnipeg Free Press's critical reaction to Mr. Pearson's domestic welfare policies is also an indication of this trend. The Liberal Prime Minister could, in this case, expect little support from the supposedly Liberal newspaper. Although the results point to a frequent display of partisanship, instances of editorial integrity, of criticism where criticism is needed, can also be

provided.

The propensity of newspapers to pronounce judgment more frequently on the government's domestic rather than foreign policies can be explained in terms of their parochialism. Most positive or negative comments on the government's domestic performance can be related to how that performance will affect the newspaper's own province. Parochialism, then motivates newspapers to react to the domestic issue as well as to the government's performance regarding that issue. Combined with political partisanship it confounds and offsets the differences supposedly inherent in the domestic/foreign dichotomy. In the foreign area, on the other hand, the considerations of foreign policy mentioned above might inhibit the press from passing hasty judgment on the government's policy. The question of differences in motivational intensity in the editorial treatment of domestic and foreign issues must therefore be considered inconclusive.

The same can be said about the question of motivational competence. It was assumed in the third hypothesis that, in line with Rosenau's reasoning, the press would show itself more capable of influencing the outcome of domestic situations and disputes than foreign ones, because there is an immediate stake in seeing them resolved. The domestic area would thus produce frequent instances of editorial suggestion/advice. The same competence would not be as evident regarding foreign and thus distant and unfamiliar issues. The empirical findings obtained contradict the hypothesis. They indicate that newspapers generally do not give advice too often, but if they do they are more likely to give advice in the foreign area than in the domestic area. It appears that there exists

a correlation between the ideological orientation of the newspaper vis-a-vis the government and the propensity to offer suggestion or advice. Just as the Globe and Mail, a Conservative newspaper, was more likely than the other two newspapers to offer suggestions, both domestic and foreign, during the Diefenbaker administration, so the Winnipeg Free Press, a Liberal newspaper, was most likely to offer suggestions during the Pearson administration. It seems that newspapers have a vested interest in seeing the government with which they feel an ideological affinity prosper and do well, and toward that end they offer whatever suggestion or advice they have regarding the resolution of issues. All newspapers also feel competent to offer domestic suggestion or advice which would benefit their own province. Thus parochialism and political partisanship again appear to be the most salient intervening factors. There is little evidence to suggest that newspapers feel uncomfortable with foreign issues because they do not know them and do not understand them. While reluctant to take stands and express judgments, they obviously feel quite free to offer suggestions regarding how these issues should be resolved. The finding demonstrates that consciously or subconsciously the newspapers differentiate between taking a stand and giving advice. While both behaviours would seem to flow from the same motivation, in fact, they do not. It is one thing to take a stand, i.e. to express judgment, of someone else's policy or an issue, but it is quite another to offer a creative suggestion on how the policy or the issue should be resolved. The former is more prevalent in the domestic field where judgment is frequent but suggestions sparse, the latter in the foreign field where there is no need to defend one's own province and one is more free to offer sugges-

tions and solutions. The lack of domestic constraints and the fact that the ultimate responsibility for foreign policy decisions rests with the federal government seem to leave the press more free to dispense advice in the foreign field.

With respect to the direction of interaction through which issues are sustained or resolved, Rosenau claimed that domestic issues, whose resolution depends on bargaining and coalition, are more likely to be resolved through horizontal interaction, i.e. interaction among relatively equal actors, while foreign issues, which are the responsibility of a few top officials in the government, will likely involve vertical interaction, i.e. be directed towards the government. The fourth hypothesis thus postulated that the domestic area would produce more references to various national actors taking part in the debate of issues, while the foreign area would produce more references to the federal Opposition Party or its Leader. The data obtained indicate that while on the whole references to Opposition Party/Leader were few and far between, they were far more numerous in the foreign than in the domestic area, in which they were practically nil. During Mr. Diefenbaker's administration the foreign area was full of references to the Opposition Party/Leader, who were used as a weapon to give credence to the course of action pursued by the government, or as an alternative point of view to be considered if the one propagated by the government was non-existent or considered unacceptable. The specific use that was made of the Opposition Liberals depended on the newspaper's ideological disposition vis-a-vis the government. The Globe and Mail, a Conservative newspaper, used the Liberals to point out how difficult they made life for Mr. Diefenbaker,

and although it criticized the Prime Minister for his nuclear confusion it was reluctant to support Mr. Pearson on this issue. The Montreal Star and the Winnipeg Free Press used Mr. Pearson's NATO ideas as an alternative policy, preferable to that of the Prime Minister. The three newspapers' ideological partisanship shone through luminously, unhampered by provincial considerations of financial gain or loss which did not apply here.

During Mr. Pearson's administration similar results were obtained. Domestic references to the federal Opposition Party/Leader were practically nill, while foreign references were more numerous, and almost all critical of the Opposition Conservatives and their Leader Diefenbaker. Even the Conservative Globe and Mail joined in the chorus. Mr. Diefenbaker was presented as a bitter old man desperately trying to sabotage the government's policy.

Generally speaking then, it can be said that the Opposition Party/Leader are not perceived by the press to play a very creative role in either the domestic or the foreign area. In the domestic area they are considered irrelevant because they are not involved in the bargaining which takes place between the federal government and the provinces. In the foreign area, if the government is in a state of confusion or indecision, newspapers ideologically hostile to that government may seize the opportunity to display allegiance to the Opposition Party, which is presented as an alternative source of ideas. But when the government is pursuing a policy, the views of the Opposition Party/Leader may be mentioned in editorials once in a while, but not in any constructive way. This may have something to do with the function of the Opposition Party

in the parliamentary system of government. It is a thankless task which involves mostly criticizing what the government is saying and doing and allows the Opposition little chance to present an alternative policy and to get publicity for that policy.

With respect to references to other national actors, the statistical results are reversed: the domestic references far outnumber the foreign ones. In the foreign area an occasional professor or a pressure group spokesman made a contribution to the debate by having their views printed in an editorial in the form of an interesting interjection with which the newspaper's own views could be contrasted. In the domestic area, on the other hand, the actors were overwhelmingly the other provinces, who had a vested interest in the resolution of federal-provincial issues, and therefore their views and demands were often quoted in editorials. Generally these references were critical of the demands of provinces other than the newspaper's home province, and defended the aspirations and demands of the home province. The only exception was the Montreal Star, which could not very well take the side of the government of Quebec because that government was then waging a war on Ottawa and even threatened to leave Confederation. Thus the nature of the issue, i.e. the fact that it involved the distribution of powers and resources rather than simply the fact that it was a domestic issue, has decreed the behaviour of the newspapers to be arrogant, competitive and intransigent. The nature of the issue also makes the conclusion very tentative.

In summary it can be stated that Rosenau's assertions have not been confirmed by this study, as, on the whole, no consistent pattern of differences between domestic and foreign issues has emerged. Rosenau's explanations for the dichotomy remain in a dim light as well. Generally, his explanations focused on the potency of such factors as cross-cutting affiliations, loyalties and interests which are supposed to be present in the domestic but not the foreign area, the immediacy of the familiarity with issues and the ability to influence their outcome which are to stimulate different levels of participation in the domestic and the foreign area, and the necessity to interact with certain actors but not with others in the domestic and the foreign area. Although some of these factors do indeed affect the two areas in a different way, they do not produce a convincing differentiation between the two types of issues. Very often other factors appear to be of paramount importance. Political partisanship and parochialism have already been mentioned and constitute the two most potent intervening factors. Parochialism, in particular, acts as a powerful motivational force. One might hypothesize for future studies that it is parochialism which is the operative factor in stimulating motivation, especially in the domestic field. It tends to focus the affiliation and loyalty of newspapers on their own backyard, and their goal of defending that backyard is not very likely to be confounded by other cross-cutting interests and pressures. Having taken care of their home province, newspapers then focus their affiliation and loyalty on the government with which they feel an ideological affinity, and which they may therefore, want to assist in the resolution of issues. An empirical investigation of press partisanship, exploring

such phenomena as the creative role that the press may play in the policy making process by offering suggestions and advice, with controls for the political orientation of the government in power and the political orientation of the newspaper, would very likely bear this out.

Another direction for future empirical studies to follow is to test newspaper performance regarding different types of issues. The issues selected for this study may have unique characteristics, other than being domestic and foreign, which are likely to confound the hypotheses. The issue of federal-provincial fiscal relations can be classified, for example, as a distributive or redistributive issue, because it deals with the allocation of resources and powers to various groups in society, in this case the different provinces.¹ In a pluralistic society like Canada, where groups are encouraged to participate in the never ending competition for resources, a distributive issue may generate a certain set of behaviour patterns that a different issue might not engender. For example, if the domestic issue chosen had been one of the emotive-symbolic or regulatory type, like the adoption of a new flag for Canada or the reduction of speed limit on highways to 50 mph, the results might have been different. The issue of NATO is mostly emotive-symbolic for it deals with foreign loyalties of Canadians, political symbols and concepts of right and wrong in foreign policy. It brings no direct material advantages or disadvantages to Canadians. Again, if the foreign issue chosen had been a different one, for example the sale of grain to foreign customers, which would involve Canadian farmers in a direct way, the results might have been different.

In addition to differentiating among issues one can also

differentiate between countries. Rosenau's assertions spring from his experience in the American political system, which is somewhat different from the Canadian one. Canadian history and governmental process, as well as Canadian intentions, are unlike those of the United States. The specific nature of Canadian federalism is a good example. While the federal structure in the U.S. is not a matter of discussion, Canadian federalism by comparison has been confused and chaotic, with differentiation in powers and fiscal responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments being imprecise and often resolved by ad hoc negotiations. This was particularly true of the time period under investigation, 1957-67. It may be that the tentativeness of the federal structure in Canada makes provincial loyalties more pronounced than would otherwise be expected. In the American political environment, where the nature of the division of powers between the two levels of government is less questioned, the results might have been different.

Furthermore, the process of policy making in Canada and the United States follows two different paths. In the United States, the Congressional committee system results in a constant search for consensus. All Congressional committees, but standing committees in particular, are extremely powerful because they can author, modify or pigeonhole any and all legislative proposals. Their chairmen, who are chosen by the rule of seniority, exercise enormous policy making powers. In Canada, committees generally do not consider the principal substance of legislation, but only the detailed provisions of a bill. They, unlike Congressional committees, are not the initiators of legislation. Virtually all initiation is done by the executive, which also generally

controls the behavior of committee members. As a result the federal executive in Canada is in a different position vis-a-vis the provinces as well as other actors participating in the resolution of issues, than the federal executive in the United States. The entire process of policy making is different, which implies that the pattern of affiliations and loyalties as well as the direction of actor orientation may be different too.

Thirdly, the United States is a world power and Canada is not. From this difference in status flow implications reaching particularly to the foreign field. The Americans have a set of international obligations, priorities and commitments which may elicit different motivations and patterns of interaction from those in Canada. The controversy surrounding the acquisition of nuclear arms for Canadian armed forces in NATO had no counterpart in the United States where nuclear arms were made an integral part of the military arsenal quickly and with little controversy.

The research design of this thesis departed from Rosenau's design by choosing the press as the main actor. The specific object of Rosenau's hypotheses were two groups of political actors: (1) government officials and organizations, and (2) private citizens and groups. The claim was that these two groups might respond differently to domestic and foreign issues because of certain unique characteristics of each group. With respect to motivational intensity, Rosenau expected private actors to exhibit a high degree of intensity regarding foreign but not domestic issues, while officialdom was expected to respond with equally low intensity to both types of issues, because officials are

conditioned to approach every type of issue in a similarly casual and businesslike way. With respect to motivational competence the public would feel more competent to deal with domestic and familiar issues than with foreign and distant issues, while officialdom would once again display an equal level of competence with both issues. The actor orientation would elicit identical responses from the public and the government officials.

The object of this study was the press, which was defined as an identifiable group of actors, acting in a professional capacity. If Rosenau's assertions for the public and the officials are sound - and they have not been empirically tested - the data obtained in this thesis seem to place the press closer to the officialdom, because it exhibited little difference in motivational intensity or competence between the domestic and the foreign issue. This finding, however, is not of great importance because we do not know that the officialdom does indeed behave that way. In fact, officials are human beings and circumstantial evidence does exist to support the proposition that they bring to their jobs a multiplicity of affiliations and loyalties, which influence their performance. J. Edgar Hoover, the late director of the American FBI, for example, had a particular dislike for communist and negro civil rights workers and directed the Bureau's investigative efforts against these, rather than other people.²

Of more importance are the findings related to press performance substantiated in this thesis. Its provincialism and parochialism in particular mean that as far as the domestic policy making process is concerned the press polarizes the country and acts as an opposition to

the federal government. The often heard accusation that the press has failed to promote the cause of national unity and explain the French point of view to English Canadians, and the English point of view to Quebecers may be quite accurate. The finding also seems to confirm the often lamented absence of a Canadian national newspaper. This study clearly shows that Canada has provincial newspapers propagating provincial viewpoints. It also shows that political partisanship has not disappeared from the pages of Canadian newspapers. Partisanship is more subtle than it used to be half a century ago, and it manifests itself in different ways, but it does exist, and is more likely to be found in the creative attempts of the press to contribute to the problem-solving dilemmas of an ideologically compatible government. Such creative attempts are more pronounced in the foreign than the domestic field, which means that Canadians are not very well served by the press with respect to the solution of their internal problems and that the government cannot depend on the performance of the press to find imaginative approaches to the domestic issues before it.

But then it may be that the domestic/foreign dichotomy is of no consequence anyway. In fact one of the insights of this study is how the dichotomy can get easily blurred in the performance of the newspapers. The domestic issue under investigation was clearly "domestic" in that it involved no foreign considerations or influences. But the same cannot be said about the foreign issue, which begot a long range of domestic implications. This phenomenon was particularly evident in the issue of atomic weapons. The truly "foreign" NATO issues, such as

what type of warheads would Canadian air force divisions stationed in Germany carry, or whether Canadian NATO staff should move out of France, caused little involvement. It was the "domestic" aspects of the "foreign" issue that stirred the real controversy. These were whether nuclear warheads should be stationed on Canadian, and thus "domestic" soil, what dangers would they pose for Canadians, should American NORAD personnel be charged with the maintenance of these warheads and displace the Canadiana military, and similar questions. In fact, in many instances, the foreign issue of NATO became so domestic it was difficult to see its foreign aspects altogether. This suggests that foreign issues may acquire a domestic status and may be treated as if they were domestic issues.

The finding lies at the heart of the problem posed by Rosenau. His contribution to the study of political science is a genuine one, in that he did make assertions which provide a framework for analysis, by suggesting how to organize the material, how to categorize it and how to go about testing it. The assertions do make the two areas, the domestic and the foreign one, comparable. They focus on a dichotomy long established in the field of political science and often taken for granted. But the shortcomings of Rosenau's thinking become obvious when empirical testing begins. For one thing the two areas of study turn out not to be mutually exclusive. Foreign issues, such as NATO/NORAD, tend to acquire a domestic status, and it is reasonable to assume that a different domestic issues would have probably acquired a foreign status. For example, if Canada's agricultural policy had been taken as a specimen of the domestic issue it would have arched over to such

foreign considerations as the sale of Canadian wheat to the Soviet Union and China, the export of Canadian beef to the United States, and the like. The difficulty involved in the operationalization of the domestic and the foreign is thus obvious.

Furthermore, the various hypotheses tested produce no confirmation for the existence of different motives, roles and interaction sequences in the domestic and the foreign field. The basic finding is that the dichotomy is not operative because Rosenau's explanations can operate in a diversity of directions, and do not account adequately for the behaviours which occur. This finding combined with the impossibility of separating the domestic and the foreign, and in particular of separating the domestic aspect of foreign issues, leads to the conclusion that the thesis provides no grounds to believe in the existence of the domestic/foreign dichotomy. It must have been quite an experience for Rosenau to see his country get involved in a very foreign war in South East Asia, which became such a domestic issue that it nearly tore the country apart. The research thus points to the fluidity of the domestic/foreign dichotomy, and the difficulties inherent in theorizing without adequate empirical support. Rosenau's suggestions of the differences do not stand the test of empirical investigation.

In fairness to Rosenau one must remember the tentative status of his suggestions and his claim, a correct one, that no work has been done regarding the domestic and the foreign dichotomy in political science. Rosenau did pose a problem and suggest ways how to go about dealing with it, by delineating factors which might separate the domestic from the foreign. He produced a string of testable generalizations

regarding actor responses to domestic and foreign issues. But his explanations have not been found adequate.

In the first chapter of this thesis it was noted that the partial abandonment of the domestic/foreign dichotomy in political science came about only recently, and not as a result of empirical studies which proved this dichotomy to be untenable, but as a result of changes in the international political system, and as a result of analytical innovations in the field of political science. This study seems to confirm the correctness of this approach. In a complicated world of today it may indeed be difficult to divorce the domestic from the foreign. Furthermore, it may be that the dichotomy is indeed analytically doubtful and generally unnecessary. The physical boundary delineating one state from the outside world may not correspond to the real division between the domestic and the foreign. Rosenau himself was well aware of this proposition when he introduced the concepts of domestic sources of foreign policy and the convergence of national and international systems. Viewing issues from the perspective of one state and seeing everything which occurs outside its borders as foreign may be a short-sighted way of looking at things. As has already been mentioned, even a major and once isolationist power like the United States has had its domestic policies increasingly influenced by foreign considerations. In the case of Canada, once a dominion in the British Empire and now the much less populous neighbour of the United States, domestic politics has until only very recently, always been closely linked to first Imperial and then American considerations.

Different findings in this thesis would have isolated the

Vietnamese experience of the United States as an idiosyncratic situation. But this is not the case. This thesis shows that the scepticism often voiced about the theoretical value of treating foreign policy processes as analytically distinctive is quite valid. Foreign policy issues do not seem to constitute an area with clear cut boundaries and distinguishable characteristics. This thesis supports the efforts of those researchers who attempt to minimize the dichotomy as an analytical tool and look elsewhere for explanations of the political behavior of man.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Bruce Doern and Peter Aucoin, eds., The Structure of Policy Making in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1971)
2. See for example Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Thomas Allen and Sons, 1978).

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